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Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by
men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who
leads that gains the victory.
-George S. Patton, Jr.'
INTRODUCTION
Most contemporary policy discussions about sexual
equality in almost any sphere proceed from the assumption,
whether implicit or explicit, that there is one human
psychology-or "human nature"-that is shared by both
sexes. We should expect, the argument goes, that absent
discrimination or arbitrary social practices, the sexes would
sort themselves in just the same way throughout society
according to their identical talents, interests, and
temperaments.! The findings of modem evolutionary
1. VICTOR D. HANSON, THE SOUL OF BATTLE: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE
PRESENT DAY, How THREE GREAT LIBERATORS VANQUISHED TYRANNY 273 (1999).
2. Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, for example, has described her vision of a
just society:
In this world of the future men and women would fully share political
and financial power; no one would be unable-in the midst of great
wealth-to feed and clothe their children adequately. Men and women
would be represented equally, according to their equal abilities, in all
walks of life.
ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT
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psychology call that assumption into question. In important
ways, there are two "human natures," a male nature and a
female nature,' a fact with substantial implications for
public policy and the world of work,4 as well as the world of
war.
The assumption that humans possess a sexually
monomorphic mind is pervasive in the social sciences and
the public-policy literature that relies on those disciplines.'
This social-science dogma stands in contrast to the
common-sense intuition of the untutored that there is a
fundamental difference between male and female. Recent
scholarship in psychology, biology, and anthropology has
cast substantial doubt on the view of the intellectual
establishment and confirmed the understanding of the
"man on the street" that the psychologies of the two sexes
differ in important ways. One might invert George Orwell's
dictum that there are some ideas so preposterous that only
an intellectual could believe them and observe that there
are some ideas so obvious that only an intellectual could
deny them.
One policy area in which the assumption of identity of
the sexes is particularly significant involves the question of
whether women should participate in combat and close
combat support.6 To date, the argument in favor of
WOMEN AND MEN 11-12 (2d ed. 1992).
3. See generally DAVID C. GEARY, MALE, FEMALE: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
SEX DIFFERENCES (1998).
4. See generally KINGSLEY BROWNE, DIVIDED LABOURS: AN EVOLUTIONARY
VIEW OF WOMEN AT WORK (1998) [hereinafter BROWNE, DIVIDED LABOURS];
Kingsley R. Browne, An Evolutionary Account of Women's Workplace Status, 19
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 427 (1998) [hereinafter Browne, An
Evolutionary Account]; Kingsley R. Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on
Sexual Harassment: Seeking Roots in Biology Rather than Ideology, 8 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5 (1997) [hereinafter Browne, An Evolutionary
Perspective on Sexual Harassment]; Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament
in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap,
37 ARiz. L. REV. 971 (1995) [hereinafter Browne, Sex and Temperament];
Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of
Biological Sex Differences, 38 Sw. L.J. 617 (1984).
5. See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Evolutionary Psychology and the
Generation of Culture, Part I, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 29 (1989)
(criticizing the assumption of the monomorphic mind).
6. Compare LINDA BIRD FRANCEE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE
MILITARY (1997) (arguing for an expanded role for women in the military) with
BRIAN MITCHELL, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: FLIRTING WITH DISASTER (1998)
(arguing for exclusion of women from virtually all positions in the military other
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including women in such positions has proceeded under
three fundamental assumptions: (1) that warfare in this
modern age is fundamentally different from the warfare
experienced by our fathers and our more distant ancestors;
thus prior experience is no guide to future conduct; (2) that
men and women are essentially identical in combat-
relevant ways, other than (most would agree) in physical
strength, a trait they view as largely irrelevant; thus, men
and women are for the most part interchangeable in
military positions; and (3) that the primary impediments to
integration of women are male "attitudes" operating at a
cognitive level; thus, only the lack of proper leadership
stands in the way of overcoming this "ideology of
masculinism."
All three of these assumptions are subject to serious
question and have led to an under-appreciation of the costs
and difficulty of sexual integration. The first assumption-
that the nature of warfare has changed so much that the
long-standing exclusion of women from combat is no longer
justified-is based upon a misunderstanding of modern
warfare, a misunderstanding made considerably more acute
by the lopsided experience of the allies in the Gulf War and
the even more lopsided NATO air assault against the
Serbs.8 Yet the business of warfare is still killing and
risking being killed, often at short ranges. Many combat
tasks, even in this technological age, have not changed that
much from earlier times, and many continue to require
physical strength, a trait that virtually everyone agrees is
differentially distributed between the sexes.
The second assumption-that men and women are
essentially identical in combat-relevant traits other than
physical strength-overlooks a vast literature on
temperamental and cognitive sex differences. Traits that
than medical ones).
7. JAMES F. DUNNIGAN, HOW TO MAKE WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
MODERN WARFARE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 37 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that
"[t]he coalition troops soon realized that they had achieved a rarely realized
dream: a defender who didn't want to fight"); id. at 482 (noting that, for the first
time in this century, the war resulted in more noncombat than combat
casualties).
8. See Craig R. Whitney, Air Wars Won't Stay Risk Free, General Says, N.Y.
TZIES, June 18, 1999, at A22.
9. For a description of the physical and physiological differences between
men and women related to physical capacity, see M. O'Brien, Women and Sport,
16 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 25 (1985).
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are important to combat personnel include physical
aggressiveness; willingness to kill strangers; willingness to
expose oneself to physical risk; and cognitive skills, such as
the three-dimensional spatial ability that is so critical to
the "situational awareness" of fighter pilots. The questions
raised by sex differences in these attributes are primarily
whether they can be efficiently tested in advance of actual
combat and whether there is enough overlap between the
sexes to warrant considering women as well as men for
combat positions.
The third assumption-that all it will take to integrate
women into combat roles is educating men out of their
ideology of masculinism-overlooks the possibility of
predispositions rooted deep in the psyches of both males
and females that may stand as an obstacle to integration.
Thus, even though some women as individuals possess as
much strength, aggressiveness, and inclination to take risks
as many men, there may still be reasons for excluding them
from combat service. The relevant issue is "femaleness qua
femaleness" rather than the individualized attributes of the
women in question. Some of the questions that must be
answered are whether men have an innate predisposition to
resist introduction of women into certain all-male groups;
whether introduction of women will disrupt cohesion by
creating competition among men for the attentions of
women; whether introduction of women will impair
effectiveness by causing men to be overprotective of women;
whether women can elicit following behavior in men to the
same extent that other men can; and whether introduction
of women will diminish the willingness of men to risk their
lives and make the military'less attractive to potential male
"warriors." These questions involve not the capacity of
women as individuals to be soldiers but rather the social
dynamic that results from mixing men and women under
what are often very trying conditions. This set of issues is
more difficult to analyze than the former, because it is
generally easier to measure traits of individuals than it is
to measure social interactions between them.
The primary purpose of this article is to examine these
three assumptions and provide some much-needed balance
to the legal literature on the subject of women in combat."
10. Most of the legal literature advocates inclusion of women in combat as a
matter of policy, fairness, or constitutional imperative, usually giving short
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Is it really true that warfare has changed so much as to
reverse the almost unanimous conclusion of human history
that defense of the community and external projections of
force should rest with men? The notion that modern
warfare differs dramatically from warfare in the past tends
to encourage the belief that the function of the military
differs little from the civilian sector and, therefore, that
integration of women into combat units should be no more
difficult than their integration into the professions." Are
men and women equivalent in all combat-relevant ways
other than physical strength? Or do stereotypic views about
males' greater aggressiveness, risk-taking, and the like rest
on a scientifically supported foundation? Further, will
sexually integrated combat groups function the same as, or
at least as well as, all-male groups, without regard to the
individual characteristics of the women involved? Or is
there something special about the character of all-male
groups organized for violent purposes? A consideration of
these questions may lead to a new understanding of the
costs of sexual integration.
Acceptance of the existence of biological sex differences
does not necessarily mandate any particular policy
response, especially in the absence of an identified policy
goal. The reader could accept all of the factual assertions
contained in this article and still conclude that complete
sexual integration of the military is the appropriate course,
whether or not inclusion of women diminishes military
readiness. However, an underlying assumption (or bias)
shrift to possible costs, whether economic costs or reductions of military
readiness. See, e.g., D'Ann Campbell, Combating the Gender Gulf, 2 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 63 (1992); Michael J. Frevola, Damn the Torpedoes, Full
Speed Ahead: The Argument for Total Sex Integration in the Armed Services, 28
CONN. L. REV. 621 (1996); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991); Lori S.
Kornblum, Women Warriors in a Men's World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 LAW &
INEQ. 351, 383 (1984); James D. Milko, Beyond the Persian Gulf Crisis:
Expanding the Role of Servicewomen in the United States Military, 41 AMI. U. L.
REV. 1301 (1992); Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military
Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 751 (1996); Robin Rogers, Note, A Proposal for
Combating Sexual Discrimination in the Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78
CAL. L. REv. 165 (1990).
11. See Elisabetta Addis, Women and the Economic Consequences of Being a
Soldier, in WOMEN SOLDIERS: IMAGES AND REALITIES 3, 17 (Elisabetta Addis et
al. eds., 1994) (stating that it is difficult "to pinpoint why it is that the army is
more male than the university").
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contained herein is that military effectiveness is the
touchstone of military manpower policy. While that may not
be everyone's view, it is probably the only view that is
politically acceptable today. That is, it seems unlikely that
anyone could be successful in the political process by
arguing that even though inclusion of women would
measurably decrease military readiness, the reduction in
readiness is justified by reference to some other policy goal,
such as sexual equality. Moreover, given the deference
shown by the courts to the political branches in matters of
national defense, it seems equally unlikely that anyone
could succeed with such an argument in the courts.
I. POLICIES REGARDING WOMEN IN COMBAT SHOULD BE
SUBJECTED TO A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A. Current Policy
The role of women in the United States military greatly
expanded as a result of the creation of the All Volunteer
Force and the abolition of the draft in the early 1970s. Not
surprisingly, in the aftermath of the unpopular Vietnam
War and hostility to the draft, the military encountered
difficulties finding enough quality male recruits. The
services made up for the shortfall by increasing the number
of women. Until the early 1990s, however, women were
excluded from combat positions and from support positions
where the risk of exposure to combat was as great as that
faced by combat units." Under current policy, however,
women have been admitted to most combat specialties,
primarily as a result of changes made in the early years of
the Clinton Administration. ' The primary exception is
"direct ground combat," which is defined as:
engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served
weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high
12. See Mady Wechsler Segal & David R. Segal, Social Change and the
Participation of Women in the American Military, 5 RES. SOC. MOVEMiENTS 235,
250 (1983).
13. MARGARET C. HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, RAND's NATIONAL DEFENSE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY WOMEN: EFFECTS UPON
READINESS, COHESION, AND MORALE 2 (1997). For a thorough review of the
history of women's service in the military, see JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (rev. ed. 1992).
14. See HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 2-4.
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probability of direct physical contact with hostile force's personnel.
Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield
while locating and closing5with the enemy to defeat them by fire,
maneuver, or shock effect.
Each service has attempted to formulate its policy in
light of this definition, and overall more than a quarter of a
million positions were opened to women. Today, over 80% of
all jobs in the services are open to women,6 and women
comprise approximately 14% of the armed services. 7
In the Air Force, prior to the changes, women were
already eligible for approximately 97% of all positions, the
conspicuous exceptions being flying fighters, bombers, and
special operations aircraft in combat. Today, women are
eligible for over 99% of all positions and are excluded only
from positions in which they would be deployed with ground
troops. 8
Given that the primary function of the Army is to
engage in ground combat, numerous Army combat
specialties remain closed to women. They include infantry,
armor, artillery, and special forces (all at battalion level
and below), the Ranger Regiment, ground cavalry
squadrons, forward air defense batteries, combat engineer
line companies, and ground surveillance radar platoons.
9
Eighty-three percent of military occupational specialties
(MOSs), which include approximately 70% of all job slots,
are open to women."
In the Navy, women had previously been banned from
combatant ships, but today are eligible to serve on most
15. Id. at 3-4 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-200. In addition to "direct ground
combat," the services are authorized to close positions to women if: (1) the units
and positions are required to physically collocate with ground-combat units; (2)
the costs of providing appropriate living space for women is prohibitive; (3) the
units are engaged in special operations missions; or (4) job-related physical
requirements would exclude the vast number of women. No jobs are closed to
women because of the last factor. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER
ISSUES: TRENDS IN THE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY WOMEN,
GAO/NSIAD-99-212, at 3 (1999) [hereinafter GAO, TRENDS IN OCCUPATIONAL
DISTRIBUTION].
16. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 11.
17. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION ON
DOD's ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND DIRECT GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION,
GAO/NSIAD-99-7, at 3 (1998).
18. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 14-15.
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id.
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warships, exceptions being submarines and small vessels
such as patrol craft.2  These exceptions were made
primarily because of berthing and privacy issues. Women
are also barred from serving in the Navy Special Forces,
Sea-Air-Land (SEALS).22 Altogether, over 91% of positions
are open to women, although there are substantial
limitations on the number of shipboard bunks available to
them. Women currently serve on approximately one-third of
all combat ships.'
All occupational fields other than infantry, artillery,
and armor are open to women in the Marines." Although
this leaves 93% of MOSs open to women, the large numbers
of positions within the closed specialties means that only
62% of all billets are open to women.2
At present, the Defense Department apparently has no
plans to expand the number of positions open to women,
although many inside and outside of government have
encouraged the military to open some or all of the closed
positions.26
B. A Cost-Benefit Analysis
A sensible discussion of whether more positions should
be opened to women-or whether some currently open
positions should be closed to them-requires
acknowledgment of both the benefits and the costs of
integration. The benefits of integration of women are
relatively obvious and have received pride of place in the
21. The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
(DACOWITS) has recently recommended opening the submarine service to
women. Steven L. Myers, New Debate on Submarine Duty for Women, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1999, at Al. The Navy plans to continue the current exclusion.
Gidget Fuentes, Still No Women on Subs, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 22.
22. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 22.
23. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION TO
ASSESS SERVICEMEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER INEQUITIES IS INCOMPLETE,
GAO/NSIAD-99-27, at 19 (1998).
24. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 26.
25. Id. at 27.
26. See, e.g., Frevola, supra note 10 (arguing for the opening of most combat
positions); Morris, supra note 10 (arguing for the opening of most combat
positions); Gidget Fuentes, Panel on Women Frustrated by Impasse of Last
Barriers, NAVY TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1999, at 22 (reporting that DACOWITS has urged
that special-operations helicopters, multiple launch rocket system artillery, and
submarines be opened to women).
[Vol. 49
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discussion over the merits of integration. Primary among
the benefits is according all citizens the right (or duty) to
bear arms in defense of their country. Our egalitarian ethic
suggests that just as women may compete for positions in
the civilian sector, so should they be permitted to compete
for positions in the military, including the combat positions
that are often important for military career advancement.27
Another chief benefit is expansion of the pool from which
the services may draw volunteers. Exclusion of women from
combat positions means that these positions can be filled
only from the smaller pool of male volunteers. Since the
advent of the all-volunteer force a quarter of a century ago,
the services have gone through periods of difficulty in
meeting recruitment goals,28 which an expansion of the pool
arguably might ameliorate. Others have argued that
sexual harassment in the military is linked to the symbolic
"second-class citizenship" inherent in the combat
exclusion."
Many of the costs of integration of women into combat
positions are less tangible than the benefits."' Women are
27. Although it is often asserted that women face substantial obstacles to
promotion, studies indicate that overall promotion rates for men and women are
roughly equivalent, with a slight advantage in favor of women. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: ANALYSIS OF PROMOTION AND CAREER
OPPORTUNITIES DATA, GAOINSIAD-98-157 (1998); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: CERTAIN TRENDS IN RACIAL AND GENDER
DATA MAY WARRANT FURTHER ANALYSIS, GAO/NSIAD-96-17 (1995). As of
November 1999, thirty-seven women were active-duty generals or admirals.
Elizabeth Becker, Motherhood Deters Women from Army's Highest Ranks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at Al.
28. See Jacob Alex Klerman & Lynn A. Karoly, Trends and Future
Directions in Youth Labor Markets: Implications for Army Recruiting, in
MARCHING TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: MILITARY MANPOWER AND RECRUITING 41
(Mark J. Eitelberg & Stephen L. Mehay eds., 1994).
29. But see infra text accompanying notes 787-817.
30. See, e.g., Frevola, supra note 10, at 667-68; Kristin K. Heimark, Sexual
Harassment in the United States Navy: A New Pair of Glasses, 44 NAVAL L. REv.
223, 225 (1997); Kornblum, supra note 10, at 406. But see Charles Moskos,
Army Women, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1990, at 70 (reporting that only 2% of
enlisted women believe that opening combat positions to women would reduce
sexual harassment, while 61% believed that sexual harassment would
increase).
31. Direct financial costs, such as the costs of refitting Navy ships to
accommodate berths for female sailors, will not be discussed, not because they
are not significant but rather because they can be easily measured and a cost-
benefit analysis can be straightforwardly applied. However, it should be noted
that the cost is not merely the one-time cost of making physical alterations in
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less likely than men to possess the aggressive' and risk-
taking 3 temperaments that have traditionally been thought
characteristic of a "warrior." Moreover, there is reason to
think that inclusion of women in combat positions may
have negative effects on the cohesion and effectiveness of
fighting forces.34 Thus, while it may be true that "the
military does not benefit from those women who would
perform well in combat," 5 that does not necessarily
establish that "the [combat] exclusion harms the
military...."" Inclusion of women may also exacerbate the
military's trend toward an "occupational" rather than
"institutional" orientation, in which the military is no
longer a "calling" but rather "just a job" and where its claim
on the individual rests on the individual's economic self-
interest rather than his devotion to some "higher good." 7
A frank balancing of costs and benefits is ordinarily the
norm when dealing with questions of social policy. An
unstated exception to this practice seems to exist when the
question deals with issues of equality, when a sense of
justice and fairness leads equality concerns to be treated as
at least presumptively decisive. However, if men and
women are not similarly situated with respect to combat-
relevant traits, the presumption in favor of sex-neutrality
may be less appropriate. To the extent that inclusion of
women in combat risks degradation of military
effectiveness, that cost should be balanced against any
benefits that accrue as a consequence of their inclusion.
It should be emphasized that to question whether
women should be assigned to some positions is not to
the ship, but also the reduced personnel flexibility that results when a woman
departing from a ship must be replaced by another woman because of the
location of the vacant bunk.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 151-71.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 107-50.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 596-613.
35. Kornblum, supra note 10, at 383.
36. Id.
37. See Charles C. Moskos, Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed
Forces, in THE MILITARY: MORE THAN JUST A JOB? 15, 16-17 (Charles C. Moskos
& Frank R. Wood eds., 1988); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The Marketplace All-
Volunteer Force: A Critique, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE 15
(William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (discussing the shift toward an occupational
model); Segal & Segal, supra note 12, at 240 (noting that military recruiting
strategies have attracted "young people who in fact think of their service as a
job, and tend not to think of war-fighting as a part of that job").
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disparage the important contribution that women may
make in other positions, particularly in traditional service
support positions." Women have long served in substantial
numbers, relatively noncontroversially, in many noncombat
positions.39 Many noncombat positions in the military are,
after all, largely indistinguishable from positions in the
civilian sector." The advisability of a clear demarcation
between combat and noncombat positions is subject to
debate, however. Brian Mitchell suggests that the
distinction may be an artificial one in an organization
whose entire raison d'Otre is to engage in combat and whose
goal is to maintain a "warrior spirit" in the ranks.41 On the
other hand, military analyst James Dunnigan suggests that
the military's failure to recognize even more sharp
distinctions between combat and noncombat personnel
diminishes the stature of the real combat personnel,
"weaken[ing] the armed forces in order to give the
38. Military MOSs are categorized as "combat," "combat support," and
"service support." Laura L. Miller & Charles Moskos, Humanitarians or
Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope, 21
AR ED FORCES & SOC'Y 615, 635 n.2 (1995).
39. Some draw too much from women's prior service as noncombatants. For
example, one writer observes:
Nor does the label "non-combatant" protect military women from
battlefield violence. Nurses, the largest contingent of military women,
are designated "non-combatants." Nevertheless, they experience as much
violence, bloodshed, and fighting as "combat" soldiers. In Vietnam, for
example, some nurses were trained to use weapons to defend against
the combat dangers of their positions.... The fact that many women,
both civilian and military, have been killed in wars destroys the myth
that the combat exclusion protects women from war.
Kornblum, supra note 10, at 397-98 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). To
say that female nurses perform admirably and that they are exposed to
bloodshed is true. To suggest parity with men is absurd. Over 47,000 men were
killed in action in Vietnam, compared to one woman. (Total deaths, including
from accidents and disease, were 58,000 and nine, respectively). JAM S F.
DUNNIGAN & ALBERT A. NoFI, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS OF THE VIETNAMi WAR 161,
241-42 (1999).
40. Indeed, according to the General Accounting Office, many support
positions in the military could be staffed by civilians instead of military
personnel, at substantial savings. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD
FORCE MIX ISSUES: CONVERTING SOME SUPPORT OFFICER POSITIONS TO CIVILIAN
STATUS COULD SAVE MONEY, GAO/NSIAD-97-6 (1996); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD FORCE Mix ISSUES: GREATER RELIANCE ON CIVILIANS
IN SUPPORT ROLES COULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS, GAO/NSIAD-95-5
(1994).
41. See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 347.
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noncombat officers a vicarious thrill."'
A discussion of women in combat cannot sensibly
proceed without some appreciation of what modern combat
entails. Moreover, because part of the argument here is that
male participation in warfare involves evolved human
predispositions, it is appropriate to consider the nature of
primitive warfare, both to appreciate the continuities in
warfare and the circumstances in which male
predispositions regarding warfare evolved.
II. THE NATURE OF WARFARE
War is cruelty and you cannot refine it.
-William Tecumseh Sherman43
Much of the argument in favor of women in combat
rests upon the view that warfare is no longer the tough
business that it was in times past. This section will briefly
examine primitive warfare and then compare it with
warfare in the modem age.
A. Primitive Warfare: The "Environment of Evolutionary
Adaptation" of the Male Warrior
The nature of primitive warfare has often been
misunderstood. According to the popularly accepted
Rousseauian notion of the "noble savage," warfare became
common only when people organized themselves into
civilizations and lived under man-made laws rather than
the laws of nature.' As information about the frequency of
primitive warfare accumulated, however, some modification
of that view became necessary. What replaced it was an
equally erroneous consensus that primitive warfare was
highly ritualistic and that its participants were seldom
killed."
42. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 321.
43. RICHARD WHEELER, SHERMAN'S MARCH: AN EYEwITNEss HISTORY OF THE
CRUEL CAMPAIGN THAT HELPED END A CRUELER WAR 44 (1978) (quoting William
T. Sherman, Letter to the Mayor and Leaders of Atlanta (1864)).
44. See LAWRENCE H. KEELEY, WAR BEFORE CIILIZATION: THE MYTH OF THE
PEACEFUL SAVAGE 6-7 (1996).
45. Id. at 9. For a critique of the commonly held view that hunter-gatherer
groups tend to be relatively peaceful, see Carol R. Ember, Myths About Hunter-
Gatherers, 17 ETHNOLOGY 439 (1978).
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Anthropologist Lawrence Keeley argues, in contrast to
either of these widely held views, that constant (and
dangerous) warfare was a way of life for many primitive
societies." Although formal battles in pre-state societies
were often ritualistic in nature and might be called off after
a few casualties were suffered, most warfare did not consist
of set-piece battles. 7 Rather, the most common form of
combat was the raid or ambush, in which small groups of
men would sneak into the enemy's territory and kill any
targets of opportunity.' Women and children were often
killed as well, although women were commonly captured as
either slaves or wives, and their capture was in fact the aim
of some of the warfare.49 Even as late as the Twentieth
Century, at least twenty-six cultures practiced female
abduction." Sometimes larger-scale massacres were staged,
in which case large attack parties might converge on a
village and attempt to kill all of its occupants. An
archaeological site in South Dakota, for example, contains
the remains of more than 500 men, women, and children
who had been slaughtered, scalped, and mutilated during
an attack on their village more than 150 years before
Columbus's arrival in the New World.5' The fact that young
women were under-represented in the burial suggests that
young women were carried off as captives.5  In many
societies, body parts of slain enemies-heads, scalps, hands,
genitals, or teeth-were taken either as demonstrations of
the warrior's prowess or because of magical properties
attributed to them.53
46. KEELEY, supra note 44, at 27-33.
47. Id. at 59-65; see also JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 94-103
(1993); HARRY HOLBERT TURNEY-HIGH, PRIMITIVE WAR: ITS PRACTICE AND
CONCEPTS 255 (2d ed. 1971).
48. KEELEY, supra note 44, at 65.
49. Id. at 86.
50. Douglas R. White, Rethinking Polygyny: Co-Wives, Codes, and Cultural
Systems, 29 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 535-40 (1988).
51. KEELEY, supra note 44, at 68. John Keegan describes an almost exactly
contemporaneous site from the Old World:
One of the most gruesome discoveries made at the disinterment of the
mass grave at Gotland, containing 2000 bodies from the battle of Visby
of 1361, was that many of the dead had been extensively mutilated-
typically by repeated sword-cuts down their shins-and such cuts could
only have been inflicted after they were disabled.
KEEGAN, supra note 47, at 121.
52. KEELEY, supra note 44, at 68.
53. Id. at 101.
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Primitive warfare placed a substantial premium on
physical strength, involving as it did clubs, spears, and
bows and arrows-weapons that reward upper-body
strength. It also required a psyche that allowed its
participants to engage the enemy at close quarters, both
risking death and being willing to kill at a face-to-face level.
Because primitive warfare was so frequent and
populations relatively small, the proportion of primitive
populations killed in warfare was often several times the
proportion killed in the massive, but episodic, wars of this
century.54 In part, this is because primitive societies rarely
took adult male prisoners-other than for the temporary
diversion of torturing them to death or in some societies
eating them 5 -- so surrender in the hope of ultimate
repatriation was not an option.
B. The Nature of Modern Combat
The belief in push-button war is fundamentally a
fallacy. But it is not a new fallacy. It is simply an age-old
fallacy in modern dress.
--S.L.A. Marshall56
Many people acknowledge that the practice of limiting
combat service to men made sense in the past, but they
argue that changes in the nature of modem warfare have
replaced the premium on brawn, which men
disproportionately possess, with a premium on brains,
rendering the sexes largely equivalent in their ability to
participate in combat.57 War in the Twenty-First Century,
54. See id. at 89-92.
55. See TURNEY-HIGH, supra note 47, at 188-95.
56. S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND
IN FuTURE WAR 19 (1947).
57. See, e.g., Lucinda J. Peach, Gender Ideology in the Ethics of Women in
Combat, in IT'S OUR MILITARY, Too!: WOMEN AND THE U.S. MILITARY 156, 168
(Judith Hicks Stiehm ed., 1996); WOMEN SOLDIERS: IMAGES AND REALITIES xv
(Elisabetta Addis et al. eds., 1994) (noting that "[t]he soldier of [the Gulf War]
was a technician: prowess was a matter of brains, not of brawn"); Gerard J. De
Groot, Women Warriors, 266 CONTEMP. REV. 257, 259 (1995) (stating that
"[miodern weaponry no longer requires physical strength, rather only a resolve
to kill"). Sometimes the arguments descend to silliness, as Linda Francke's
challenging of the presumption (whose she does not say) that "all men are
stronger than all women." FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 248. The argument is not
that there is no overlap in strength between the sexes, but that there is not
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according to this view, rather than being a duel of the
strong, will be a duel of the smart. Images sent home from
the Gulf War reinforced this notion, portraying the war as
the equivalent of a multi-billion dollar game of Nintendo'
that, at least for the allies, was no more dangerous than a
walk across Central Park.58 This argument rests in
important ways on two assumptions: (1) that the need for
physical strength is gone because war is now largely a
"technical" enterprise; and (2) that the only differences
between the sexes that are relevant to the combat question
involve physical strength. Both of these assumptions are
palpably false.
While it is certainly the case that some combat-related
tasks require little physical strength or "warrior spirit" to
perform-sitting in front of a console in a missile silo in
North Dakota, for example-much combat, and the
demands it places on its participants, has not changed that
much in this century. While the infantryman of today
carries an M-16 instead of an M-1 and wears a helmet made
of Kevlar instead of steel, the basic job of the infantry
soldier is not much different from that of the GI in World
War II and even less so from that of the GI in Vietnam. The
soldier must carry much of his own equipment, and the
loads occasionally exceed 100 pounds. The infantryman
must be prepared to engage the enemy with small arms,
and this includes the possibility of hand-to-hand combat.' 9
Although seemingly an artifact from World War I and
before-although only a fraction of 1% in "the Great War"
died from them-bayonets killed men in both Vietnam and
the Falklands."' Even today, the infantryman must be
proficient with hand grenades, yet a large proportion of
women Marines cannot throw a grenade outside the blast
radius-that is, far enough to avoid blowing themselves
enough to make inclusion of women worthwhile.
58. While most people's images of the Gulf War were shaped by television
coverage of the air war, it should not be forgotten that the allies had more than
a half-million ground troops in the Gulf, and the ground war was itself massive
in scale. See Peter Tsouras, The Ground War, in BRUCE W. WATSON, MILITARY
LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR 81 (1993).
59. See MICHAEL HERR, DISPATCHES 94 (1977) (referring to the 1965 battles
in the Ia Drang Valley and "Americans and North Vietnamese stiff in one
another's death embrace, their eyes wide open, their teeth bared or sunk deep
into enemy flesh").
60. RICHARD HOLMES, ACTS OF WAR: THE BEHAVIOR OF MEN IN BATTLE 378
(1985).
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Some modern warfare is strikingly similar to primitive
warfare. The Vietnam War, for example, was characterized
by numerous small-unit ("search and destroy") missions in
which the goal was not to take and hold territory but rather
to ambush and kill the enemy."2 As in primitive warfare,
there were relatively few set-piece battles and few prisoners
taken.63
The sexual overtones present in much primitive
warfare persist into the modem age. For example, Japanese
troops in China and elsewhere during World War II
systematically rounded up women either for immediate
rape or for service as forced prostitutes in "comfort houses"
set up for Japanese soldiers. Moreover, while the practice
of taking trophies of body parts has generally been officially
frowned upon in modem western armies, the practice is
still widespread. 5
Some argue that even if women cannot do certain
61. See John Leo, A Kinder, Gentler Army, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
11, 1997, at 14. Thus, in basic training, women are required to throw a grenade
at a target twenty-five meters away, while the target for men is thirty-five
meters away. See also James H. Anderson, Boot Camp or Summer Camp?
Restoring Rigorous Standards to Basic Training, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
BAcKGROUNDER No. 1157 (Nov. 6, 1997).
62. See generally JAMES ESTEP, CoMPANY ComvIANDER-VmTNAM (1991). Of
course, even in large wars, such as World War II, a substantial amount of
combat involved small groups of men engaged in patrolling and small-scale
skirmishes. See generally AUDiE MURPHY, To HELL AND BACK (1949).
63. See PHILIP CAPUTO, A RUmOR OF WAR xvii (1977) (noting that his men
soon learned "that Vietnam was not a place where a man could expect much
mercy if, say, he was taken prisoner [and that a]ny men who do not expect to
receive mercy eventually lose their inclination to grant it"). The taking of few
prisoners was also the practice on both sides in the Pacific Theater in World
War H. As William Manchester recounts:
Having been introduced to the enemy's code of total resistance,
defiance to the last man, the Marines had no choice; they had to adopt
it themselves. From [Guadalcanal] until the end of the war, neither
side took prisoners except under freakish circumstances. It was combat
without quarter: none was asked, none was given.
WILLIAM MANCHESTER, GOODBYE DARKNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE PACIFIC WAR 220
(1979); see also E. B. SLEDGE, WITH THE OLD BREED AT PELELIU AND OKINAWA
118 (1981) (noting that the Japanese "were no more likely to surrender to us
than we would have been to them had we ever been confronted by the
possibility of surrender").
64. See IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF
WORLD WAR II 52-53 (1997).
65. See JOANNA BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING: FACE-TO-FACE
KILLING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY WARFARE 25-31 (1999).
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combat tasks, such as infantry service, there are many
other combat specialties that do not impose the same kinds
of physical burdens. However, it should be recognized that
even those in non-infantry positions often find themselves
because of circumstances doing the work of infantry. When
the Navy departed Corregidor in the face of the Japanese
invasion of the Philippines, leaving the Army to defend
Corregidor and the Bataan Peninsula, "[almong
MacArthur's ardent infantrymen were cooks, mechanics,
pilots whose planes had been shot down, seamen whose
ships had been sunk, and some civilian volunteers."66 Those
who left on warships were not spared the prospect of
difficult physical burdens, since no matter how nonphysical
their regular assignment, one well-placed enemy shell or
bomb could instantly convert their primary assignment into
the often very physical task of damage control.67 In
northwestern Europe in 1944, the picture was very much
the same. When the number of replacements needed
substantially exceeded estimates, anti-aircraft and tank
destroyer units were inactivated and personnel were
transferred to the infantry,6 8 and in October 1944, General
Eisenhower imposed a five-percent levy on all rear-echelon
troops and had them rushed to the front,69 so that "cooks,
drivers, mechanics, clerks, and other rear-echelon
personnel" flowed into the pipeline of infantry
replacements.7" When the Korean War erupted, "Operation
Flush Out" was designed to get troops out of noncombat
positions in Japan and into action in Korea as quickly as
66. MANCHESTER, supra note 63, at 76. During the battle for Guadalcanal, it
appeared that many of the pilots would be unable to get into the air, so they
drew rifles to prepare for a fight to the finish on the ground. MAX BRAND,
FIGHTER SQUADRON AT GUADALCANAL 124 (1996).
67. PRESmENTIAL COAM'N ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED
FORCES, WOMEN IN COMBAT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 32 (1992) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL COMAiN].
68. ROBERT R. PALMER ET AL., UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR I, THE
ARMY GROUND FORCES: THE PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING OF GROUND COMBAT
TROOPS 212-13 (1948).
69. JOHN ELLIS, THE SHARP END: THE FIGHTING MAN IN WORLD WAR 11296
(1980). As Brian Mitchell observes, this is not an expedient available to today's
army, with its inclusion of women in the support ranks but exclusion from
combat units. See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 6.
70. STEVEN E. AMBROSE, CITIZEN SOLDIER: THE U.S. ARMY FROM THE
NORMANDY BEACHES TO THE BULGE TO THE SURRENDER OF GERMANY, JUNE 7,
1944-MAY 7, 1945, at 274 (1997).
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possible." During the Tet offensive in Saigon, "cooks, clerks,
and jerks" were called upon to defend Tan Son Nhut
airbase" In the event of major attacks on base camps in
Vietnam, some helicopter pilots were to fly helicopters
away, while others were to stay behind to defend the
camp." Although support troops must occasionally be used
in combat, they are less effective than combat troops and
"will more quickly be destroyed."74 Unfortunately, the
greater mobility of today's battlefield will likely expose
more of them to combat than in the past.75 An army drill
sergeant, when asked whether Army clerks should have to
carry seventy-pound backpacks and be able to drag 190-
pound men, responded: "Who's defending your airfield?
Your support weenies."76
Even some of the "highest tech" jobs in the military are
not insulated from the strain of ground combat. Scott
O'Grady was flying his multi-million dollar F-16 five miles
over Bosnia but in very short order found himself on the
ground with bugs as one of his major sources of food, being
pursued by enemy soldiers intent on his capture or death.
A substantial proportion of the prisoners of war held by
North Vietnam were downed flyers, although the high
proportion is due less to the large number of American
71. T. R. FEHRENBACH, THIS KIND OF WAR 108 (1963); See JAIES L.
STOKESBURY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR 60 (1988).
72. ESTEP, supra note 62, at 170; see also STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAMi: A
HISTORY 538-42 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the Tet Offensive in Saigon).
73. ROBERT MASON, CHICKENHAWK 67-68 (1983); see also id. at 122
(recounting the story of a helicopter pilot who was shot down resupplying a
trapped patrol and who spent the night crewing a machine gun).
74. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 505.
75. Id. at 487; see also ELMAR DINTER, HERO OR COWARD: PREssuREs FACING
THE SOLDIER IN BATTLE 119 (1985) (noting that "[in the future the fighting will
involve those formations which in World War H had less group cohesion than
the front-line troops, and were more readily induced to surrender or flee when
under fire or faced with enemy break-throughs").
One commonly-raised argument against the combat exclusion is that
preventing women from serving on the front lines does not protect them,
because the fluidity of today's battlefield means that rear-echelon positions are
no longer safe. Campbell, supra note 10, at 85-86; Frevola, supra note 10, at
627; Peach, supra note 57, at 163. Thus, the argument goes, the distinction
between front-line and rear-echelon is arbitrary. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the appropriate response is to open front-line positions to women;
an equally logical response would be to close the rear-echelon positions.
76. STEPHANIE GUTmANN, THE KINDER, GENTLER MILITARY: CAN AMERICA'S
GENDER-NEUTRAL FIGHTING FORCE STILL WIN WARS? 54 (2000).
77. See SCOTT O'GRADY, RETURN WITH HONOR (1995).
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pilots downed than to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
practice of taking few prisoners on the ground and of killing
the ones they had. An example of the experience a flyer can
have is the case of Air Force Lieutenant Lance Sijan, whose
experience was vividly captured in the book Into the Mouth
of the Cat.73 Sijan was shot down over Laos in 1967. Despite
serious injuries, including a compound fracture of his tibia
and a broken hand, Sijan evaded capture for forty-six days
in enemy-controlled territory.79 After his capture, again
despite his grievous injuries, he overpowered a guard and
escaped into the jungle."0 Captured once again, he was
taken to Hoa Lo prison ("The Hanoi Hilton") in North
Vietnam, where he resisted torture for two weeks until he
died of his injuries. He was posthumously awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor in 1976. While his story is
particularly compelling, the fate that met Sijan is one that
all pilots must risk. The protection afforded by a multi-
million-dollar fighter plane can be ephemeral, indeed.
Combat remains one of the most physically and
psychologically demanding of human activities, and not
everyone is suited to it. Israeli military historian Martin
van Creveld had the following to say about the Israeli view
of women in combat:
Asked about their impressions of women in combat, Israeli officers
are united in their view that it is no place for them. This is
because, unlike most Americans, Israelis are familiar with combat;
they know that the favorite American method of breaking war
down into Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) distorts the
issue. For example, women can certainly pilot an Apache
helicopter as well as men. However, it is equally certain that their
weaker physiques will put them at a disadvantage when it is a
question of flying that helicopter eight times a day in enemy fire,
with the chance of being shot down, wounded, and forced to make
their way back on foot.
Combat, in other words, is not merely a matter of doing a job. It is
the toughest, most demanding, most terrible activity on earth. It is
far beyond the imagination of anybody who has not experienced it.
The demands that it makes in terms of physical force, endurance,
78. MALCOLM MCCONNELL, INTO THE MoUTH OF THE CAT: THE STORY OF
LANCE SIJAN, HERO OF VIETNAM (1985).
79. Id. at 147.
80. Id. at 156.
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and sheer wear and tear are horrendous.8 1
Over a half-century ago in his classic study Men
Against Fire, S.L.A. MarshallP2 issued the warning quoted
at the beginning of this section.' The warning seems at
least equally apt for today, a time when many seem to
believe that we are for the first time faced with a
technological transformation that changes all the rules of
warfare. But we were wrong to believe that precision
bombing would win World War II quickly; 5 we were wrong
to believe that air power would quickly bring North Korea
to its knees;88 we were wrong to believe that our
technological advantage in Vietnam would win that war;87
we were wrong in our estimate of the effectiveness of our
high-tech weapons in the Gulf War;8 and most recently, we
81. Martin van Creveld, Women of Valor: Why Israel Doesn't Send Women
into Combat, POL'Y REV., Fall 1991, at 65, 67.
82. Marshall was the official historian of the European Theater of
Operations in World War I.
83. Several years before the Gulf War, Darryl Henderson issued a similar
warning, one that popular perceptions of that war have made more imperative:
[Olne of the perils for military planners in a high-tech-world is to be
taken in by the destructiveness of modern weapons and to give in to
the currently popular theory that modern war will last for days or
weeks rather than months or years-in short, to envision the world
where technologies, not people, dominate war.
WM. DARRYL HENDERSON, COHESION: THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN COMBAT xi (1985).
84. See Charles Moskos, The Folly of Comparing Race and Gender in the
Army, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1998, at Cl:
All the talk of how modern warfare is high-tech and push-button is off
the mark. Ground combat in any setting involves the most physically
demanding endurance imaginable. Even in the Persian Gulf War, when
the media highlighted the efficiency of stand-off weapons, large
numbers of men were involved in physically grueling armored assaults.
And, not to be overlooked, much of the work involved in logistics often
requires sheer muscle power as well.
85. See PAUL FUSSELL, WARTIME: UNDERSTANDING AND BEHAVIOR IN THE
SECOND WORLD WAR 13-19 (1989); WALTER J. BOYNE, CLASH OF WINGS: WORLD
WAR II IN THE AIR 282 (1994) (noting that prior to World War II, the
conventional wisdom was that forty or fifty tons of bombs would be enough to
destroy London or Paris, but by the end of the war British and American
bombers had dropped 2,790,000 tons of bombs on Axis targets in Europe).
86. STOKESBURY, supra note 71, at 179-81, 256-57 (discussing the lack of
success of "Operation Strangle").
87. KARNOW, supra note 72, at 50, 415-19.
88. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OPERATION DESERT STORM:
EVALUATION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (concluding that claims
of the Defense Department concerning effectiveness of high-tech weapons
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were wrong in believing that a few days of bombing in
Kosovo would achieve our strategic goals. 9 In each case,
ground troops, and lots of them, (or in the last case, the
increasing threat of them) were necessary.
War is at bottom about warriors. The history books are
full of numerically inferior forces getting the better of their
opponents because of superior training, tactics, discipline,
or spirit."' Thus, it is critical to understand the
psychological forces that motivate the warrior and, for
purposes of the issue at hand, to know the role that
particular psychological factors play in these motivations.
Because the argument that the sexes are not
interchangeable in combat roles rests on differences in the
evolved psychologies of the two sexes, our inquiry must
begin with a brief examination of the biological legacy of
our evolutionary past.
during Desert Storm were exaggerated).
89. See John M. Broder, Clinton Underestimated Serbs, He Acknowledges,
N.Y. TImES, June 26, 1999, at A6 (reporting that the President acknowledged
his error in believing that "a couple of days" of bombing would halt the Serbian
assault on Kosovo, when in fact it took seventy-eight days). Arguably NATO's
strategic goals were not even achieved, since NATO's purpose was to stop ethnic
killings rather than simply to cause the retreat of the Serb army. The early
ruling out of ground troops allowed the killing of Kosovar Albanians to continue
and even to intensify. See Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Operation Allied Force and the
Role of Air Power, PARAMETERS: U.S. AmiY WAR C.Q., Winter 1999-2000, at 24;
Blaine Harden, Crisis in the Balkans: Doing the Deal, A Special Report, A Long
Struggle that Led Serb Leader to Back Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, § 1, at
1.
90. See Jane Perlez, Clinton and the Joint Chiefs Meet to Discuss Ground
Invasion, N.Y. TnIES, June 2, 1999, at A14.
91. See, e.g., KEEGAN, supra note 47, at 253 (noting the Athenian victory
over the Persians at Marathon); id. at 258 (noting Epaminondas's victory over
the Spartans at Leuctra); id. at 260-61 (noting Alexander's victories over
Darius); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, AGINCOURT 99 (1978) (noting Henry Vs victory
over the French at Agincourt); ALISTAIR HORNE, How FAR FROM AuSTERLiTZ 150,
182 (1996) (noting Napoleon's victory over Austria and Russia at Austerlitz);
ERNEST B. FURGURSON, CHANCELLORSVILLE 1863: THE SOULS OF THE BRAVE 88
(1992) (noting Lee's victory at Chancellorsville). In World War I, German
soldiers were viewed as being five to fifteen times more combat effective than
Russian soldiers. JAMES L. STOKESBURY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WORLD WAR i 129
(1981). At the Battle of Kharkov in 1942, a smaller German force annihilated
two Soviet Armies, taking 250,000 prisoners at a cost of 20,000 Germans.
ANTONY BEEVOR, STALINGRAD 67 (1998). Paul Fussell notes that whenever the
British or Americans met the German army on equal terms, the Germans
prevailed. FUSSELL, supra note 85, at 123. The Argentine army outnumbered
the British in the Falklands, but it was decisively outclassed in organization,
leadership, and cohesion. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 3.
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III. SEX DIFFERENCES IN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
The evolution of life on earth, and likely everywhere it
exists, is governed by the process of natural selection
described by Charles Darwin almost a century-and-a-half
ago.92 While we are accustomed to thinking about the
influences of natural selection on the bodies of animals,
natural selection shapes their psychology no less than their
morphology. Many people are resistant, however, to the
notion that there is a fundamental "human nature" that is a
product of our biology, apparently believing that we have
escaped the lot of other animals, which, unlike humans, are
constrained by their natural endowment to act in particular
ways. Humans, under this view, rather than being
programmed by nature, are programmed by society; we act
the way we act exclusively because of social influences
rather than biological predispositions. 3 However, modern
studies of both human and animal behavior have called into
question the stark dichotomy between humans and other
animals that this outlook embodies. Animal behavior is now
known to be more environmentally sensitive and human
behavior more biologically influenced than previously
believed. 4
This section will examine how natural selection has
shaped the minds of the two sexes just as it has shaped
their bodies. It will begin with a description of individual
differences between men and women and then shift to a
discussion of differences in social interactions. This
bifurcation is a matter of convenience, since there is, of
course, no clear distinction between attributes of
individuals and social interactions, since social interactions
are a function of the individuals who possess attributes that
92. CHARLEs DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
93. See Judith Lorber, Believing is Seeing: Biology as Ideology, 7 GENDER &
Soc'Y 568, 569 (1993) (asserting that, "in Western societies, we see two discrete
sexes and two distinguishable genders because our society is built on two
classes of people, 'women' and 'men' "). She does not identify societies that
recognize some number of sexes other than two.
94. See generally JOHN T. BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE IN ANIMALS
(1980) (discussing the influence of environment on animals); TIMOTHY H.
GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS
BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (1991) (discussing the role that evolution
has played in influencing human behavior); ROBERT PLOMIN, NATURE AND
NURTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO HUfAN BEHAVIORAL GENETICS (1990) (discussing
the influence of genes on human behavior).
[Vol. 49
WOMEN AT WAR
lead to such interactions. However, social interactions
between men and other men, on the one hand, and men and
women, on the other, are emergent properties that cannot
be measured or predicted simply by atomistic examination
of individuals.
A. Sexual Selection and the Origin of Sex Differences
Sex differences in temperament and behavior are due in
large part to an evolutionary process called "sexual
selection," defined by Darwin as selection arising from "the
advantage which certain individuals have over other
individuals of the same sex and species, in exclusive
relation to reproduction."95 As any observer of animals
knows, males and females of the same species often behave
differently. We do not expect the same behavior from the
mare as from the stallion, from the cow as from the bull, or
from the hen as from the rooster. We should not then be
surprised if we do not always see the same behavior from
the woman as from the man. Indeed, we should be
surprised if we did.
Given that the sexes differ genetically on only a single
chromosome, with males having the XY configuration and
females the XX, one might wonder how parents could
transmit different behavioral predispositions to their sons
than to their daughters. The answer is not, as many
characterize it, that males purportedly inherit a "gene for
aggressiveness," for example, that females do not inherit.
The answer lies instead primarily in differences in sex
hormones-which are, of course, ultimately traceable to
genes-rather than in sex differences in specific genes for
specific traits.96 A critical gene on the Y-chromosome codes
for the development of testes, which, once developed,
95. CHARLES DARwiN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO
SEX I, 256 (1871). While early Darwinists viewed natural selection and sexual
selection as distinct phenomena, "for modem Darwinism, nothing remains of
the traditional idea that the intraspecific and social nature of sexual selection
sets it apart from natural selection." HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE
PEAcocK: ALTRUISM AND SEXUAL SELECTION FROM DARwIN TO TODAY 234 (1991).
96. See S. Marc Breedlove, Sexual Differentiation of the Human Nervous
System, 45 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 389, 393 (1994); June M. Reinisch et al.,
Hormonal Contributions to Sexually Dimorphic Behavioral Development in
Humans, 16 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 213, 214 (1991); see also Browne, Sex
and Temperament, supra note 4, at 1040-49.
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secrete male sex hormones.97 These hormones cause the
fetus's brain as well as its body to develop in a male
direction, and differential hormonal exposure throughout
postnatal life-especially from the onset of puberty-
enhances the difference. These hormones produce a male
mind oriented more toward risk, aggression, and
competition, just as they produce a male anatomy that is
larger, hairier, and more muscular. Indeed, females who
are exposed to the hormones typically experienced by males
tend to be more male-like in their behavior, cognitive
pattern, and physique.99
Sex differences in behavior often follow a characteristic
pattern, for reasons explained in a classic paper by biologist
Robert Trivers. Trivers demonstrated that "[wihat governs
the operation of sexual selection is the relative parental
investment of the sexes in their offspring."' Trivers defined
parental investment as "any investment by the parent in an
individual offspring that increases the offspring's chance of
surviving (and hence reproductive success) at the cost of the
parent's ability to invest in other offspring."' Trivers
showed that the sex whose typical parental investment is
less than that of the other sex will compete among
themselves to mate with members of the sex investing
more. Members of the sex investing less can increase their
reproductive success through numerous partners in a way
that members of the other sex cannot. °2 In mammals,
including humans, the male can enhance his reproductive
success by securing sexual access to multiple females.
Because the costs of a fertile union-both the physiological
costs and opportunity costs-are substantially higher for
females than for males, females tend to be the "choosier"
sex.
10 3
97. Jeremy Cherfas, Sex and the Single Gene, 252 SC. 782 (1990).
98. See Lee Ellis, Evidence of a Neuroandrogenic Etiology of Sex Roles from
a Combined Analysis of Human, Nonhuman Primate, and Nonprimate
Mammalian Studies, 7 PERSONALITY & INDIVMUAL DIFFERENCES 519 (1986).
99. See e.g., Reinisch et al., supra note 96.
100. Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SE:XUAL
SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 1871-1971 136, 141 (Bernard Campbell
ed., 1972).
101. Id. at 139; see also ROBERT L. TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLuTION 207 (1985).
102. Trivers, supra note 100, at 140.
103. David M. Buss & David P. Schmitt, Sexual Strategies Theory: An
Evolutionary Perspective on Human Mating, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 204, 210-11
(1993).
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Because the sex ratio is approximately 1:1, if some men
are able to monopolize the reproductive potential of
multiple women, some men will end up excluded from
reproduction. The stakes of the mating game are therefore
higher for males than for females.' Thus, it is critically
important to males to develop the attributes that lead to
reproductive success. The currency of male reproductive
success in humans is status and resources. For much of
human history, male status came primarily from skill at
hunting and warfare and from the capacity to dominate and
lead others by force of arms, personality, or intellect.0 5 It is
no surprise, then, that men are more disposed than women
to strive for status and exhibit greater risk-taking and
aggressive behavior, particularly in behaviors historically
relevant to acquisition of resources and mates.0 6
B. Sex Differences in Temperament: Risk-Taking and
Aggressiveness
1. Risk-Taking. The greater male propensity toward
risk is observable from childhood. ' Men are
disproportionately involved in risky recreational activities
such as car racing, sky diving, and hang-gliding."8 Even
when engaged in such seemingly benign activities as
sunbathing, males disproportionately take the riskier
course of declining to use sunscreen.' The driving style of
104. DAvID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING 200-01 (1994) (noting that in every known society, unmarried men
outnumber unmarried women).
105. See generally DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF THE MIND 349-52 (1999) (discussing evolutionary explanations of sex
differences in dominance and status-seeking).
106. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and
Violence: The Young Male Syndrome, 6 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 59, 60
(1985).
107. Barbara A. Morrongiello & Heather Rennie, Why Do Bays Engage in
More Risk Taking than Girls? The Role of Attributions, Beliefs, and Risk
Appraisals, 23 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 33 (1998); Harvey J. Ginsburg & Shirley
M. Miller, Sex Differences in Children's Risk-taking Behavior, 53 CHILD DEV.
426 (1982).
108. Jean E. Veevers & Ellen M. Gee, Playing It Safe: Accident Mortality
and Gender Roles, 19 SOCIOL. FOCUS 349, 352 (1986). See generally Paul
Roberts, Risk, PSYCHOL. TODAY 50, 51 (NovJDec. 1994) (pointing out that "the
leisure pursuit of danger is a grow[ing] industry").
109. Barbara Keesling & Howard S. Friedman, Psychosocial Factors in
Sunbathing and Sunscreen Use, 6 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 477, 487, 489 (1987).
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men also shows a greater propensity toward risk. They are
less likely to use seatbelts "° and are more likely to engage
in risky behavior, such as speeding, tailgating, refusing to
yield the right of way,"' running amber lights,"2 and
driving while intoxicated. The overall male accidental-death
rate is two to three times as high as the female rate in the
United States."' Notwithstanding greater equality and
socially sanctioned androgyny, the male/female accidental-
death ratio actually increased from 1960 to 1979."' This sex
difference holds worldwide. A World Health Organization
study of accidental-death rates for 1971 in fifty countries
throughout the world found a higher death rate for boys in
all age groups in all countries but one."'
Men also participate disproportionately in risky
employment. Over 90% of all workplace deaths in the
United States are males."' A list of dangerous occupations
is a list of disproportionately male occupations: fisherman,
logger, airplane pilot, structural metal worker, coal mining,
oil and gas extraction, water transportation occupations,
construction laborer, taxicab driver, roofer, and truck
110. J. Richard Eiser et al., Smoking, Seat-Belts, and Beliefs About Health,
4 ADDICT. BEHAv. 331, 334 (1979) (demonstrating a relationship between
smoking and failure to wear seatbelts).
111. Bruce D. Jamieson, Sex Differences Among Drivers in Yielding Right-of-
Way, 41 PSYCHOL. REP. 1243, 1246 (1977).
112. Vladimir J. Konecni et al., Decision Processes and Risk Taking in
Traffic: Driver Response to the Onset of Yellow Light, 61 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 359,
362 (1976). See generally Wilson & Daly, supra note 106, at 68-69 (collecting
sources detailing males' more aggressive driving style); Nils Petter Gregersen &
Hans Yngve Berg, Lifestyle and Accidents Among Young Drivers, 26 AcoID.
ANAL. & PREv. 297, 300-01 (1994) (stating that a substantial majority of high-
risk drivers are males; substantial majority of low-risk drivers are females).
113. Veevers & Gee, supra note 108, at 349.
114. Id.
115. H. Marcusson & W. Oehmisch, Accident Mortality in Childhood in
Selected Countries of Different Continents, 1950-1971, 30 WORLD HEALTH STAT.
REP. 57, 69-70 (1977). The ratio of male to female deaths was 1.9:1 in Europe
and 1.7:1 in non-European countries. The sole exception to the pattern of higher
male rates was among one- to four-year-olds in Luxembourg, which had a
slightly higher accidental-death rate for girls than for boys. The reason for this
deviation is not obvious, but perhaps it is simply a small-sample effect. The
Luxembourg death rate for girls was approximately twice that of the European
and world average. In the five-to-fourteen age group, however, the normal sex
ratio was found. Id.
116. See High Murder Rate for Women on Job, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 3, 1993, § 1,
at 29 (reporting that men comprise 93% ofjob-related deaths).
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driver.117
Greater propensity of men to risk their lives is
illustrated by a study of the recipients of awards granted by
the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission. Of the 676 acts of
heroism recognized from 1989 through 1995, 92% were
performed by males."' Moreover, over one-half of those
rescued by women were known to the rescuer, while over
two-thirds of those rescued by men were strangers."9
Men's willingness to take risks is not limited to physical
risk. For example, men are more likely to gamble, 2 ' and the
higher the stakes the greater the disproportionality
becomes."' Psychologist Elizabeth Arch has suggested that
sex differences in achievement-orientation may be
explained at least in part as a consequence of sex
differences in risk-taking. 22 From an early age, females are
more averse not just to physical risk, but also to social risk,
and "tend to behave in a manner that ensures continued
social inclusion."" Arch notes that achievement
opportunities often present uncertainty and the potential
for loss of resources or group support. 4 This aversion to
risk may be partially responsible for women's
disproportionately low representation in positions involving
"career risk," which may adversely affect their prospects for
117. See Guy A. Toscano & Janice A. Windau, Profile of Fatal Work Injuries
in 1996, in BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, COMPENSATION AND WORKING
CONDITIONS 37, 42 (Spring 1998), available at http'//stats.bls.gov/
special.requests/ocwc/ oshwc/cfar0024.pdf.
118. Ronald C. Johnson, Attributes of Carnegie Medalists Performing Acts of
Heroism and of the Recipients of Those Acts, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 355,
357 (1996).
119. Id. While these statistics are not a random sample of rescues-one
must be nominated to receive an award and only about one in nine nominees
receives one-the researchers believed that, if anything, these statistics would
overstate the percentage of female rescuers, because acts of heroism by women
are likely to receive greater public notice. Id. at 359.
120. See, e.g., Rachel A. Volberg & Henry J. Steadman, Prevalence
Estimates of Pathological Gambling in New Jersey and Maryland, 146 AM . J.
PSYCH. 1618, 1619 (1989).
121. Wilson & Daly, supra note 106, at 67; see also A.C. Bruce & J.E.V.
Johnson, Male and Female Betting Behaviour: New Perspectives, 10 J.
GAMBLING STUD. 183 (1994) (finding that men placed riskier bets than women).
122. Elizabeth C. Arch, Risk-Taking: A Motivational Basis for Sex
Differences, 73 PSYCHOL. REP. 3, 4 (1993).
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 6.
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advancement.'
Psychological tests confirm what daily observation
suggests. Consistent sex differences are found on the Thrill
and Adventure Seeking subscale of the "Sensation Seeking
Scale."2 6 This subscale measures a desire to engage in
activities involving speed or danger. A recent meta-analysis
of 150 studies found that nearly every one of the studies
found statistically significant sex differences, with most of
the largest differences in studies involving physical risks.'27
The researchers found that "males took risks even when it
was clear that it was a bad idea to take a risk," while
females "seemed to be disinclined to take risks even in
fairly innocuous situations or when it was a good idea to
take a risk."2 ' This finding may be quite significant for
military risk-taking, because from the individual's
perspective many militarily appropriate risks are a "bad
idea."
Females tend to find physical risk more stressful than
males do. A recent study was designed to determine
whether fourteen- to sixteen-year old boys and girls differed
in their response to a risky activity, namely, abseiling down
a rock face for the first time. 9 This task required them to
lean out over the edge of the rock face. The researchers
found marked sex differences in the amount of stress
experienced. Similarly, women seem to experience greater
levels of fear of animals. and spiders"' than men do.
The sex differences in response to risk seem to have two
125. See generally BROWNE, DivinED LABOURS, supra note 4 (observing that
women are less likely to take risky jobs); Browne, Sex and Temperament, supra
note 4 (discussing the biological mechanism that leads to sex differences in
behavior).
126. Marvin Zuckerman et al., Sensation Seeking in England and America:
Cross-Cultural, Age, and Sex Comparisons, 46 J. CONSUL. & CLIN. PSYCHOL.
139, 143 (1978); James P. Kurtz & Marvin Zuckerman, Race and Sex
Differences on the Sensation Seeking Scales, 43 PSYCHOL. REP. 529, 530 (1978).
127. James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differences in Risk-Taking: A Meta-
Analysis, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 367 (1999).
128. Id. at 378.
129. J.H. Kerr & J. Vlaminkx, Gender Differences in the Experience of Risk,
22 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 293 (1997).
130. William A. Arrindell et al., Disgust Sensitivity and the Sex Differences
in Fears to Common Indigenous Animals, 37 BEHAVIOUR RES. & THERAPY 273
(1999).
131. Randolph R. Cornelius & James R. Averill, Sex Differences in Fear of
Spiders, 45 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 381 (1983).
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132components. Women perceive risk more often than men,
and even when they have the same levels of perceived risk,
women have higher fear levels.'33  For example,
notwithstanding the fact that women are less frequently
victimized by serious crime, they are more fearful of it than
men.' Women's fear is greatest among those of peak
reproductive age. 3 '
Sex differences in attitudes toward risk are reflected in
attitudes about war, as well. Women were more likely than
men, for example, to fear substantial casualties from the
Gulf War 36 and more likely to believe that the death of U.S.
troops was too high a price to pay for the expulsion of Iraq
from Kuwait.'37
Fear of physical violence is just one facet of concern for
one's physical well-being. Just as women are more afraid of
physical violence than men are, they also exhibit greater
concern for their general physical health. They visit doctors
more than men do (even excluding obstetric and
gynecological visits) and are more likely to seek preventive
care. '3 Indeed, sex is the single strongest predictor of
132. Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender and Aggressive Behavior: A
Meta-Analytic Review of the Social Psychological Literature, 100 PSYCHOL.
BuLL. 309 (1986); B. Ann Bettencourt & Norman Miller, Gender Differences in
Aggression as a Function of Provocation: A Meta-Analysis, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL.
422 (1996).
133. Mark Warr, Fear of Victimization: Why Are Women and the Elderly
More Afraid?, 65 Soc. Sci. Q. 681 (1984).
134. William R. Smith & Marie Torstensson, Gender Differences in Risk
Perception and Neutralizing Fear of Crime, 37 BRiT. J. CRBIINOLOGY 608 (1997);
Randy L. LaGrange & Kenneth F. Ferraro, Assessing Age and Gender
Differences in Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 697 (1989).
While sex differences in fear of crime can be influenced by women's special
vulnerability to rape, Warr, supra note 133, at 700, women's greater fear of
crime extends to other violent crimes as well. Thus, women are more fearful of
being murdered than men, LaGrange & Ferraro, supra, at 706, even though
men are substantially more likely to become murder victims. See M. Dwayne
Smith & Victoria E. Brewer, Female Status and the "Gender Gap" in U.S.
Homicide Victimization, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 339, 339 (1995) (noting
that a "striking characteristic" of homicide in the United States is the
considerably lower rate of female victims). Moreover, women also have greater
fear of property crimes. LaGrange & Ferraro, supra, at 707; Warr, supra note
133, at 681.
135. Smith & Torstensson, supra note 134, at 618.
136. Mary E. Bendyna et al., Gender Differences in Public Attitudes Toward
the Gulf War: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 33 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 5 (1996).
137. Id. at 7.
138. Debra Umberson, Gender, Marital Status and the Social Control of
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preventive health care."9
Risk-taking is associated with a number of other
stereotypically male traits.4 ' People who rate high on
achievement and dominance, for example, tend to be high
risk-takers.' This relationship has led to speculation that
there may be a relationship between risk-taking and
competitiveness, since competition-prone individuals would
be likely to take greater risks in pursuit of their competitive
objective.' High risk takers also fight more frequently, are
more socially aggressive, take more dares, and participate
in more rough sports and physical activities such as
hunting, mountain climbing, and auto racing.' Even more
to the point of this article, among fighter pilots, aces and
non-aces differ substantially in risk-taking rating."M On the
other hand, risk-taking is negatively associated with a
number of stereotypically feminine traits: affiliation,
nurturance, succorance, deference, and abasement.4 Male
sex hormones seem to play a role in sensation-seeking,'
and there appears to be a substantial genetic component to
the trait as well.'
Traditionally, the evolutionary explanation for greater
male risk-taking propensity has focused on the lesser
potential reproductive benefit to women from risk-taking.'
Health Behavior, 34 Soc. SC. MED. 907, 908 (1992).
139. Id.
140. Hamida A. Begum & Eliza Ahmed, Individual Risk Taking and Risky
Shift as a Function of Cooperation-Competition Proneness of Subjects, 31
PSYCHOL. STUDIEs 21 (1986).
141. David C. McClelland & Robert I. Watson, Jr., Power Motivation and
Risk Taking Behavior, 41 J. PERSONALITY 121, 134-35 (1973).
142. Begum & Ahmed, supra note 140, at 22.
143. Jared B. Jobe et al., Risk Taking as Motivation for Volunteering for a
Hazardous Experiment, 51 J. PERSONALITY 95, 95 (1983) (citing E. P. Torrance
& R. C. Ziller, Randolf Air Force Base, Crew Research Laboratory, Air Force
Personnel and Training Research Center, Risk and Life Experience:
Development of a Scale for Measuring Risk-Taking Tendencies (Research Report
AFPTRC-TN-57-23) (1957)).
144. Id.
145. McClelland & Watson, supra note 141.
146. Reid J. Daitzman et al., Sensation Seeking and Gonadal Hormones, 10
J. Biosoc. ScI. 401, 402 (1978); Susan M. Resnick et al., Sensation Seeking in
Opposite-Sex Twins: An Effect of Prenatal Hormones, 23 BEHAV. GEN. 323
(1993).
147. Auke Tellegen et al., Personality Similarity in Twins Reared Apart and
Together, 54 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1031, 1036 (1988).
148. See Wilson & Daly, supra note 106.
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Because risk-taking in males is likely to increase
reproductive success in a way that it would not for women,
there is no reproductive reason for women to subject
themselves to risk. Recently, psychologist Anne Campbell
has argued that this picture of sex differences in risk-taking
is unnecessarily one-sided.' She points out that not only do
women have less to gain reproductively from risk-taking, as
the traditional account suggests, but they also have more to
lose, because the death of a mother is more likely to result
in death of offspring than is the death of a father. "0
2. Aggressiveness. Aggressiveness is another
temperamental trait for which consistent sex differences
are found,'5' and, like risk-taking, differences appear quite
early in development. 2 The term "aggressiveness" requires
some definition, because it can be used to mean different
things. Psychologists often employ a narrow meaning: the
intentional infliction of harm on another.'53 However, both
psychologists and laymen sometimes define the term more
broadly to include not only harm-inflicting behavior, but
also "assertiveness," "competitiveness," "achievement-
motivation," and "dominance-seeking," as in the phrase
"aggressive businessman"2 or "aggressive soccer player." "'
149. See Anne Campbell, Staying Alive: Evolution, Culture and Women's
Intrasexual Aggression, 22 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 203 (1999).
150. Id. at 204-07.
151. ELEANOR MACCOBY & CAROLYN JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX
DIFFERENCES (1974); Eleanor Maccoby & Carolyn Jacklin, Sex Differences in
Aggression: A Rejoinder and Reprise, 51 CHILD DEv. 964 (1980) [hereinafter
Macoby & Jacklin, Sex Differences in Aggression].
152. Maccoby & Jacklin, Sex Differences in Aggression, supra note 151, at
964 (noting that the sex difference is evident at least as early as the preschool
years); Michael J. Boulton, Aggressive Fighting in British Middle School
Children, 19 EDUC. STUD. 19, 25 (1993) (finding that over 90% of observed
playground fights involved boys only).
153. John Archer, The Influence of Testosterone on Human Aggression, 82
BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1991) (stating that "aggression... includes varying
mixtures of three components, the intention to harm another individual, a
behavioural manifestation of this intention, and an accompanying emotion,
ranging from irritation to rage").
154. See Eleanor E. Maccoby, Woman's Intellect, in THE POTENTIAL OF
WOMEN 24, 37 (Seymour M. Farber & Roger H. Wilson eds., 1963) (stating that
"there is good reason to believe that boys are innately more aggressive than
girls-and I mean aggressive in the broader sense, not just as it implies
fighting, but as it implies dominance and initiative as well"); Eagly & Steffen,
supra note 132, at 323 (stating that "nonpsychologists consider that aggression
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These traits, though not identical, appear to be related...
and all show consistent sex differences. Psychologists
Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Nagy Jacklin have observed
that despite frequent assertions that parents reinforce
aggressive behavior in boys, existing research indicates
similarity in parental response to aggressive behavior in
boys and girls.5'
Evidence of sex differences in agression as physical
harm-inflicting behavior is compelling. One of the clearest
indicators of disproportionate male aggressiveness is
involvement in violent crime. 5 ' In 1995, state and federal
prisons held approximately one million inmates,'59 of whom
94% were male. 6 ' The sex disparity for violent crimes is
even greater, since a smaller proportion of female inmates
are serving time for violent offenses.' In 1997, males were
encompasses forceful actions intended to dominate or master, regardless of
their harmful intent").
155. See Eagly & Steffen, supra note 132, at 310-11; J. Philippe Rushton et
al., Altruism and Aggression: The Heritability of Individual Differences, 50 J.
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1192 (1986).
156. Maccoby & Jacklin, Sex Differences in Aggression, supra note 151, at
974.
157. See Frank A. Elliott, Violence: The Neurologic Contribution: An
Overview, 49 ARCH. NEUROLOGY 595, 598 (1992); Archer, supra note 153, at 4
("Surveys of sex or gender differences in human aggression generally show
males to be more aggressive than females, over a wide range of different
measures of direct verbal and physical aggression.").
Eagly & Steffen conducted a meta-analysis of studies of aggression in adults
and concluded that the magnitude of the difference was only modest. Eagly &
Steffen, supra note 132, at 322. However, the authors excluded from their
review literatures on violent crime. Id. at 309. Since their definition of
aggression was behavior that is "intended to inffict harm or injury," id., and
since in our society a great deal of behavior intended to inflict harm is both
illegal and engaged in disproportionately by males, excluding criminal behavior
results in an understatement of the sex difference.
158. See Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law
Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 80-81 (1994) (collecting sources
supporting greater male involvement in violent crime); Walter R. Gove, The
Effect of Age and Gender on Deviant Behavior: A Biopsychosocial Perspective, in
GENDERAND THE LIFE COURSE 115 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1985).
159. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, at v (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdo.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csfcf95.pdf.
160. Id. at 1.
161. In 1991, for example, 47% of male inmates, but only 32% of females,
were serving sentences for violent offenses, meaning that for every woman in
state prison for violent crime, there were twenty-eight men. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Survey of State Prison Inmates, 1991 5
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more than nine times as likely to commit murder as females
were.162
Some have argued that the consistent finding that
males are more aggressive than females is based on an
unduly narrow definition of aggression.16 While males
engage in significantly more direct physical aggression, the
argument goes, females engage in more "indirect"
aggression-that is, hostile behavior "carried out in order to
harm the ,pponent, while avoiding being identified as
aggressive."' Thus, when such actions as social exclusion
and rumor spreading, which are more characteristic of girls,
are included in the definition, the magnitude of the sex
difference substantially declines. 65 That argument need not
detain us here, since even if spreading a rumor belongs in
the same broad classification as punching a nose, the
aggression that is relevant to combat performance is about
as direct and physical as one can imagine.
Men not only engage in more physical forms of attack,
they also have more positive attitudes toward aggression,
being more likely to view it as an acceptable way of
achieving one's ends. Moreover, men experience less guilt
and anxiety about aggression than women do. 66 Like
sensation-seeking, aggression has been associated with the
exposure to sex hormones. 67
(1993), available at http//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sospi9l.pdf
162. James A. Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, Homicide Trends in the United
States, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS CRIME DATA BRIEF (January 1999),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/homtrnd.htm.
163. See, e.g., Karin Osterman et al., Cross-Cultural Evidence of Female
Indirect Aggression, 24 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 1, 6 (1998); Nicki R. Crick et al.,
Relational and Overt Aggression in Preschool, 33 DEVEL. PSYCHOL. 579, 579
(1997); Kaj Bj6rkqvist et al., Do Girls Manipulate and Boys Fight?
Developmental Trends in Regard to Direct and Indirect Aggression, 18
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 117, 117-19 (1992).
164. Osterman et al., supra note 163, at 6.
165. Crick et al., supra note 163, at 579.
166. Anne Campbell & Steven Muncer, Sex Differences in Aggression: Social
Representation and Social Roles, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 233, 234 (1994).
167. Sheri A. Berenbaum & Susan M. Resnick, Early Androgen Effects on
Aggression in Children and Adults with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, 22
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 505, 511 (1997) (finding a relationship between
prenatal androgen exposure and some forms of aggression in adolescence and
adulthood); Marcia L. Collaer & Melissa Hines, Human Behavioral Sex
Differences: A Role for Gonadal Hormones During Early Development?, 118
PSYCHOL. BULL. 55 (1995). The relationship may be more complicated than
commonly realized, see DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 150-71
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The prior two sections have shown that men, on
average, possess to a greater extent than women two
temperamental traits important for combat personnel-a
willingness to apply physical force against another human
being and a willingness to expose themselves to the
possibility of application of that force by others. Because
these are attributes of individuals, it ought in theory to be
possible through use of screening tests to predict which
individuals-male or female-have the requisite
aggressiveness and willingness to take risks to be effective
combat personnel. Unfortunately, experience suggests
otherwise. When combat comes, it is always something of a
surprise to see who will fight and who will not.6 ' As S.L.A.
Marshall observed from his study of combat behavior in
World War II:
[CIompany by company we found in our work that there were men
who had been consistently bad actors in the training period,
marked by the faults of laziness, unruliness, and disorderliness,
who just as consistently became lions on the battlefield, with all
the virtues of sustained aggressiveness, warm obedience, and
thoughtfully planned action .... Did these earlier signs of
indiscipline then provide any light in the search for men who
would probably act well in battle? Not at all! Fighting alongside
the rough characters and taking an equally heroic part in the
actions were an even greater number of men whose preliminary
conduct had marked them as good soldiers.
16 9
In the words of one set of military psychologists, "[a]ll
research work done to predict stress tolerance of soldiers
under war conditions has to be an illusion in terms of the
(1999), but it is no less real for not being simple. But see Peach, supra note 57,
at 185 n.27 (asserting, without citation of authority, that, "even assuming that
women are less aggressive than men, there is still no evidence that this trait
stems from biological causes rather than culture and socialization, which are
malleable") (emphasis added). In fact, there is abundant evidence for those who
are willing to look for it.
168. See F.M. RICHARDSON, FIGHTING SPIRIT: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN
WAR 95 (1978) (noting that "soldiers know from experience that it is so difficult
as to be well-nigh impossible to foretell which men will do well in battle and
which will fail"); DINTER, supra note 75, at 126 (noting that "the situations
which a soldier may face in battle are so varied and so extreme that it is
practically impossible to foresee in peace-time who will be able to cope").
169. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 61; see also ROY R. GRINKER & JOHN P.
SPIEGEL, MEN UNDER STRESS 11 (1945) (noting that "the only valid test for
endurance of combat is combat itself').
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present methodological possibilities."7 ° This is not to
suggest that there are no personality traits that are
predictive of success as a soldier. However, reliable
individual predictions of combat capability simply do not
appear practical in advance of combat, particularly in large
numbers, increasing the need to rely on categorical
judgments. 7 '
C. Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities
Our evolutionary history has left a sexually
differentiated imprint not only on temperament but also on
cognitive abilities. 2 The two sexes have different strengths
and weaknesses, some of which have implications for the
military.
1. Measurement and Reporting of Differences. Before
we turn to specific sex differences, a word about the
measurement of such differences is in order. When
researchers talk about "significant" sex differences, they
might mean one of two things. They might mean that the
difference between male and female performance is
170. Peter Braun et al., The Assessment of Complex Skills and of Personality
Characteristic in Military Services, in REUVEN GAL & A. DAVID MANGELSDORFF,
HANDBOOK OF MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 37, 55 (1991); see also James E. Driskell &
Eduardo Salas, Overcoming the Effects of Stress on Military Performance:
Human Factors, Training, and Selection Strategies, in GAL & MANGELSDORFF,
supra, at 183, 189 (noting that, while screening may be relatively effective for
identifying psychopathology, there has been less success in identifying
personality correlates of the response to stress in normal populations); Paul T.
Bartone & Faris R. Kirkland, Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units, in GAL
& MANGELSDORFF, supra, at 393, 394 (observing that, "[u]nfortunately, there is
little agreement on what constitutes a reasonable predictor of combat
effectiveness").
171. More can be done on a small scale. The Army is relatively confident of
the combat capability of members of its Delta Force, for example, but the
selection process for Delta Force would be difficult to duplicate service-wide.
Applicants are selected from the Army Special Forces and the Rangers, and
then endure a month-long period of selection and assessment. This assessment
involves batteries of psychological tests and grueling physical and mental
challenges under the scrutiny of psychiatrists who attempt to assess how well
they will stand up to combat stress. DOUGLAS C. WALLER, THE COMMANDOS: THE
INSIDE STORY OF AMtERICA'S SECRET SOLDIERS 216-21 (1994). It is considered
extraordinary if twelve out of 100 applicants pass, and sometimes no one in a
class does.
172. See generally DOREEN K IURA, SEX AND COGNITION (1999); DIANE F.
HALPERN, SEX DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE ABILITIES (3d ed. 2000).
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"statistically significant."73 This means that the observed
difference between male and female samples-no matter
how small the magnitude of the difference-can be
attributed to reliable differences between the sexes (or the
subgroup of the sexes from which the sample is drawn, such
as college applicants) rather than being just a chance
consequence of the two samples that happened to be
selected. Put another way, the question is whether the two
samples came from the same hypothetical population or
from different ones.' When sample size is very large, even
tiny differences between two groups may be statistically
significant, even though their magnitude may be so small
as to have no meaningful effect in real life.75
A concept that can provide greater insight into the
meaningfulness of differences is "effect size," which is
denoted as "d." "Effect size" is a measure of the differences
between the means of groups, expressed in terms of the
number of standard deviations separating the means of the
groups.'76 In sex-differences research, d is usually calculated
as the male mean minus the female mean divided by the
pooled standard deviation.'77 Thus, a positive value for d
indicates a higher score for males, and a negative value
indicates a higher score for females. An effect size of 1.0
indicates that the male mean exceeds the female mean by a
full standard deviation, which in practical terms means
that the average male exceeds the performance of 84% of
females.' In such a circumstance, the ratio of males to
females among those who exceed the male mean would be
50:16, or slightly more than 3:1. This description assumes
173. See David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61
WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1342-45 (1986).
174. KIMURA, supra note 172, at 191.
175. See Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond
"Damned Lies," 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 548-52 (1993). The magnitude of sex
differences is often dismissed as being so small as to be meaningless. But see
Robert P. Abelson, A Variance Explanation Paradox: When a Little Is a Lot, 97
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 129, 131 (1985) (stating that although baseball players' batting
skills have a substantial impact on their teams' success, the percentage of
variance in any single batting performance that is explained by batting skill is
only about one-third of one percent).
176. KIMURA, supra note 172, at 194, 202; HALPERN, supra note 172, at 68-
73.
177. KIduRA, supra note 172, at 194.
178. Id.
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that the two groups are equally variable.'79
The proportions described above would be different if
one group is more variable than the other.' On most
cognitive measures-especially ones that favor males-
male performance is more variable than female
performance. 8' These differences in variability can be very
important and can interact with average differences in
fairly striking ways.12 If, for example, there is no sex
difference in the mean (i.e., d=O) but males are more
variable than females, then at both the high and low tails of
the distribution, males will outnumber females; that is,
males will be disproportionately represented among both
the best and the worst. If the male mean is higher than the
female mean and males are more variable, even small
differences in variability and in the mean can yield
substantial sex differences in representation of high
scorers. For example, if d is only 0.10-an effect size that
most would consider trivial-and the male standard
deviation is only slightly larger than the female, say eleven
for males and ten for females, males would outnumber
females by approximately three-to-one in the top tenth of
1%.183
2. Sex Differences in Specific Cognitive Traits. Sex
differences have been reported for a number of cognitive
traits that may be relevant to military occupations,
primarily spatial, mechanical, and mathematical ability.
Among the spatial tasks favoring males are mental
rotation, spatial perception (field independence), spatial
visualization, and targeting."M Tests of mental rotation
require the subject to imagine what a figure would look like
if rotated in a particular way, in either two or three
179. Effect size is not an alternative to statistical significance. In order for a
given effect size to be viewed as "real" and not an artifact of chance, the
difference between the means of the two groups must also be statistically
significant.
180. ARTHUR R. JENSEN, THE G FACTOR: THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL ABILITY 535
(1998).
181. WARREN W. WILLINGHAMi & NANCY S. COLE, GENDER AND FAIR
ASSESSMENT 68-69 (1997).
182. See Alan Feingold, The Additive Effects of Differences in Central
Tendency and Variability Are Important in Comparisons Between Groups, 50
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (1995).
183. Id. at 11.
184. KIMURA, supra note 172, at 53-55.
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dimensions. Such tests reveal the largest and most
consistent sex differences, yielding a d approaching or
exceeding 1.0.185 Spatial perception is the ability to
determine spatial relations, especially in the presence of
distracting cues. For example, the Rod-and-Frame test
requires subjects to set a rod at the true vertical or
horizontal within a frame that may be tilted at various
angles.'86 Spatial visualization is the ability to manipulate
complex spatial information when several steps are
required to produce a correct solution.8 7 Tests that tap this
ability include the embedded-figures test and the hidden-
figures test.88 Targeting involves throwing accuracy, which
has both motor and cognitive components. 9
Sex differences exist for dynamic tasks as well as for
static ones. 9 ' Dynamic tasks may involve judgments of
relative arrival time-which require a decision about which
of two moving objects will arrive first at a given target-
and intercept judgment tasks-which require judgments
about the meeting of two objects. Tests of perceptual-motor
performance-which involve "coordinated movements of two
or more limbs, precisely controlled movements in response
to dynamic stimuli"--likewise show substantial
differences."'
As an illustration that "spatial ability" is not a unitary
185. Id. at 53. A meta-analysis of 286 effect sizes from a large number of
studies found an average effect size in adults of .66 for mental rotation, .48 for
spatial perception, and .23 for spatial visualization. Daniel Voyer et al.,
Magnitude of Sex Differences in Spatial Abilities: A Meta-Analysis and
Consideration of Critical Variables, 117 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 250, 258 (1995); see
also Irwin Silverman et al., Homogeneity of Effect Sizes for Sex Across Spatial
Tests and Cultures: Implications for Hormonal Theories, 31 BRAIN & COGNITION
90, 92 (1996) (finding ds of 1.36 and 1.19 in three-dimensional mental rotation
in Japanese and Canadian samples, respectively); David W. Collins & Doreen
Kimura, A Large Sex Difference on a Two-Dimensional Mental Rotation Task,
111 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 845 (1997) (finding similar results on a difficult
two-dimensional task).
186. KIMURA, supra note 172, at 55.
187. Voyer et al., supra note 185, at 250.
188. HALPERN, supra note 172, at 68.
189. KUJIRA, supra note 172, at 31-36.
190. David J. Law et al., Comparing the Tortoise and the Hare: Gender
Differences and Experience in Dynamic Spatial Ability, 4 PSYCHOL. ScI. 35
(1993).
191. William C. Tirre & Karen K. Raouf, Gender Differences in Perceptual-
Motor Performance, 65 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVIRON. IED. A49, A51 (1994)
(reporting effect sizes of .35 and .62 on two tasks).
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concept, females do better than males in "object location,"
again often yielding effect sizes of approximately 1.0.192 This
test involves first showing subjects an array of objects, then
showing them a second array in which some of the objects
have changed location and requiring them to identify which
objects have been moved.Y These different spatial
strengths of the two sexes yield an interesting real-world
effect. It turns out that males and females use different
tactics in navigation, with men being more attuned to
compass directions, while women are more attentive to
landmarks.'
Sex differences in performance on tests of mathematical
ability also regularly appear.'95 Males consistently excel in
tests of mathematical reasoning,'96 while females excel,
although by substantially smaller margins, in arithmetic
calculation. 9' In nationally representative samples, effect
sizes for overall mathematical ability range mostly between
.10 and .25 on the various intelligence tests.' However,
again because of greater male variability, males outnumber
females by almost 2:1 in the top 10% of math ability.'99 Sex
differences at various levels of performance on the
mathematics portion of the SAT (SAT-M) illustrate the
combined effect of a higher male mean and greater male
192. See Donald H. McBurney et al., Superior Spatial Memory of Women:
Stronger Evidence for the Gathering Hypothesis, 18 EVOLUTION & HUm. BEHAV.
165 (1997) (showing substantial female superiority on the Memory Game')
193. See id. at 167-68.
194. KIIURA, supra note 172, at 47-48. A recent study found that the same
sex differences in route learning that are found in adults are present in children
five to twelve years old. Amber C. Gibbs & Josephine F. Wilson, Sex Differences
in Route Learning by Children, 88 PERCEPT. & MOTOR SKILLS 590, 593 (1999).
195. KMIURA, supra note 172, at 67.
196. Id. at 70.
197. Id. at 68.
198. JENSEN, supra note 180, at 535. Because of greater overall male
variability on these and other tests, broad inferences about males and females
in general cannot properly be drawn from samples that are not representative
of the entire population. Assume, for example, a trait for which d in the overall
population is zero, but where there is greater male variability. A sample taken
from the middle of the ability distribution will show no average sex difference.
However, a sample taken from the high end of ability-for example, from the
college bound-will show a male advantage, because of the greater number of
males in the high end of the distribution. Similarly, a sample taken from the
low end of the sample will show a female advantage, because of the greater
number of males in the low end of the distribution. Id. at 537.
199. Id. at 535. Males outnumber females in the bottom 10% as well. Id.
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variability. The overall effect size is only approximately
.5,20 which means that about 30% of females score above
the male mean. Put another way, the sex ratio among those
scoring above the male mean is five boys to three girls, a
substantial, though not enormous, difference. In a sample of
mathematically precocious youth, however, David Lubinski
and Camilla Benbow found that the male/female ratio of
those scoring over 500 was 2:1; it increased to 4:1 at 600,
and to 13:1 at 700.201
Another dimension of sex differences is mechanical
ability. On the Differential Aptitude Test, male 12th
graders substantially outperform females on mechanical
comprehension, with an effect size of around 0.9.202 A large-
scale study of results on the Air Force Officer Qualification
Test (AFOQT), which is used in the selection of candidates
to be Air Force officers, showed an effect size of 0.95 for
mechanical comprehension.0 3 One caution that applies to
many test results is that the creators of the tests often
intentionally eliminate items that show large sex
differences. 04 The military aptitude tests are exceptions; no
effort is made to minimize sex differences in outcomes on
these tests.0 5
There is substantial reason to believe that these
differences in cognitive performance have an underlying
biological basis. The sex differences seen in the United
States are replicated cross-culturally, although the
magnitude of the differences may vary.06 Moreover, there is
abundant evidence that these differences are mediated by
sex hormones, °0 but only a bit of that evidence will be
200. KDURA, supra note 172, at 67.
201. David Lubinski & Camilla Persson Benbow, Gender Differences in
Abilities and Preferences Among the Gifted: Implications for the Math-Science
Pipeline, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 61, 62 (1992). These results pre-
date the "re-centering" of the SAT, which resulted in compression of top
scores-meaning that sex differences at the top may now be less dramatic but
only because the test does not separate the very good from the exceptional as
well as it formerly did. Michael Winerip, S.A.T. Increases the Average Score, by
Fiat, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1994, at Al.
202. Lubinski & Benbow, supra note 201, at 62.
203. Thomas R. Carretta, Group Differences on US Air Force Pilot Selection
Tests, 5 INT'L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 115, 118 (1997).
204. JENSEN, supra note 180, at 533.
205. Id. at 539.
206. See Silverman et al., supra note 185, at 90-91.
207. KIMURA, supra note 172, at 105-25; GEARY, supra note 3, at 290-93;
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described here.
Spatial ability is substantially correlated with
testosterone levels, although the relationship is not a
simple linear one.20' The optimal testosterone level seems to
be toward the lower end of the normal male range. Thus,
relatively low testosterone levels are optimal for male
spatial performance, while relatively high testosterone
levels are optimal for females, although the performance of
the males remains substantially higher than that for
females.
There are a number of other sources of data that
support the conclusion that cognitive performance is related
to sex hormones. For example, spatial performance in men
varies both with time of day and season of year, being
greater in the afternoon than the morning and greater in
the spring than the fall, both periods of lower testosterone
levels."9 Spatial performance in women varies depending
upon the phase of the menstrual cycle, with performance
being higher in those phases where estrogen levels are
low." ° Moreover, spatial performance is greater in females
with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), a condition in
which fetuses are exposed to abnormal levels of
testosterone.21' Spatial performance also increases in female
to male transsexuals who have undergone testosterone
treatment prior to sex-reassignment surgery.212
An evolutionary explanation for all of the differences
described in this section is quite plausible for some and less
obvious for others. That men, the traditional hunters,
HALPERN, supra note 172, at 150-79.
208. Catherine Gouchie & Doreen Kimura, The Relationship Between
Testosterone Levels and Cognitive Ability Patterns, 16
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 323 (1991). Similar results were found for
mathematical performance, but they fell just short of statistical significance. Id.
at 330.
209. KMIURA, supra note 172, at 119-20.
210. Elizabeth Hampson, Variations in Sex-Related Cognitive Abilities
Across the Menstrual Cycle, 14 BRAIN & COGNITION 26, 37 (1990); Elizabeth
Hampson, Estrogen-Related Variations in Human Spatial and Articulatory-
Motor Skills, 15 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 97, 106 (1990).
211. Elizabeth Hampson et al., Spatial Reasoning in Children with
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia Due to 21-Hydroxylase Deficiency, 14
DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 299, 309 (1998).
212. See Ditte Slabbekoorn et al., Activating Effects of Cross-Sex Hormones
on Cognitive Functioning: A Study of Short-Term and Long-Term Hormone
Effects in Transsexuals, 24 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 423 (1999).
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should have greater dynamic spatial perception and
targeting accuracy, for example, is hardly surprising.213 But
what of the difference in navigational technique? Irwin
Silverman and Marion Eals suggest that these differences
can be attributed to the different demands of hunting and
gathering.214 Because hunters must pursue prey and then
return home, there would be a substantial premium on a
sense of direction that would allow the hunter to proceed
home in a straight line after the kill, rather than having to
retrace what might have been a very lengthy and circuitous
route followed in search of prey. On the other hand,
gatherers often return from year to year to the same
location to find reliable sources of foodstuffs, a task that
landmark recognition would substantially enhance. Thus,
while both hunting and gathering require navigational
skills, they require somewhat different ones.
An evolutionary explanation for sex differences in
mathematical ability is less obvious. Mathematics is a
relatively recent activity, and for most of our evolutionary
history, no one was doing math problems. But
mathematical ability, like reading ability, presumably is
related to some other abilities that were important even
before the development of mathematics or written
language. Some have argued that mathematical ability is
simply a by-product of spatial ability,215 although others
have expressed doubt because of the low correlation, at
least in some samples, of spatial and mathematical
ability.2
16
Although it is commonly asserted that differences in
mathematical and spatial ability are due exclusively to
213. See generally David C. Geary, Sexual Selection and Sex Differences in
Spatial Cognition, 7 LEARNING & INDIVD. DIFF. 289 (1995).
214. Irwin Silverman & Marion Eals, Sex Differences in Spatial Abilities:
Evolutionary Theory and Data, in JEROME BARKOW ET AL., THE ADAPTED MIND:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CuLTURE 534 (1992).
215. GEARY, supra note 3, at 312-13.
216. KmnURA, supra note 172, at 70. Among some samples, mathematical
ability is significantly correlated with mental rotation ability, so that if mental
rotation ability is held constant, the sex differences in mathematical
performance disappear. M. Beth Casey et al., The Influence of Spatial Ability on
Gender Differences in Mathematics College Entrance Test Scores Across Diverse
Samples, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 697, 701 (1995). However, for
mathematically precocious pre-adolescents, the sex difference was reduced only
slightly by controlling for mental rotation ability (unadjusted d=.70; adjusted
d=.60). Id.
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social factors, such as differential encouragement of the
sexes in mathematics, differential expectations of teachers
and parents, and differential participation in sports, there
is little evidence to support such assertions and much
evidence that calls them into question. Although it would be
foolhardy to dismiss social contributors entirely, it seems
unlikely that such factors as differential participation in
sports or differential use of video games can explain the
existence of sex differences in spatial ability, given that
such differences are found in young children.21 The
argument that girls internalize the view that math is for
boys is difficult to square with the fact that girls do better
than boys at arithmetic calculation, which, for most people,
is math.218 Moreover, one would expect that if girls are
trying to hide their mathematical ability, they would do
relatively better on anonymous standardized tests than
they would on more visible enterprises, such as classroom
performance. Yet, the observed pattern is just the opposite.
Girls get better grades in school than boys do, even in math,
but do less well on standardized tests of conceptual
ability.219 At this point, the weight of evidence supports the
conclusion that boys have greater spatial and mathematical
ability and that there is an underlying biological
explanation for these differences.
D. Sex Differences in Physical Strength
The existence of sex differences in physical strength
requires little elaboration. The difference between the
average upper-body strength of men and that of women is
very large, larger than most of the sex differences in
temperament or cognitive ability previously discussed.
Women have approximately one-half to two-thirds the
upper-body strength of men. In many studies, the effect
217. Susan C. Levine et al., Early Sex Differences in Spatial Skill, 35
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 940, 940 (1999). The magnitude of the differences,
however, is smaller than that found among adults.
218. KnIURA, supra note 172, at 68.
219. Id. at 67-68.
220. S.T. Pheasant, Sex Differences in Strength-Some Observations on
Their Variability, 14 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 205 (1983). Sex differences in
strength are observable even among newborns. Carol Nagy Jacklin et al.,
Tactile Sensitivity and Muscle Strength in Newborn Boys and Girls, 4 INFANT
BEHAVIOR & DEVEL. 261 (1981).
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sizes are greater than 1.5, which means that there is very
little overlap between the strength distributions of the two
sexes.22' For most measures of upper-body strength, the
probability that a man selected at random from the
population will be stronger than a randomly selected
woman is over 95%.
Many believe that the strength difference between men
and women is limited to upper-body strength. Although
upper-body strength differences are the largest, substantial
differences in lower-body strength exist as well with effect
sizes generally ranging from around 1.0 to 1.5.222 The reason
for the common perception that sex differences do not exist
in lower-body strength is that often the sex difference
disappears when controlling for "lean body weight." Thus, a
study of male and female West Point cadets found that an
effect size of 1.3 for the leg press disappeared after such
control.2' This phenomenon apparently accounts for the
suggestion by one proponent of women in combat that
women may actually be better at "leg wrestling" than
men. 2  She does not provide any authority for the
suggestion that women would actually defeat men in leg
wrestling, however, nor does she explain how we can
convince our adversaries to decide our disputes in that way.
In any event, given the twin facts that women are
substantially smaller than men and that a greater
proportion of their body mass consists of fat, unless we
could convince our enemies to send only their smallest
soldiers into these leg-wrestling battles, women would be
substantially outclassed. The same study of West Point
cadets found that the effect size for lean body mass (d=1.73)
was actually larger than that for leg strength, so much so
that more than 99% of the time a man chosen at random
would have greater lean body mass than a randomly chosen
221. Pheasant, supra note 220, at 207. See, e.g., Richard R. Reilly et al.,
Validity and Fairness of Physical Ability Tests for Predicting Performance in
Craft Jobs, 64 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 262 (1979); James R. Morrow, Jr. & W.W.
Hosler, Strength Comparisons in Untrained Men and Trained Women Athletes,
13 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 194 (1981); Phillip Bishop et al., Sex
Difference in Muscular Strength in Equally-Trained Men and Women, 30
ERGONOMICS 675 (1987).
222. Morrow & Hosler, supra note 221, at 195; see Bishop et al., supra note
221.
223. Terrence Hoffman et al., Sex Difference in Strength, 7 AM. J. SPORTS
MED. 265 (1979).
224. Kornblum, supra note 10, at 417.
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woman.
In addition to differences in individual traits,
differences in social interactions between members of the
two sexes are also relevant to the question of integration of
women into combat positions. The next section deals with a
less tangible and less easily measured psychological
phenomenon-men's inclination to form coalitions with
other men from which women are excluded.
E. The Male Tendency to Form Same-Sex Coalitions
In addition to individual differences, sex differences in
social interactions may also be relevant to the question of
sexual integration in combat. One characteristic feature of
human societies is the division of labor by sex, which is a
human universal.225 All societies have recognized "men's
work" and "women's work."226 Although the content of the
categories often varies, some categories are relatively
constant. For example, big-game hunting and warfare are
virtually everywhere the exclusive domain of men.227 The
division of labor seems likely to be related to, although
perhaps in a complex way, some differences in cognitive
abilities, especially spatial ability, reflecting the different
demands placed on hunters and gatherers, respectively.228
The social environments of men and women have
traditionally differed. In our ancestral environment, women
often worked with sisters and co-wives, situations in which
they gained no reproductive advantage through open
conflict or changes in coalitions. 229 Female coalitions are
seldom powerful in the extra-domestic sphere.' ° Male-male
coalitions, on the other hand, tend to be associated with
status competition and with resources that are best
225. See DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UmVERSALS 48, 137 (1991).
226. MARGARET MEA, MALE AND FEMALE 7 (1949) (noting that "[i]n every
known society, mankind has elaborated the biological division of labour into
forms often very remotely related to the original biological differences that
provided the original clues").
227. Roy G. D'Andrade, Sex Differences and Cultural Institutions, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SEX DIFFERENCES 173, 177 (Eleanor E. Maccoby ed., 1966).
228. See Silverman & Eals, supra note 214, at 534-35.
229. See Bobbi S. Low, Sex, Coalitions, and Politics in Preindustrial
Societies, 11 POLITICS & LIFE Sci. 63, 67 (1992).
230. BOBBI S. Low, WHY SEX MATTERS: A DARWIAN LOOK AT HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 194 (2000) [hereinafter LOw, WHY SEx MATrERs].
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obtained or protected by groups of males."' Men tend to
cooperate with male relatives and non-relatives at times
and compete with them at other times, resulting in more
fluid coalitions.232
Humans, being social primates, form relationships with
other conspecifics. The reproductive bond between male and
female is a fundamental bond that everyone appreciates, if
not understands. It is a product of our sexual psychologies
that deals with the problems of mating and the rearing of
offspring. It typically exists between two specific
individuals (although in polygamous societies, an individual
may possess such a bond with more than one partner).
Another form of relationship that seems to be a product of
our primate heritage is a tendency of men to form male
coalitions, which form to solve any number of problems,
such as subsistence, warfare, and politics."3 Lionel Tiger, in
his seminal work Men in Groups, labeled this coalition
formation "male bonding," a term he defined as "a
particular relationship between two or more males such
that they react differently to members of their bonding unit
as compared to individuals outside of it.""4 Tiger argues
that male-male bonds are of the same biological order for
defensive, food-gathering, and social-order-maintenance
purposes as the male-female bond is for reproductive
purposes."'Part of Tiger's description of bonding is that generally
231. Id. at 194.
232. Similar sex differences are observed in chimpanzees, with males
engaging in cooperation on a transactional basis, helping one another on a tit-
for-tat basis, while females cooperate on the basis of kinship and personal
preference. FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES
185-87, 194-99 (1982); see also RICHARD WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC
MALES: APES AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMiAN VIOLENCE (1996) (describing the
practice of both human and chimpanzee males to band together to attack
others).
233. See LIONEL TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS (1969); see also Craig B. Stanford,
Predation and Male Bonds in Primate Societies, 135 BEHAVIOUR 513, 514 (1998)
(defining "male bonds" as "social relationships among adult males that involve
cooperative behavior, such as joint defense against predators or extragroup
conspecifics, in the defense of food sources, or in within-group coalitions
involving competition for females").
234. TIGER, supra note 233, at 19. Unfortunately, the term "male bonding"
has taken on a quasi-mystical meaning that appears quite different from Tiger's
original meaning. See, e.g., Men Bond to Touch Their Souls, USA TODAY, Oct.
22, 1990, at 1-D (describing activities of the "men's movement").
235. TIGER, supra note 233, at 42.
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"males and females are not interchangeable in the process
of forming and maintaining bonds in those species in which
male bonding occurs. " 6 The organization of cooperative
groups for hunting or warfare may have resulted in
substantial selective pressure for "all-maleness."237
According to Tiger, most adult females would be pregnant
or nursing most of the time and therefore would be unable
to participate effectively in these activities, and those who
did would risk the loss of their offspring, born or unborn.
Men who permitted women to join their ventures would
also be at a disadvantage, because women would be less
valuable contributors and their presence could disrupt the
cooperative nature of the enterprise by engendering
competition for sexual access.23 Tiger summarizes his
points as follows:
(1) that, when they can, males choose their workmates in
processes analogous to sexual selection; (2) that the bond
established generates considerable emotion; (3) that males derive
important satisfactions from male bonds and male interactions
which they cannot derive from male-female bonds and
interactions; and (4) that the sexual division of labour is a
consequence of males' wishes to preserve their unisexual bonds
and not simply a result of physical and temperamental differences
with females in any culture.
A slightly different, but related, argument is that it was
not an affirmative aversion to women that developed. After
all, in our ancestral environment, few women would have
had the time or inclination to participate in warfare, and
therefore there would have been little selective pressure for
"anti-woman" tendencies. Rather, it may simply be that
men, having evolved to participate in these all-male groups,
developed a tendency to form particular relationships with
other men, and whatever it is about other men that triggers
these relationships is simply not present in women.
236. Id. at 20.
237. Id. at 44. Tiger places primary emphasis on bonding for hunting
purposes, and seemingly only secondarily on bonding for aggressive purposes. It
may be that the pressures related to organized aggression were as great as, or
even greater than, those related to hunting. Although big-game hunting is
dangerous, it may not be as dangerous as warfare. Moreover, warfare may have
been even more prevalent than large-game hunting in our evolutionary past.
238. Id. at 44-45.
239. Id. at 100.
2001]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the true answer is a mixture of two. It is certainly
the case that many men exhibit a strong aversion to the
inclusion of women in all-male groups, while others simply
report that women's inclusion just does not "feel right."
While these explanations are admittedly somewhat
speculative, they plausibly account for much cross-cultural
observation.
All-male groups-whether secret societies, warrior
groups, street gangs, or college fraternities-are quite
common cross-culturally and are often involved with the
use of force, which is virtually a male monopoly.24 ° Men tend
to bond most strongly in situations involving power, force,
and dangerous work, and they consciously and emotionally
exclude females from these groups.24
Precursors of human male-male coalitions can be seen
in the behavior of our chimpanzee cousins. One is
immediately struck, for example, by the similarities
between Lawrence Keeley's description of primitive raids. 2
and the description by Richard Wrangham and Dale
Peterson of raids conducted by chimpanzee bands. 43
Wrangham and Peterson describe the behavior of (mostly
male) chimpanzee bands in Tanzania that appeared
purposefully and silently to strike out into the territory of
another band and over time kill all of the males in the other
band.2 " The females were either killed or incorporated into
the victorious group.
There should be nothing at all surprising in the
suggestion that individuals have biases in selection of
others with whom they interact in circumstances in which
the choice may have an important effect on the individual's
fitness.245 Most people by now accept, for example, that a
male preference for reproductive-age women as sex
partners is not simply arbitrary. A man who found gray
hair and wrinkles more attractive than smooth skin and
240. See id. at 126-131.
241. Id. at 75-76.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49 & 51-52.
243. WRANGHAm & PETERSON, supra note 232, at 5-21; see also JANE
GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 488-534 (1986).
244. See Low, supra note 230, at 223 (noting that "[wihat we call warfare in
preindustrial societies is indistinguishable in context and function from much
intergroup aggression seen in other species; it differs only in scope").
245. Lee Alan Dugatkin & Andrew Sih, Behavioral Ecology and the Study of
Partner Choice, 99 ETHOLOGY 265 (1995).
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lustrous hair would be easily out-competed in the
reproductive arena by men with the opposite preferences. 6
Mating is not the only context in which partner choice is
significant to the individual, however. Men who were as
willing to stand shoulder to shoulder on the hunt or in
battle with weak and cowardly men-or with women-
would likely find themselves reproductively disadvantaged
over time. Even many species of fish display partner
preferences, preferring those who have shown themselves
trustworthy in foraging or anti-predator behavior.247
The social-constructionist view of human male groups is
that their exclusion of females is an arbitrary pattern
adopted by the society and that society could as easily
fashion sexually integrated groups having the same
function. However, as with so many assertions of socially
constructed sex differences, one must wonder why the
"arbitrary" pattern is so widespread. The biological view, or
a least a biological view, is that there is something inherent
in male psychology that predisposes men to group in that
pattern, and a consequence of that predisposition is that
sexual integration changes the character of the group,
altering the psychic benefits to its members and perhaps
undermining its effectiveness.
In sum, there is convincing evidence that men and
women differ on average in a number of important combat-
relevant temperamental, cognitive, physical, and behavioral
traits. Most of these traits would have been important to
the primitive warrior: physical strength, aggressiveness,
willingness to take risks, ability to throw accurately, and
ability to navigate through strange territory. The tendency
of men to form coalitions that exclude women in response to
dangerous circumstances may help explain the
overwhelming tendency of cultures throughout the world
and throughout time to rely upon males for defense, as well
as the conception of combat as a male activity from which
women should be excluded. While mathematical ability per
se, and perhaps mechanical ability, would have provided
the primitive warrior no advantage, the underlying trait
that gives rise to these abilities may have done so.
246. Douglas T. Kenrick & Richard C. Keefe, Age Preferences in Mates
Reflect Sex Differences in Human Reproductive Strategies, 15 BEHAVIORAL &
BRAIN Sci. 75, 77 (1992).
247. Dugatkin & Sih, supra note 245.
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Moreover, given the increasingly technical nature of
warfare, mathematical and mechanical ability have become
increasingly important to many military functions.
The next section discusses the traditional intertwining
of warfare and masculinity and examines how this link may
affect the willingness of men and women to fight.
IV. WAR AS A MASCULINE PURSUIT
A. The Traditional Link Between Warfare and Masculinity
War is Hell, as Sherman said, but it is not pure Hell for
all men all of the time. The fact is that some men enjoy war
and "there are few soldiers for whom military service does
not have, albeit in rosy retrospect, some attractions."248
Many soldiers say that their combat service was the
happiest time of their lives: "The honor and romanticism
involved in fighting a war often appeal to the young soldier
who experiences the need for asserting manliness or
toughness."2 49 In his study of war memoirs, Samuel Hynes
wrote:
What is it, exactly, that war lovers love? Not the killing and the
violence, I think, but the excitement, the drama, and the danger-
life lived at a high level of intensity, like a complicated, fatal game
(or a Wagnerian opera).
War is an exciting, dangerous, skillful, physical occupation, to
which most men respond while they're there. Some men never lose
their taste, or their need, for that excitement but go on being war
lovers all their lives. They makegood soldiers, but they are by and
large no good for war memoirs.
248. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 271. This is not to say that all men enjoy
combat or the prospect of it. If they did, there would be little need for wartime
conscription. From the privileged position of a prosperous peacetime society,
however, the question that needs answering is why anyone would find
satisfaction in an endeavor involving so much risk, pain, and privation.
249. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 164; see also J. GLENN GRAY, THE
WARRIORS: REFLECTIONS OF MEN IN BATTLE 28 (1959) ("What are these secret
attractions of war, the ones that have persisted in the West despite
revolutionary changes in the methods of warfare? I believe that they are: the
delight in seeing, the delight in comradeship, the delight in destruction. Some
fighters know one appeal, and not the others, some experience all three, and
some may, of course, feel other appeals that I do not know.").
250. SAMUEL HYNES: THE SOLDIERS' TALE: BEARING WITNESS TO MODERN WAR
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The eagerness of many men to go into war is well
known. In the early stages of World War I, Americans
crossed the border into Canada to join the Canadian Army
before the "fim" was over.2"' Audie Murphy, the most
decorated American soldier in World War II, was one of
untold numbers in all of our wars who describe being afraid
that the war would be over before he got into it.2 Pilots
competed to go to Guadalcanal even when it appeared that
Guadalcanal would go the way of Wake Island, leading to
certain death or capture of those who went.253 Alvin Kernan
resigned from aviator training to get his rating of first-class
ordnanceman back because the surfeit of aviators in
training meant that it would take him another year to get
his wings and he wanted to get back to the war."'
This "rosy" perspective is not limited to men who are on
the winning side. It would be hard to imagine a more
unpleasant experience than serving in the German army for
two-and-a-half years on the Russian front. In his memoirs,
Guy Sajer recounts almost inconceivable hardships and
brutality-from men urinating on their hands and the
hands of their comrades to warm them; to a pattern of
atrocities on both sides; to extraordinarily heavy casualties.
Yet, he wrote, "even now, looking back on everything that
happened, I cannot regret having belonged to a combat
unit. We discovered a sense of comradeship which I have
never found again, inexplicable and steady, through thick
and thin."255
This perspective is also not limited to epic wars like
23 (1997). In his own memoirs, Hynes recounts the positive effect of a kamikaze
raid late in the war: "We took it as a sign that the war was still with us, that we
still had an enemy, and went to bed heartened by the incident." SAMUEL HYNES,
FLIGHTS OF PASSAGE: REFLECTIONS OF A WORLD WAR II AvIATOR 180 (1988).
251. STOKESBURY, supra note 91, at 34.
252. MURPHY, supra note 62, at 7. Murphy tried to join the Marines, but he
was too small, so the Army infantry took him. Id. at 7-8; see also SLEDGE, supra
note 63, at 5 (stating that although his family in 1942 urged him to stay in
college to obtain a commission, "prompted by a deep feeling of uneasiness that
the war might end before I could get overseas in combat, I wanted to enlist in
the Marine Corps as soon as possible"). Sledge then signed up for an officer
training corps, but, like half of his detachment, intentionally flunked out of
school to get into the war sooner as an enlisted man.
253. BRAND, supra note 66, at 117.
254. ALvIN KERNAN, CROSSING THE LINE: A BLUEJACKET'S WORLD WAR II
ODYSSEY 130 (1994).
255. GuY SAJER, THE FORGOTTEN SOLDIER 333 (1967).
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World War II. In a three-week period in August 1950,
15,000 Canadians volunteered to fight in Korea."6 Pilots in
Korea tried to avoid the point system that would require
that they be rotated home.57 A battalion commander in the
battle of Chipyong-ni was a former general who had taken a
demotion to Lieutenant Colonel in order to obtain a combat
command.
258
Although the Vietnam War was unpopular at home
(and often in the field), the common assumption that all of
those who fought there hated the experience is belied by the
testimony of many participants. Philip Caputo wrote of his
experience:
After I came home from the war, I was often asked how it felt,
going into combat for the first time. I never answered truthfully,
afraid that people would think of me as some sort of war-lover.
The truth is, I felt happy. The nervousness had left me the
moment I got into the helicopter, and I felt happier than I ever
had. I don't know why.
259
James Estep, commander of an airmobile rifle company,
similarly explains his decision to volunteer for a third tour
of duty in Vietnam. He wrote:
Why? I asked myself. Why go back again? Two times should be
enough for any sane man. And don't tell yourself it's because of
patriotic fever, that you're once again heeding the trumpet's call.
You're not. Nor is it because America's infantry is now in the fray
and you, as a captain of infantry, should be in it with them. That's
not really it; you saw enough of that sort of thing last time around.
Then why go again? You know the answer. It's because you like it!
Yes, it's really that simple; you like the pace of combat, like that
awareness of life that only it seems to induce. You like to feel that
sudden surge of adrenaline when confronting the unexpected; you
like the lack of routine, the opportunity to innovate, the hunting of
animals who do indeed shoot back, the stark terror and brilliant
splendor of a firefight... and you like watching boys grow into
men virtually overnight and in most cases being better off for
having done so. You like the fear of the unknown, and for that
matter you like these familiar feelings of apprehension and
256. STOKESBURY, supra note 71, at 220.
257. Id. at 212-13.
258. Id. at 121.
259. CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 81.
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remorse you're now experiencing."6
Suggesting that Caputo's and Estep's perspective is not
an extraordinary one is a 1980 Veterans Administration
study that found that "71 percent of those polled said that
they were 'glad' to have gone to Vietnam; 74 percent
claimed to have 'enjoyed' their tour there; 66 percent
expressed a willingness to serve again."26' Although the
flight of many American draft dodgers and deserters to
Canada is well known, less well known is the fact that even
more Canadians-some 30,000-voluntarily enlisted in the
U.S. armed forces and saw service in Vietnam.262 The simple
fact is that many men like combat.2"
Sometimes there is a darker side. Some men not only
find that they like the camaraderie and the excitement and
feeling of freedom in a combat zone, they also find that they
like to kill. Frederick Downs, an Army platoon leader in
Vietnam, candidly acknowledged what many are loath to
admit:
It turned out that most of us liked to kill other men. Some of the
guys would shoot at a dink much as they would at a target. Some
of the men didn't like to kill a dink up close. The closer the killing,
the more personal it became.
Others in the platoon liked to kill close in. A few even liked to
torture the dinks if they had a prisoner or cut the dead bodies with
knives in a frenzy of aggression. A few didn't like to kill at all and
wouldn't fire their weapons except to protect their buddies.26
If there were not some attractions to war, the horror
260. ESTEP, supra note 62, at 5-6.
261. KARNOW, supra note 72, at 480.
262. DUNNIGAN & NOFI, supra note 39, at 65.
263. In his account of a firefight in Somalia, Mark Bowden describes a
young Army Ranger who decided, while crouched in the street behind a rock too
small to provide him cover, and with bullets snapping over his head and hitting
around him, that he enjoyed the experience so much that he would re-enlist for
another four years. MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DowN 245-46 (1999).
264. FREDERICK DowNs, THE KILLING ZONE: MY LIFE IN THE VIETNAMi WAR
149 (1978); See also William Broyles, Why Men Love War, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1984,
at 54, 61 (describing a "love of war [that] stems from the union, deep in the core
of our being, between sex and destruction, beauty and horror, love and death,"
and noting that "one of the most troubling reasons men love war is the love of
destruction, the thrill of killing"); BOURKE, supra note 65, at 18-21 (describing
the joy of slaughter for many combatants).
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would probably be unbearable. The ambivalence of
professional soldiers is revealed in Robert E. Lee's
observation, made while looking over the Union dead at
Fredericksburg, "it is well that war is so terrible or we
would become too fond of it."65 What accounts for the
strange appeal of an enterprise that can be so painful and
destructive and that is so contrary to "civilized" mores and
norms? The answer appears to lie deep in the male psyche.
Warfare has always been, with only very limited
exceptions,266 the work of men. No modern society relies,
and virtually no pre-modern society relied, on women as
combat soldiers. As psychologist David Barash has
observed, "in every known society-now and at any time in
the past-it has been men and not women who were
primarily expected to deal with enemies."" '
Not only is warfare a male occupation, in many ways it
has been viewed as the quintessential "manly" pursuit.
Unlike, say, the manufacture of musical instruments-a
task that also tends cross-culturally to be performed by
men -warfare has often been the defining feature of
masculinity for a culture, and courage and manhood have
been inextricably intertwined.269  In many primitive
societies, for example, a male was not entitled to full status
as a man until he distinguished himself in warfare, usually
by killing an enemy. In some areas of Oceania, a man could
not marry until he had taken an enemy head.70 Moreover,
the capture of women was often one of the spoils of victory,
and sometimes one of the primary aims, of warfare in tribal
societies.2 ' Among American Indian tribes, a successful
warrior could often have a broad selection of sexual
partners or wives." 2
Just as warfare has been associated with men, peace
265. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 274.
266. See, e.g., DAVID E. JONES, WOMEN WARRIORS: A HISTORY (1997); JOHN
LAFFIN, WOMEN IN BATTLE (1967).
267. DAVID P. BARASH, BELOVED ENEMIES: OUR NEED FOR OPPONENTS 65
(1994) (noting the "virtually unanimous, apparently independent insistence on
male soldiering, encompassing people as diverse as humanity itself, from New
Guinea to the African Bush to the Amazon Basin, the North American Plains,
Europe, and Asia").
268. D'Andrade, supra note 227, at 174-204.
269. WILLAM IAN MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE 13 (2000).
270. TURNEY-HIGH, supra note 47, at 161.
271. KEELEY, supra note 44, at 86.
272. TURNEY-HIGH, supra note 47, at 158.
106 [Vol. 49
WOMEN AT WAR
has often been associated with women. Although the
Shoshone girl Sacagawea is often erroneously referred to as
Lewis and Clark's "guide," her most significant contribution
to that epic journey was to reassure Indians who might
have perceived the explorers as having hostile intentions.
William Clark wrote in his journal: "The wife of Shabono
[Charbonneau] our interpreter we find reconsiles all the
Indians, as to our friendly intentions[.] A woman with a
party of men is a token of peace."273 Similarly, in the first
contact with the people of the highlands of New Guinea in
the early 1920s, Australian prospector Michael Leahy
recorded in his diary: "It was a relief when the [highland
natives] came in sight, the men in front, armed with bows
and arrows, the women behind bringing stalks of
sugarcane. When he saw the women, [the native guide from
the lowlands] told me at once that there would be no
fight."274 Similarly, the Papuans of New Guinea viewed
peace declarations as women's work, so wives accompanied
their husbands to the hostile village.275 Indeed, there is
research suggesting that the presence of sexually attractive
women has an appeasing effect.
2 76
Successful participation in warfare often had a
reproductive payoff. Behavioral ecologist Bobbi Low has
pointed out that throughout history men have been able to
gain reproductively by warring behavior.27 7 While the
association between prowess as a warrior and reproductive
success may no longer hold,278  the behavioral
predispositions of that evolutionary legacy persist.279
The link between warfare and manliness persists to the
273. 3 MERMWETHER LEWIS & WILLIAm CLARK, ORIGINAL JOURNALS OF THE
LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION 111 (Reuben G. Thwaites ed., 1904) (entry of Oct.
13, 1805).
274. BOB CONNOLLY & ROBIN ANDERSON, FIRST CONTACT 24 (1987).
275. TURNEY-HIGH, supra note 47, at 247. That night the hosts would have
sexual relations with their guests' women, "and that is the real object of the
visit." Id.
276. Robert A. Baron, Sexual Arousal and Physical Aggression: The
Inhibiting Influence of "Cheesecake" and Nudes, 3 BULLETIN PSYCHONOMIC SOC.
337, 339 (1974); Robert A. Baron, The Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of
Heightened Sexual Arousal, 30 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 318, 321 (1974).
277. Bobbi S. Low, An Evolutionary Perspective on War, in BEHAVIOR,
CULTURE, AND CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 13, 19, 44 (W. Zimmerman & H.K.
Jacobson eds., 1993); Low, WHY SEX MATTERS, supra note 230, at 223-29.
278. Low, An Evolutionary Perspective on War, supra note 277, at 46.
279. Id.
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modern age. Samuel Stouffer's classic study of soldiers in
World War II concluded that the core code by which
members of combat units judged each other was "Be a
man." ' The shared conception of masculinity included
"courage, endurance and toughness, lack of squeamishness
when confronted with shocking or distasteful stimuli,
avoidance of display of weakness in general, reticence about
emotional or idealistic matters, and sexual competency."
281
The conception of manliness that Stouffer was
attempting to capture was less the flamboyant machismo of
Sylvester Stallone's Rambo or John Wayne's Sergeant
Stryker than it was the quiet masculinity of Gary Cooper's
Sergeant York or even Tom Hanks's Captain Miller.8 The
Rambo type may be successful for a while but they risk
getting not only themselves but their comrades killed.283 As
S.L.A. Marshall has noted, "[t]he majority are unwilling to
take extraordinary risks and do not aspire to a hero's role,
but they are equally unwilling that they should be
considered the least worthy among those present."2" In
modern warfare, the aspiring "hero" is not typically
admired by his comrades and the negative definition of the
role tends to discourage the overly risky and aggressive
behavior that could cause enemy fire to rain down.285 This
sentiment is the origin of the infantry maxim "Never share
a foxhole with anyone braver than you."286 In Vietnam, such
norms were sometimes enforced even against non-
commissioned officers and company-grade commissioned
280. SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT AND ITS
AFERMATH VOL. II 131 (1949).
281. Id.
282. Indeed, William Manchester describes the hostile treatment given John
Wayne by the troops. MANCHESTER, supra note 63, at 23.
283. See MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 132 (asserting that "brilliant
individualism at the expense of team play will invariably prove more fatal on
the field of battle than ever on the field of sport").
284. Id. at 149.
285. Roger W. Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, in THE
NEW MILITARY: CHANGING PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION 195, 204-05 (Morris
Janowitz ed., 1964); see also CHARLES MOSKOS, JR., THE AMERICAN ENLISTED
MAN 155 (1970) (noting that once a unit has been exposed to combat,
"definitions of manly honor are not seen to encompass individual heroics" and
that "the very word 'hero' is used to describe negatively any soldier who
recklessly jeopardizes the unit's welfare"). Even Audie Murphy recounted that
he would rather have been with anyone other than a particular man he was
with because that man took too many chances. MURPHY, supra note 62, at 17.
286. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 339.
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officers through the practice of "fragging," which involved
the killing of superiors through the use of fragmentation
grenades or otherwise."
The link between warfare and sexuality has not been
severed. Many have noted the attraction that women have
for men in uniform. Alvin Kernan wrote about his return on
leave to Wyoming after service in the Pacific:
[Tihe uniform really did, as I had heard rumored overseas, seem to
work some kind of magic. Girls who would never speak to me
before were now willing to dally and to charm. Most myths are just
that, myths, but the connection between sex and war must have
some truth in it, for chastity seemed to have been cast aside in the
Rocky Mountains for the duration.2
Glenn Gray indicates that the uniform did not just have an
effect on the women who saw it, but also upon the men who
wore it, remembering that "[w]hen we were in uniform
almost any girl who was faintly attractive had an erotic
appeal for us." 9
The personal appeal of warfare is not necessarily linked
in any important way to a commitment to bellicosity or a
conservative ideology. Philip Caputo's classic Vietnam
memoir A Rumor of War demonstrates a common
ambivalence about war. Caputo, like many men, joined the
Marines because of a need to prove something: "my courage,
my toughness, my manhood."90 He was among the first
Marines who landed at Danang in 1965.291 After his
discharge, he participated in the anti-war movement 2
Nonetheless, he describes his wartime experience as being
"as fascinating as it was repulsive, as exhilarating as it was
sad, as tender as it was cruel."293 Even after his convictions
about the war "had eroded almost to nothing," he
volunteered for a line company because of the "magnetism"
of combat.294
Not only does combat appeal to the masculinity of men,
it also rewards it. A study of combat performance in the
287. HOLAIES, supra note 60, at 329.
288. KERNAN, supra note 254, at 93.
289. GRAY, supra note 249, at 61.
290. CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 6.
291. Id. at xi.
292. Id. at xiv.
293. Id. at xv.
294. Id. at 230.
2001] 109
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Korean War found that more "masculine" men-as reflected
in the Strong Vocational Interest Battery and in
masculinity-femininity scales of personality tests-were
judged by their peers to be more effective fighters than less-
masculine men." The attributes of effective fighters ranged
from calmness under fire to "the highest kind of daring and
bravery," while the attributes of ineffective fighters ranged
from firing at imaginary objects to failing to fire to running
away under fire.296
The military did not create the link between militarism
and masculinity. After all, long before boys learn what basic
training is about, they engage in militaristic play. However,
the military has relied on that link in a very substantial
way.297 As Charles Moskos has noted, one of the only ways
to convince men in combat to do "an essentially irrational
thing-put themselves in a position where they are likely to
get killed"-is to appeal to their masculinity. 29' Recruiting
slogans such as "The Marine Corps Builds Men" and "Join
the Army and Feel Like a Man 2  are designed to operate
on a young male mind that already associates masculinity
with toughness.
B. A Critique of the Link Between Warfare and Masculinity
The previously widely accepted link between warfare
and masculinity has been subjected to recent attack in a
number of quarters. In a recent article, for example,
Madeline Morris, former Special Assistant to the Secretary
of the Army, argued for transition to an "ungendered"
vision of warrior, "from a masculinist vision of unalloyed
295. MARTIN BINKIN, WHO WILL FIGHT THE NExT WAR: THE CHANGING FACE
OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY 39 (1993) (citing Robert L. Egbert et al., Fighter I:
An Analysis of Combat Fighters and Nonfighters, Technical Report 44 (Presidio
of Monterey, Calif; U.S. Army Leadership Human Research Unit) iii, 26 (Dec.
1957)). The five main factors distinguishing good fighters were (in decreasing
order of importance): leadership, masculinity, intelligence, sense of humor, and
emotional stability. PETER WATSON, WAR ON THE MIND: THE MILITARY USES AND
ABUSES OF PSYCHOLOGY 49 (1978).
296. Robert L. Egbert, Profile of a Fighter, INFANTRY SCH. Q. 46, 47 (Oct.
1954).
297. See William Arkin & Lynne R. Dobrofsky, Military Socialization and
Masculinity, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES 151 (1978).
298. BINKIN, supra note 295, at 39 (quoting Charles Moskos) (citations
omitted).
299. MOSKOS, supra note 285, at 154.
110 [Vol. 49
2001] WOMEN AT WAR
aggressivity to an ungendered vision of aggressivity with
compassion."30 0 She is critical of "standards of masculinity
that emphasize dominance, assertiveness, aggressiveness,
independence, self-sufficiency, and willingness to take
risks, and that reject characteristics such as compassion,
understanding, and sensitivity... ."' These "masculine"
attitudes are, she says, related to heightened levels of rape
propensity. Unfortunately for her argument, however, these
"undesirable" traits are highly desirable in a combat soldier.
While Morris believes that enhancing the "compassion,
understanding, and sensitivity" of military personnel would
decrease levels of both rape and war atrocities, °2 she does
not adequately deal with the tension that those traits create
with combat objectives. 3 In war, insensitive as it may seem
to say, "compassion, understanding, and sensitivity" can
easily get one killed, without-as would be the case, say,
with risk-taking-contributing to the mission. Gerald
Linderman describes the effects of compassion as follows:
[B]attle often made very dangerous temperate thoughts or
gestures. "Tenderness must die," declared Marine Grady Gallant,
or the horror would grow unendurable and "[vle would become
mad." More was at stake than the soldier's psychological stability,
his very survival. "The gentle die in battle," concluded one of
writer John Home Burns's soldiers.... Sympathy became a
sentimental, fatuous, deadly indulgence. When a fellow pilot
charged him with "callous indifference to the losses in the
squadron," John Muirhead tried to explain his want of pity: "[All
men in combat must come to [insensitivity]. To feel sorrow, to
grieve for the dead, to weep in despair, was not what we were
300. Morris, supra note 10, at 751. While it would be tempting simply to
ignore Morris's views, they have particular significance in light of her former
position.
301. Id. at 701; see also Tom Philpott, Full Speed Ahead, WASHINGTONIAN
MAG., July 1999, at 89 (quoting Navy Secretary Richard Danzig's comment to
female admirals and captains that although sexual integration has certain
costs, one of the benefits of including women is "the sensitivity").
302. Morris acknowledges that despite the fact that women participated in
the Russian Army during World War II, Russian soldiers engaged in pervasive
rape, sometimes assisted by female soldiers. Id. at 746.
303. Nor does she explain how this could even be done. Some of the
personality traits that Morris would alter appear to be hormonally mediated. In
both males and females, salivary testosterone levels are positively correlated
with aggressive personalities and negatively correlated with pro-social
personalities. Julie A. Harris et al., Salivary Testosterone and Self-Report
Aggressive and Prosocial Personality Characteristics in Men and Women, 22
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 321 (1996).
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asked to do. To kill, to maim, to destroy, to die, these were our
tasks, and we were to do them without too much fuss."
30 4
Morris may be right that inclusion of large numbers of
women in combat forces would reduce the rate of rapes and
war atrocities, although her assertion is purely
speculative."5 But it must be seriously considered that this
reduction would come at the cost of combat effectiveness,
since it is quite likely that the same psychological traits
that cause men to be willing to kill in battle also dispose
them to overdoing it."0 6 Indeed, a study of men who had
committed atrocities in Vietnam found that they were
"three times as likely as the others to win medals and they
tended to have killed leitimately more than those who did
not commit atrocities.
Morris acknowledges that "idealization of [masculine]
characteristics is highly fumctional in an organization
whose raison d'etre is combat," but she then goes on to
assert, without any supporting authority, that "there is no
304. GERALD F. LINDEImAN, THE WORLD WITHIN WAR: AMERICA'S COMBAT
EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II 76 (1997); see also CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 21
(noting that after Officer Candidate School, "[w]e had acquired the military
virtues of courage, loyalty, and esprit de corps, though at the price of a
diminished capacity for compassion"); DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 352 (noting
that the "unavoidable death and destruction of warfare makes for an
impersonal attitude in commanders" because "[t]o grieve for each death or
mutilation would quickly make leaders ineffective").
305. See WATSON, supra note 295, at 244 (concluding that "although the
conditions of war may make anyone a potential mass murderer, some men are
more prone to kill indiscriminately than others") (emphasis in original). It
seems plausible that, on average, women would be less inclined to commit
atrocities than men. Of course, it is probably also the case that the level of rapes
and atrocities could be reduced even further by staffing the military entirely
with social workers.
306. Many writers have commented on the tendency of soldiers to engage in
orgies of destruction. See, e.g., CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 118; SAJER, supra note
255, at 234. S.L.A. Marshall describes one episode as follows:
At last they charged the enemy, closing within hand-grappling
distance. The slaughter began with grenade, bayonet, and bullet. Some
of the patrol were killed and some wounded. But all now acted as if
oblivious to danger. The slaughter once started could not be stopped.
Millsaps tried to regain control but his men paid no heed. Having
slaughtered every German in sight, they ran on into the barns of the
French farmhouses where they killed the hogs, cows, and sheep. The
orgy ended when the last beast was dead.
MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 183.
307. WATSON, supra note 295, at 245.
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reason that the high valuation of those attributes cannot be
retained while simultaneously dissociating them from
masculine gender; they may be valued instead as important
attributes in a good soldier regardless of gender."" 8
According to Morris, there is "much to be gained and little
to be lost by changing this aspect of military culture."3"9
Is it really correct to say that there is "no reason" that
stereotypically male temperamental traits cannot be
dissociated from maleness? Is it also correct to say that
there is much to be gained by changing this aspect of
military culture or that there is little to be lost?10 Is it even
possible to change the military culture in this way and end
up with an institution that is still recognizably a military?
These questions boil down to an empirical question-
whether the linkage between war and masculinity is
functional or dysfunctional-which in turn requires an
analysis of why soldiers fight.
V. SEXUAL INTEGRATION AND COMBAT MOTIVATION
A. Why Men Fight
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition;
And gentlemen in England, now a-bed,
Shall think themselves accurs'd they were not here;
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.
-William Shakespeare"'
1. Primary Groups and Unit Cohesion. It has long been
understood by those who seek to motivate soldiers that
overcoming, or at least managing, fear is essential to the
enterprise. 2 Fear, and even the cowardice that consists of
308. Morris, supra note 10, at 751 (emphasis added).
309. Id.
310. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military: Androcentrism
and Institutional Reform, 56 L. & CONTENT. PROBS. 217 (1993) (criticizing the
"androcentrism" of the military).
311. WILLIAM1 SHAKESPEARE, HENRYV, act 4, sc. iii.
312. STOUFFER ET AL., supra note 280, at 192-241.
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giving in to that fear, 13 are phenomena that require little
explanation. Although the desire for self-preservation is
easily understood from an evolutionary perspective, one
hardly need invoke "the selfish gene"14 to appreciate a
soldier's reluctance to advance in the face of hostile fire,
where the risk, and sometimes the virtual certainty, of
death awaits. The more interesting question is what power
is strong enough to motivate men to overcome this fear and
close with the enemy or hold fast to a position in the face of
an enemy advance?
The answer to the above question varies to some extent
with the individual and the circumstances. A few men
simply, and some probably pathologically, do not experience
fear on the battlefield-exhibiting the courage that Lord
Moran characterized as having "its roots in a vacant
mind."31 The brave man, however, is one who acts not
because of lack of fear but in spite of his fear. 16 In other
cases, in keeping with the precepts of Frederick the Great,
the soldier's fear of the enemy is less than his fear of his
superiors, so he advances against the lesser of evils.1 Most
armies employ means to make it difficult for soldiers to
retreat. 8 The Greek phalanx was arranged so that the
strongest fighters were on the outside, an arrangement
"designed not merely to maximize striking power but also to
keep the half-trained citizen-soldiers under physical
control."1 Those directly in contact with the enemy literally
"had to kill or be killed."2 The Mongols made it a capital
313. See LORD MORAN, THE ANATOMY OF COURAGE 16-17 (2d ed. 1966).
314. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (New ed. 1989).
315. MORAN, supra note 313, at 4. In his study of courage, William Ian
Miller notes that the two percent of troops whose effectiveness is not reduced
after continued exposure to combat "seem to be of a special sort, often
psychotics or social misfits." MILLER, supra note 269, at 129.
316. See MORAN, supra note 313, at 61.
317. See id. at 162 (noting that the English Army in the early days of the
Peninsular War followed the teachings of Frederick the Great: "It was control
from without in its crudest, most brutal shape; men did their job because the
fear of flogging was greater than the fear of death").
318. JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATrLE 324 (1976) (noting that all armies
in both democracies and dictatorships ultimately depend upon coercion).
319. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR 41 (1985). This control was
necessary because "once the phalanx broke, defeat inevitably pursued."
KEEGAN, supra note 47, at 250.
320. W.G. Runciman, Greek Hoplites, Warrior Culture, and Indirect Bias, 4
J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 731, 732 (1998). In Athens and Sparta,
"tremblers"--those who had shown cowardice in battle-were deprived of their
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offense to desert comrades in battle212' During World War II,
Soviet officers were authorized to shoot their men on the
spot for slack discipline, 2 a situation that led Stalin to
remark that "[it takes a very brave man to not be a hero in
the Red Army."3 2 3 The willingness of German soldiers to
fight was reinforced by the execution of at least 15,000
German soldiers, mostly on the eastern front in the later
stages of the war, for such transgressions as desertion,
cowardice, and self-inflicted wounds.324 Samuel Stouffer's
study of World War II soldiers reminded that "the sheer
coercive power of Army authority was a factor in combat
motivation which must not be forgotten simply because it is
so easy to take for granted."3 25 The U.S. Army in Korea
posted military police behind advancing units to discourage
soldiers inclined to move in the wrong direction.326
Others may advance because of a belief in the rightness
of their cause, 27 but overt ideology and patriotism may be
less important than many war movies and wartime
propaganda would lead one to believe.2 8 Charles Moskos
found that combat soldiers in Vietnam dismissed as a
"crock" patriotic slogans or exhortations to defend
democracy.3 29 While such a finding is hardly surprising
given the political opposition and deep cynicism about the
Vietnam war, it mirrors earlier findings about both the
Wehrmachte3  and the American Army in World War I.'
rights as citizens. Id. at 737.
321. KEEGAN, supra note 47, at 205.
322. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 304.
323. Id. at 482.
324. Omer Bartov, The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of
Warfare, 64 J. MOD. HIST. (Supp.) S32 (1992).
325. STOUFFER ETAL., supra note 280, at 112.
326. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 304.
327. See generally Stephen G. Fritz, "We are trying... to change the face of
the world"--Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front:
The View from Below, 60 J. MIL. HIST. 683, 699-700 (1996).
328. See HOLLIES, supra note 60, at 274 (noting that although patriotism
helps persuade men to join at the beginning of a war, it provides little
explanation for why most men fight).
329. See MOSKOS, supra note 285, at 148. He did find, however, that they
operated under a "latent ideology" composed of "anti-ideology," Americanism,
materialism, and manly honor. Id. at 148-56.
330. See Edward A. Shils & Morris Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration
in the Wehrmacht in World War II, PUB. OPINION Q. 280, Summer 1948, at 280.
Shils & Janowitz quote a German sergeant captured near the end of the war
who was asked about the political opinions of his men. He laughed and replied:
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Yet others may be motivated by hatred of the enemy.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the repeated
atrocities of the Japanese Army, those who fought the
Japanese on the ground grew to hate them. Eugene Sledge,
a Marine who fought in the Pacific, observed that the
fighting between the Marines and Japanese "was not the
dispassionate killing seen on other fronts or in other wars
[but] a brutish, primitive hatred, as characteristic of the
horror of war in the Pacific as the palm trees and the
islands.""'2 Philip Caputo wrote of his own motivations for
transferring back to a line company in Vietnam from a rear-
echelon position. Part of it was boredom; part of it was the
"magnetism of combat":
Finally, there was hatred, a hatred buried so deep that I
could not then admit its existence. I can now, though it is still
painful. I burned with a hatred for the Viet Cong and with an
emotion that dwells in most of us, one closer to the surface than
we care to admit: a desire for retribution. I did not hate the enemy
for their politics, but for murdering Simpson, for executing that
boy whose body had been found in the river, for blasting the life
out of Walt Levy. Revenge was one of the reasons I volunteered for
a line company. I wanted a chance to kill somebody.33
Hatred is not necessary for the soldier, however, any
more than it is for the hunter.334 Hunters "rarely enjoy the
suffering of their quarry, and often feel affection towards it,
mingled with guilt."3 5 Participants in combat often feel the
When you ask such a question, I realize well that you have no idea of
what makes a soldier fight. The soldiers lie in their holes and are
happy if they live through the next day. If we think at all, it's about the
end of the war and then home.
Id. at 284. Shils & Janowitz attribute the remarkable tenacity of the German
Army overwhelmingly to its cohesion and only slightly to Nazi ideology. See
generally id.
331. See ELLIS, supra note 69, at 315-16 (stating that allied front-line troops
had little concern for patriotism or politics, and "[t]he world became reduced to
a company or a troop and the only thing in life was the chance of preserving
one's own").
332. SLEDGE, supra note 63, at 34. Cf KERNAN, supra note 254, at 31-32(noting that only at first did American sailors in WWII hate the Japanese, and
never after the first days of the war did they look down on them).
333. CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 230.
334. See generally John A. Ballard & Aliecia J. McDowell, Hate and Combat
Behavior, 17 ARMED FORCES & Soc. 229 (1991) (reviewing literature on
importance of hate in combat motivation).
335. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 55.
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same way.33
Many of the above-named factors may be
simultaneously present and have an important influence,
337
but many students of combat motivation believe that the
preponderant reason for why men fight is "none of the
above." There is a broad consensus among those who have
observed and studied the behavior of men in combat that
they fight for their survival, for their immediate comrades,
and for their standing in the eyes of those comrades.
Sometimes they have no alternative but to fight or die, 8
but when they have a choice, it sometimes takes a lot to
keep them going. As James Dunnigan summarized, "[iflire
teams, squads, and aircraft crews require a combination of
discipline, effective leadership, fear of reprisal, self-
delusion, and peer pressure to generate an effective fighting
attitude."339
Needless to say, these varying explanations for combat
motivation are not mutually exclusive. It seems quite likely,
for example, that ideological beliefs are important to
soldiers' motivations prior to combat, since they provide a
reason for the soldier to place himself in danger in the first
place."' These beliefs may also be important in sustaining
the soldier during long periods of privation."' On the other
hand, once the shooting starts, ideological considerations
tend to recede rapidly, being replaced by more immediate
concerns relating to the small group."'
Writers often use the term "cohesion" to describe this
bonding of "primary groups" of soldiers. 3 The concept is
336. ELLIS, supra note 69, at 317 (noting that allied front-line troops in
Europe had empathy for the German troops, knowing that the Germans were
going through the same ordeal and probably had no more ideological
commitment to the war than they did themselves).
337. Robin M. Williams, Jr., The American Soldier: An Assessment, Several
Wars Later, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 155, 164 (1989).
338. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 351 (noting that "[hieroism is not always a
voluntary act: 'A hero [may just be] a coward who got cornered' ").
339. Id. Demonstrating the importance of peer pressure is the fact that men
working in groups or in teams do not have the same tendency to default of fire
as do single riflemen. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 75-76.
340. See Elliot P. Chodoff, Ideology and Primary Groups, 9 ARIED FORCES &
Soci 569, 582 (1983).
341. See JOHN DOLLARn, FEAR IN BATrLE 42 (1944) (observing that
"[i]deology functions before battle, to get the man in; and after battle by blocking
thoughts of escape") (emphasis in original).
342. Id.
343. See Alexander L. George, Primary Groups, Organization, and Military
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admittedly nebulous and has varied definitions,"' but a
well-accepted one is "the bonding together of members of an
organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and
commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission."4 '
An appropriately cohesive group carries with it substantial
benefits. One study found, for example, that squads
exhibiting high cohesion performed at a higher level than
other squads," although there is always a question with
correlational data about the direction of any causal process
that might exist. That is, does cohesion cause good
performance, or does good performance result in cohesion?347
The arrow of causation seems to point in both directions,
perhaps in a self-reinforcing process.
348
Substantial psychological benefits seem to be associated
with high levels of cohesion. Members of cohesive units rate
higher on tests of physical and emotional well-being.19 and
suffer fewer psychiatric casualties."' One study revealed
Performance, in ROGER W. LITTLE, HIA.NDBOOK OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 293
(1971).
344. See Reuven Gal, Unit Morale: From a Theoretical Puzzle to an
Empirical Illustration: An Israeli Example, 16 J. APPLIED Soc. 549, 549-50
(1986).
345. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 3. For a discussion of the various
meanings of the related, yet distinct, terms "cohesion," "morale," and "esprit de
corps," see Frederick J. Manning, Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps, in
GAL & MANGELSDORFF, supra note 170, at 453; see also Gal, supra note 344, at
549-51.
346. See Daniel M. Goodacre III, Group Characteristics of Good and Poor
Performing Combat Units, 16 SOCIOMETRY 168, 177-79 (1953).
347. See W. Victor Madej, Effectiveness and Cohesion of the German Ground
Forces in World War II, 6 J. POL. & MIL. Soc. 233, 233-34 (1978) (arguing for
the latter view).
348. See Brian Mullen & Carolyn Copper, The Relation Between Group
Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 210, 225
(1994).
349. See Frederick J. Manning & Terrence D. Fullerton, Health and Well-
Being in Highly Cohesive Units of the U.S. Army, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
503, 515 (1988).
350. Larry H. Ingraham & Frederick J. Manning, Psychiatric Battle
Casualties: The Missing Column in a War Without Replacements, 60 MIL. REV.
19 (1980); Zahava Solomon et al, Effects of Social Support and Battle Intensity
on Loneliness and Breakdown During Combat, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1269 (1986). While "battle fatigue" was at one time viewed as an
"unfortunate aberration" brought about by an individual's personal weakness,
study of the almost one million psychiatric casualties of World War II led to the
view that it is "a normal and natural consequence of extended combat, staved
off by some better than others only by virtue of supportive relationships to their
unit and leaders." Manning, supra note 345, at 456.
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that members of cohesive groups expressed little anxiety
about the physical dangers of parachuting,351 and another
showed that individuals who have strong group
identification can withstand more physical pain.
Moreover, acts of heroism are more likely to emerge from
highly cohesive units than from units with less cohesion.353
High levels of cohesion do not always translate into
military effectiveness, however, because the norms of the
small group may not correspond to the norms of the
military institution. In Vietnam, for example, particularly
in the later years after it became apparent that the military
goal was no longer to "win" the war, the group norm in
some units became to avoid encounters with the enemy
because members of the group no longer perceived any
value in risking their lives. Thus, "search and destroy"
missions sometimes in practice became "search and evade"
missions.5 4 Charles Moskos has pointed out that essentially
the same primary-group processes that sustained combat
soldiers in World War II led to the fraggings in Vietnam.355
The difference between the two wars is that in Vietnam the
norms of some of the small groups were no longer congruent
with the norms of the military as a whole.35 Thus, it is a
critical task for the military to ensure congruence between
norms of the small-groups and those of the greater
organization.
In the fog of war, the desire to fend for oneself is
powerful, and it is largely a form of peer-pressure that
prevents this selfish and all too understandable response.
As one British infantry captain wrote:
Cohesion follows as a matter of course, and this is the root of it.
351. ANTHONY KELLETT, COMBAT MOTIVATION: THE BEHAVIOR OF MEN IN
BATTLE 45 (1982).
352. Arnold H. Buss & Norman W. Portnoy, Pain Tolerance and Group
Identification, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 106, 107-08 (1967).
353. Reuven Gal, Courage Under Stress, in SBLOMO BREZNITZ, STRESS IN
ISRAEL (1983); Reuven Gal & Richard A. Gabriel, Battlefield Heroism in the
Israeli Defense Force, 57 INTL SOC. SCI. REv. 232, 235 (1982).
354. See Robert Heinl, The Collapse of the Armed Forces, 108 AlIED FORCES
J. 30, 31 (1971).
355. Charles Moskos, Surviving the War in Vietnam, in STRANGERS AT
HomE: VIETNAI VETERANS SINCE THE WAR 71, 80 (Charles R. Figley & Seymour
Leventman eds., 1980).
356. See John H. Faris, An Alternative Perspective to Savage and Gabriel, 3
AmED FORCES & Soc' 457, 459-61 (1977).
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Men are inclined to do what their comrades expect them to do or,
more accurately, because nobody actually wants to fight, they do
what they imagine their comrades expect them to do. Whether this
be mutual deception or mutual support, it does the trick. In the
good unit-and trust and cohesion both grow from and create a
good unit-the assumption is, of course, that actions will be
governed by those never-mentioned concepts, duty and honour.
357
In an often-quoted remark, S.L.A. Marshall observed: "I
hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing
which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his
weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a
comrade."358 Darryl Henderson has similarly observed that
"the only force strong enough to make the soldier willing to
advance under fire is his loyalty to the small group and that
group's expectation that he will advance." '59 As far back as
Demosthenes, it has been recognized that shame is "the
most powerful compulsion on the actions of free men.
36°
Writing of the soldier in the German army of World War II,
which maintained its integrity through years of reverses,
Shils & Janowitz wrote:
He was likely to go on fighting, provided he had the necessary
weapons, as long as the group possessed leadership with which he
could identify himself, and as long as he gave affection to and
received affection from the other members of his squad and
platoon.Y
Men writing of their wartime experiences often speak of
the deep emotional connection between men at arms, often
comparing- the bond favorably in strength to the male-
female bond. Philip Caputo wrote of his experience in
Vietnam:
357. PETER COCHRANE, CHARLIE COMfPANY: IN SERVICE WITH C COMPANY 2ND
QUEEN'S OWN CAMERON HIGHLANDERS 1940-44, 173-74 (1977).
358. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 42. Marshall also commented that "[iin
battle, you may draw a small circle around a soldier, including within it only
those persons and objects which he sees or which he believes will influence his
immediate fortunes. These primarily will determine whether he rallies or fails,
advances or falls back." Id. at 154.
359. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 107-08.
360. Runciman, supra note 320, at 740; see also MILLER, supra note 269, at
179 (noting the dearth of cultures that "dispense with shame in the cultivation
of courage").
361. Shils & Janowitz, supra note 330, at 284.
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I have also attempted to describe the intimacy of life in infantry
battalions, where the communion between men is as profound as
any between lovers. Actually, it is more so. It does not demand for
its sustenance the reciprocity, the pledges of affection, the endless
reassurances required by the love of men and women. It is, unlike
marriage, a bond that cannot be broken by a word, by boredom or
divorce, or by anything other than death. Sometimes even that is
not enough. Two friends of mine died trying to save the corpses of
their men from the battlefield. 2
William Manchester's memoirs provide a glimpse of the
size of the group to which this loyalty attaches. Describing
the motivational efforts of a lieutenant who had recently
taken over Manchester's platoon, Manchester writes:
Rising in one swift motion, he wiped his hands on his sturdy
thighs, stood with arms akimbo, and barked: "Men, I know you'd
like to stay here. I would myself. But those yellow bastards down
the beach are killing your buddies." He didn't even realize that a
combat man's loyalty is confined to those around him, that as far
as [members of Manchester's section] were concerned the FirstS 363
Battalion might as well have belonged to a separate race.
The force that leads individuals to attempt to further
group objectives at substantial peril to themselves is a
sense of trust and reciprocal obligation.36 That trust must
exist not only between two soldiers on the line, but also
between a helicopter pilot and his door gunner, and
between a fighter pilot and his wing man. These men
362. CAPUTO, supra note 63, at xv; see also HYNES, supra note 250, at 77
(commenting that when he went off with his buddies to become a Marine pilot,
there was "an intimacy among us so close that I find it difficult to put a name to
it").
363. MANCHESTER, supra note 63, at 276-77. Psychiatrist Peter Bourne, who
studied soldiers in Vietnam, found a high degree of "combat provincialism":
"[tihey are not only unconcerned about the political and strategic aspects of the
war; they are also disinterested in the outcome of any battle not in their own
immediate vicinity." PETER G. BOURNE, MEN, STRESS, AND VIETNAM 44 (1970);
see also HYNES, supra note 250, at 10 (noting that the scale of attachment is
"not to an army or a nation or a cause, but to a battalion, a company, a
platoon."); MOSKOS, supra note 285, at 144 (noting that "[w]hen the soldier feels
concern over the fate of others, it is for those he personally knows in his own
outfit" and that "'ihlis concern does not extend to those unknown persons who
have preceded him or will eventually replace him").
364. See David C. Rapoport, Foreword to TURNEY-HIGH, supra note 47, at ix;
Bartov, supra note 324, at S36-S37.
365. See MIK SPICK, THE ACE FACTOR: AiR COMBAT AND THE ROLE OF
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know they have to help their comrades because they know
their comrades would help them. The relationship between
a man and his small group to some extent defies logical
understanding because it is not based on logic but on
emotion. These men, whom the soldier may not have known
a year earlier, are worth his life. In the bloody 1944 battle
for Peleliu in the Carolines alone, six Marines earned a
Medal of Honor for covering grenades with their bodies to
save their comrades.366 This kind of behavior is impossible
to understand for people who believe that the duties of a
soldier can be captured in a written job description and
screened for by using paper-and-pencil tests.
None of the foregoing should be taken to imply that
most combatants want to be where they are. Typically, they
yearn to go home. But they want to go home having done
their duty-thus, the hope for the "million dollar wound,"
especially in World War II where soldiers served "for the
duration" and thus knew that they could not go home until
the war was over or they were dead or wounded.367 Indeed, a
few went so far as to shoot themselves.368 In Vietnam, men
counted off the days until their twelve months (or thirteen
if they were Marines) would end and they would be shipped
back to "the World."
369
The bond between men at arms is of a paradoxical
nature, in that it is both intense and ephemeral. It does not
form spontaneously whenever men are put together. On the
contrary, the military goes to great lengths to foster that
bond: "Creating a cohesive unit requires an intensive re-
socialization process that is best created through a rites-of-
passage process that totally consumes the soldiers'
attention and efforts for an extended period and from which
he emerges with a new or adapted set of operating rules for
his daily life."37" The military structure de-emphasizes
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 4 (1988).
366. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 300.
367. ELLIS, supra note 69, at 242. In the Army Air Corps, combat crew
served a specified number of missions or combat flying hours, which left open
the possibility of an honorable, and intact, return prior to the end of the war.
See GRINIER & SPIEGEL, supra note 169, at 36. However, as the bombing
campaign in Western Europe continued, the specified number of missions
continued to grow. BOYNE, supra note 85, at 332.
368. ELLIS, supra note 69, at 243.
369. See BOURNE, supra note 363, at 41-42.
370. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 18.
122 [Vol. 49
WOMEN AT WAR
individualism, and the soldier is "constantly reminded of
his responsibilities to his buddies, to his leaders, to the
squad, to the platoon, and ultimately to the people and the
nation or party through the structure of his immediate
unit."37' Such notions as "death before dishonor" are
institutionalized mechanisms for reinforcing the fact that
some men will "gladly exchange the fear of failure for their
own physical destruction."372
Mere formal membership in the unit does not entitle
one to the benefits of primary group membership, as
individual replacements in combat units have discovered to
their great discomfort. The practice of replacing individuals
as "spare parts" in combat units has been identified as a
major failing of manpower practices in World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam."' The "new guy" (or "FNG," as he was
often called) was at first an outsider who lacked the social
support of the group and often did not live long enough ever
to gain it. 4 In World War II, many men went AWOL to
return to their former units rather than wait around in a
replacement depot to be shipped to a unit of strangers. 5
The bond is at the same time ephemeral, tending to last
only as long as the members of the group are together.
Thus, it is wrong to view the bond as "friendship," as some
seem to. Charles Moskos found, for example, that once a
squad member left Vietnam for the U.S., he seldom would
attempt to contact those remaining behind, and they would
seldom attempt to contact him.
376
Cohesion based upon a bonding among males is
fundamentally an emotional phenomenon and therefore
difficult to define and measure scientifically. The same is
true for other emotions, such as love, but difficulty in
371. Id. at 10.
372. NOrMAN F. DIXON, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE 246
(1976).
373. See HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 18; Paul L. Savage & Richard A.
Gabriel, Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternative
Perspective, 2 ARIED FORCES & SOC'Y 340, 372 n.14 (1976); see also James
Griffith, The Army's New Unit Personnel Replacement and Its Relationship to
Unit Cohesion and Social Support, 1 MIL. PSYCHOL. 17, 30 (1989) (finding
higher cohesion under Unit Replacement System than under Individual
Replacement System).
374. See HOLMIES, supra note 60, at 262; see also J.D. Wray, Replacements
Back on the Road at Last, 67 MIL. REV. 46, 51 (1987).
375. Wray, supra note 374, at 51.
376. MOSKOS, supra note 285, at 145-46.
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formulating a universally acceptable definition or method
for measuring love in a laboratory does not cause us to
question either its existence or its importance. When it
comes to questions of cohesion, the social science evidence is
admittedly equivocal. 7 Studies have generally found that
"social cohesion" (interpersonal attraction) is not positively
correlated with group performance, while "task cohesion"
(shared commitment to achieving goal) is moderately
correlated with performance.378  In contrast to the
ambiguous social-science results stands the overwhelming
and millennia-old conviction of students of the military that
unit cohesion is of profound, if not paramount,
importance.379  Manning and Fullerton suggest that
definitions of cohesion used in the social-science literature
do not capture the concept of military importance, which
they label as "social support."8 0 Whatever the formal
definition of the concept, those who study the behavior of
men in combat nearly universally believe that the
phenomenon exists in some form and is important to
military effectiveness. Moreover, polls show that a majority
of military personnel-not just members of combat units-
believe that male bonding is necessary for development of a
cohesive unit. 8'
There is somewhat less consensus about the extent to
which concerns about bonding and cohesion apply beyond
377. See Elizabeth Kier, Homosexuals in the Military: Open Integration and
Combat Effectiveness, 23 INT'L SECURITY 5, 11-19 (1998).
378. See Mullen & Copper, supra note 348; NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS
AND ASSESSmENT 291-94 (1993). Apparently, soldiers are aware of the difference
between these two forms of interpersonal relationship, given that soldiers in
effective units may choose different colleagues for combat tasks than they select
to accompany on leave. See WATSON, supra note 295, at 114.
379. See Manning, supra note 345, at 456 (commenting that "[tihe
importance of group solidarity for effective military performance has been a
staple of military doctrine for 2500 years"); see also Manning & Fullerton, supra
note 349, at 503-04.
380. Manning & Fullerton, supra note 349, at 504; see also Manning, supra
note 345, at 458 (noting that "the 'cohesion' studied at some length by academic
psychologists [is] quite different from the 'cohesion' of military writers").
381. PRESDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 67, at C-86. Of course, the fact that a
majority of people believe something does not necessarily mean that it is true
(although in this context, the belief may be a self-fulfilling prophecy). However,
the fact that social scientists have not been able to define and measure some
particular psychological or sociological construct likewise does not mean that it
does not exist or that it is not important.
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the ground-combat context. Martin Binkin argues that it "is
perhaps most prominent among ground-combat units,
where interdependence is most crucial.""2 He suggests that
male bonding is less important in air and naval combat,
which "depend more on individual performance or are
inherently less dangerous." Binkin acknowledges, however,
that this is a contentious point and that many aviators
would argue that cohesion is just as important in air
combat.383' Difficulty of measurement makes it hard to
resolve this question definitively.
Grinker and Spiegel, in their study of World War II
aircrew, found the same kind of primary group
relationships between members of bomber crews and among
fighter pilots in the same squadron that have been reported
for combat soldiers.3" The fact that there is a high degree of
interdependence and danger within aircraft crews and
among members of a squadron, in tank crews, in helicopter
crews, and in many shipboard positions, suggests that
bonding may be as important, even if somewhat different,
as it is in the infantry context. While in many of these
contexts the possibility of actual retreat does not exist,
there is always the possibility of engaging in the functional
equivalent of cowering in a foxhole.
The importance of individual motivation appears to be
increasing, rather than decreasing, but as the technology of
war develops, it may be harder to achieve cohesion. 385
Whereas in Napoleon's day soldiers acted under the
watchful eyes of their sergeants and officers, the nature of
modern warfare requires that today's soldier operate more
independently.386 The soldier is no longer bound to his job
through strict discipline, rote training, and drill. As a
result, the military must "gain control of the individual
soldier through the process of internalizing values and
codes of behavior that cause the soldier to act as a reliable
member of his unit in combat. 387
382. BINKIN, supra note 295, at 40.
383. Id. at n.95.
384. GRINKER & SPIEGEL, supra note 169, at 23-24.
385. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at xviii.
386. See id. at 107.
387. Id. Perhaps ironically, one of the modem threats to group cohesion is
something that is generally viewed as enhancing morale: the possibility of "real
time" communication with the folks back home. Psychiatrist Peter Bourne
found in his study of battle stress in Vietnam that the possibility of telephone
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The battlefield of today has become more dangerous,
combat has become more intense, and direct control of
troops has become more difficult than in the past.88 During
World War II, 10% of a fighting force generally was
psychologically disabled within the first few hours,"' and
the toll of psychiatric casualties threatens to become far
greater in wars of the future,390 rendering even more
important the "immunizing" effect of unit cohesion.
2. Fear in Battle. A complete understanding of combat
motivation, and possible sex differences in that motivation,
requires an appreciation of the range of fears that men face
before and during battle. Many people erroneously assume
that the only significant fears such men face are of being
killed and, secondarily, of being injured. While those are, of
course, major sources of fear, the picture is far more
complex and may vary depending upon the experience of
the individual.
John Dollard's study of veterans of the Spanish Civil
War who had fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade found
that the greatest fear of men who had never before faced
combat was that they would turn out to be cowards.3 9' The
"desire to appear a man amongst men, and the fear that one
might fail the acid test of battle" are among the strongest
motivators.39' Richard Holmes' finding that for many of the
members of parachute battalions in the Falklands fear of
"bottling out"-of showing cowardice-was their greatest
pre-battle fear393 replicates Dollard's earlier findings. As
Holmes puts it, "[t]here are occasions when this desire to
preserve status is quite literally stronger than the fear of
death."394 Field Marshal Slim, commander of British troops
calls to the United States and the "relative excellence" of the mail service
tended to de-emphasize the primary group as a source for dependence and
emotional support. BOURNE, supra note 363, at 42.
388. See HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 22.
389. Id. at 334.
390. Id.; see also DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 307; Chodoff, supra note 340,
at 574; Driskell & Salas, supra note 170, at 190.
391. DOLLARD, supra note 341, at 18-19.
392. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 142.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 143. Before shipping out for Southern France, Audie Murphy
suffered from malaria and a 105-degree fever. MURPHY, supra note 62, at 81. He
would have gone to the infirmary, but he "lackfed] the guts to take being
thought a coward." Id. at 80; see also KEEGAN, supra note 318, at 53 (noting that
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in Burma during World War II and later Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, probably did not exaggerate much
when he said: "I don't believe there is any man who, in his
heart of hearts, wouldn't rather be called brave than have
any other virtue attributed to him."95
The "status" that the soldier is seeking is not a
hierarchical status but rather what might be called a
"membership" status. The small unit becomes a "reference
group"-a group "in which he wants to be counted as an
individual, which include the individuals whose opinions
make a difference for him, whose standards and goals are
his."396  Such groups are particularly important for
197
adolescents, which military recruits essentially are.
Unlike other situations in which men compete with each
other for the top positions, as in tribal or corporate
politics,39 men in combat seek acceptance into the "band of
brothers" rather than seeking to outdo the other guy. This
form of status appears to be largely unrelated to
hierarchical status within the military system-i.e., formal
rank.
399
For experienced soldiers, who have already found that
they can cope with the pressures of combat, the greatest
fear going into battle is that they will suffer permanently
disfiguring physical injuries, with injuries to the abdomen,
eyes, brain, and genitals being of primary concern. 0 This
fear is often identified as being stronger than the fear of
men fight "on the one hand, for personal survival, which individuals will
recognize to be bound up with group survival, and, on the other, for fear of
incurring by cowardly conduct the group's contempt"); SLEDGE, supra note 63, at
19 (recalling that the Marine recruits never reflected on the fact that they
might be killed or crippled, and that "[t]he only thing that we seemed to be truly
concerned about was that we might be too afraid to do our jobs under fire. An
apprehension nagged at each of us that he might appear to be 'Yellow' if he were
afraid"); STOUFFER ET AL., supra note 280, at 131 (noting that combat is a "dare,"
and that "[o]ne never knew for sure that he could take it until he had
demonstrated that he could").
395. SIR WILLIAM SLII, COURAGE AND OTHER BROADCASTS 5 (1957).
396. Bartone & Kirkland, supra note 170, at 395 (quoting M. SERIF & C.W.
SHERIF, REFERENCE GROUPS: EXPLORATION INTO CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION OF
ADOLESCENTS 180 (1964)).
397. Bartone & Kirkland, supra note 170, at 395-96.
398. See generally Browne, Sex and Temperament, supra note 4.
399. See KEEGAN, supra note 47, at 226 (observing of the soldier that "[iut is
the admiration of other soldiers that satisfies him-if he can win it").
400. DOLLARD, supra note 341, at 12-13, 18-19; HOLMES, supra note 60, at
182.
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death itself.4"'
Also sometimes identified as greater than the fear of
death is the fear of killing.4"2 Many men who are willing to
expose themselves to great physical risk are simply
unwilling, or at least extremely hesitant, to kill.40 3 Part of
military training entails not only teaching soldiers the
mechanics of killing, but also teaching them to be eager to
kill. Demonizing the enemy, though offensive to civilian
sensibilities, is an effective way to do this. The Japanese,
during their invasion of China, tried to inure soldiers to
killing by practicing on captured Chinese.4 4 It is the lack of
obligation to kill that has been credited with the relatively
low rate of combat fatigue sometimes experienced by
combat medics and corpsmen, who are often exposed to
risks of harm as great as, or greater than, those faced by
combatants.4"5
These differing fears faced by combatants push them in
different directions. The concern about not measuring up
appears to be positively motivating. It inspires men to act
despite their fear of injury or death, since, by not acting, a
man stands to lose "the one thing that he is likely to value
more highly than life-his reputation as a man among
other men.""0 Fear of injury, death, and killing are, of
course, much more likely to be negatively motivating. An
exclusive focus on the potential consequences of enemy fire
rather than on accomplishment of the mission can be totally
debilitating, placing a high premium on the ability to
"compartmentalize.'
While the effect of fear on the successful completion of
the mission is obvious, excessive fear can often be
dangerous to the individual. As Mike Spick has observed:
The survival instinct is very strong, and has often been
401. DOLLARD, supra note 341, at 19.
402. See generally DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST
OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1995).
403. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 78 (noting that in the European Theater
during World War II, "fear of killing, rather than fear of being killed, was the
most common cause of battle failure in the individual, and that fear of failure
ran a strong second"). But see DINTER, supra note 75, at 23 (asserting that "[tihe
average person does not particularly worry about killing").
404. CHANG, supra note 64, at 56-58.
405. GROSSMAN, supra note 402, at 62-63.
406. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 153.
407. See infra text accompanying notes 547-48.
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counterproductive. There are many recorded cases of pilots taking
the quick way out of the battle, and giving their adversary an easy
shot in doing so. There are other instances of individuals ending in
a disadvantageous situation through being over-cautious at a time
when daring and controlled aggression would not only have had a
better chance of success, but would have been the safer course.408
The question of why men fight is a complex and multi-
faceted one. Given the length and depth of human
experience with war, if there were one simple answer we
would know it already without the aid of social science. The
question to be addressed now is whether men and women
are similarly motivated to fight.
B. Possible Sex Differences in Combat Motivation
What we know about the fears and motivation of
combat soldiers provides some insight about sexual
integration, because one would predict that the fears and
motivations of men and women would be different. As Anne
Campbell's analysis has shown, women are likely to act as
though they have less to gain and more to lose from
exposing themselves to combat risks.4 9 Women experience
greater fear of death and physical injury than men do and
are more averse to physical risk.410 If men going into battle
are concerned with permanently disfiguring injuries, as
they are, women will certainly be even more so.4 Perhaps
significantly, women have been found to be four times as
likely as men to suffer post-traumatic stress disorder after
408. SPICK, supra note 365, at 3; see also KEEGAN, supra note 318, at 71(noting that "soldiers die in largest numbers when they run, because it is when
they turn their backs to the enemy that they are least able to defend
themselves"). Spick's emphasis on "controlled aggression" is worth emphasizing.
The effective combatant is not necessarily aggressive in other respects. For
example, starting fights in garrison or abusing prisoners would both be
considered acts of "aggression," but they are not necessarily, or even probably,
positively related to effective and aggressive combat behavior. See Robert B.
Smith, Why Soldiers Fight. Part I. Alternative Theories, 18 QUALITY &
QUANTITY 33, 34-35 (1983).
409. Campbell, supra note 149, at 203.
410. See GEARY, supra note 3, at 174; see also WATSON, supra note 295, at
220 (indicating that a study of London air raids found that women were more
fearful than men).
411. Moreover, men generally have greater pain tolerance than women,
suggesting that they are better at continuing to fight after being injured. See
GEARY, supra note 3, at 213.
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nonsexual assaultive violence.412 Thus, it is predictable that
the level of this kind of negatively motivating fear will be
higher among women.
As to fear of killing, if it is true-as so many feminists
argue413 and the psychological data seem to support4 14-that
women exhibit greater compassion, sensitivity, and
empathy than men, then women may be more reluctant
than men to kill the enemy.4"5 In large part, what allows
soldiers to kill is what has been called deindividuation or
pseudo-speciation."6  These phenomena involve the
psychological categorization of other individuals into a class
that denies them any claim to a common humanity and
makes it as acceptable to kill them as to kill hunted prey,
17
a process that is easier if there are racial, cultural, or
radical ideological differences between opponents.4"' Such a
412. Murray B. Stein et al., Gender Differences in Susceptibility to
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 38 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 619 (2000).
413. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Leslie Bender,
From Gender Differences to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an
Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990).
414. See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg & Randy Lennon, Sex Differences in
Empathy and Related Capacities, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 100 (1983); Martin L.
Hoffman, Sex Differences in Empathy and Related Behaviors, 84 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 712 (1977).
415. Perhaps significantly, it has-been found that there are sex differences
in responses to images of war. Men's feelings of patriotism are enhanced after
watching scenes depicting the death and destruction of war, while women's are
higher after watching nonviolent scenes involving flags, parades, and women
kissing soldiers. See David Lester et al., Arousing Patriotic Feelings in Men and
Women, 75 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 914, 914 (1992).
416. See IRENAUS EIBL-EIBESFELDT, THE BIOLOGY OF PEACE AND WAR: MEN,
ANIMALS, AND AGGRESSION 122-25 (1979); see also GRAY, supra note 249, at 133
(noting that "[m]ost soldiers are able to kill.., more easily in warfare if they
possess an image of the enemy sufficiently evil to insure hatred and
repugnance"). Recognition of this phenomenon has led captured soldiers to
remove their helmets so as to emphasize their essential humanity and reduce
the likelihood that they will be killed by the enemy. GROSSMAN, supra note 402,
at 174; see also HOLMES, supra note 60, at 380 (noting that "combatants on both
sides in the First World War recognized that the introduction of the steel
helmet marked a deepening of hostility").
417. See EIBL-EIBESFELDT, supra note 416, at 123.
418. HOLMIES, supra note 60, at 366; see also Miller & Moskos, supra note
38, at 625 (noting that negative racial and cultural stereotypes increase
soldiers' emotional detachment from the enemy). The "difference" that
facilitates killing may be racial, ethnic, or religious, but it might also be
something less findamental, such as differences in combat arm. John Keegan
notes that it has probably been safer "to offer surrender to soldiers of one's own
sort--infantry to infantry, for example, 'inter-specific' surrender-infantry to
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process is the antithesis of compassion and sensitivity, but
"without the depersonalization of the enemy during
training, battle would become impossible to sustain.' 19
One would also expect sex differences in positively
motivating fear based on concern about "not measuring up."
Women do not feel the need to be a "man among men" and
would therefore seem less likely to expose themselves to the
risk of death to achieve that respect. To label a woman a
"coward" is a far lesser insult than labeling a man one; so
much so, that it very unusual even to hear a woman
referred to as a coward. Thus, even if women experienced
no more fear of death than men, their incentives for
overcoming that fear are smaller. In other words, if the
need to prove one's manliness is an essential motivator of
combat personnel, what motivates women?
Inclusion of women in combat units may result in a
"defining down" of acceptable combat behavior. To the
extent that expectations of risk-taking and coping with fear
are reduced, the pressure to behave bravely is diminished.
As Elmar Dinter has noted:
It is clear also that strong group cohesion can be a great and often
unique experience in life. Nonetheless, we should never forget that
the average soldier would really like to run away from the
fighting. The group prevents him from doing this. If group
morality allows for an "honourable" means of flight, it will be
accepted gratefully.
420
Thus, lessening of group expectations would predictably
lead to lessening of individual performance.
Those who adhere to the social-role theory of sex, like
Madeline Morris, would argue that the same motivational
goals could be achieved by encouraging both men and
women to be "soldiers among soldiers," that is, by
decoupling the role of soldier from the role of male.42' But
that assumes that one's identity as a man runs no deeper
cavalry-seemingly occasionally to provoke interspecific acts of cruelty."
KEEGAN, supra note 318, at 321.
419. HOLAIES, supra note 60, at 361. John Keegan notes that at all military
academies with which he is familiar there is a "de-sensitized treatment of war"
because the "injection of emotion into an already highly emotive subject will
seriously hinder, if not indeed altogether defeat, the aim of officer-training.
KEEGAN, supra note 318, at 20.
420. DraWER, supra note 75, at 50.
421. Morris, supra note 10, at 751.
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than one's identity as the occupant of a job. The job of
mechanic, for example, is an overwhelmingly male job (also
in large part for biological reasons),422 yet failure of a man
as a mechanic does not have the meaning for a man that
failure as a soldier has. A man can say "I failed as a
mechanic" without the stigma that would attach to the
confession that "I failed as a soldier." While many men
might be willing to say that they would not be good
soldiers-for reasons ranging from a dislike of taking
orders, a distaste for the regimentation of military life, or a
preference for creature comforts-that is very different from
saying "I cannot be a soldier because of my physical
cowardice," an admission that for most men, especially
young ones, would be considerably more painful than the
admission that they were not mechanically inclined.423
If combat is no longer a "manly" pursuit, then failure at
it is no longer a failure of manhood. In the words of David
Marlowe, Chief of Military Psychiatry at the Walter Reed
Army Institute of Research:
The soldier's world is characterized by a stereotypical masculinity.
His language is profane, his professed sexuality crude and direct;
his maleness is his armor, the measure of his competence,
capability, and confidence in himself.
If that "armor" is stripped away, it is predictable that his
"competence, capability, and confidence in himself' may be
stripped away as well. Thus, separating the performance of
the combat job from a soldier's feeling of self-worth as a
man may take away much of the stigma of failure and much
of the motivation for success.424
422. See Patricia Hausman, On the Rarity of Mathematically and
Mechanically Gifted Females: A Life History Analysis (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The Fielding Institute) (finding that mathematically and
mechanically gifted females possess somatic and reproductive characteristics
characteristic of either low lifetime exposure to estrogens or a high
androgen/estrogen ratio).
423. See STOUFFER ET AL., supra note 280, at 132:
So the fear of failure in the role, as by showing cowardice in battle,
could bring not only fear of social censure on this point as such, but
also more central and strongly established fears related to sex-typing.
To fail to measure up as a soldier in courage and endurance was to risk
the charge of not being a man. ("Whatsa matter, bud-got lace on your
drawers?" "Christ, he's acting like an old maid.").
424. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 58 (noting that if being a soldier is just a
job, "the soldier is not strongly bound to his unit-no job is worth getting killed
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In sum, it appears that the linkage between warfare
and masculinity is not merely arbitrary. Stereotypically
masculine traits enhance performance of the combat
function, while stereotypically female traits impair it.
Although this fact suggests that more men than women will
be effective soldiers, it does not, of course, mean that all
men will be more effective than all women, since not all
individuals conform to the stereotype of their sex. However,
the fact that men are strongly motivated to risk their lives
to satisfy their notions of manhood suggests that the
perceived linkage between warfare and masculinity may
serve an important function. The power of this motivation
suggests that the inevitable disruption of the link between
warfare and masculinity that would attend inclusion of
women in combat roles may have strongly negative effects
on combat motivation, even if the individual women serving
in combat positions resembled men in both temperament
and physical strength. If so, it is not clear what the services
could do to preserve the power of that motivation while at
the same time admitting women into these groups.
C. Leadership and Followership
There may be substantial sex differences in the capacity
to be effective combat leaders. Leadership, like cohesion,
can be a difficult phenomenon to measure, or even to define,
but leadership qualities are critical to effective military
units.
The foundation of military discipline is that leaders
lead and followers follow. There seems to be a common but
erroneous perception that leadership follows as a matter of
course from the command structure. Leadership, under this
view, means no more than that superiors issue orders and
subordinates follow them; it's as simple as that.42 In fact,
for"); see also Robert L. Goldich, American Society and the Military in the Post-
Cold War Era, in ErrELBERG & MEHAY, supra note 28, at 126 (noting that "[n]o
amount of pay can attract young people to enlist, and later to stay for a career,
who simply are not disposed to volunteer for service or discover, once enlisted,
that they do not like the military. Military life is simply too arduous and too
demanding").
425. See, e.g., Patricia M. Shields et al, Women Pilots in Combat: Attitudes
of Male and Female Pilots, 8 MNERVA Q. 21 (1990), available at
http://www.softlineweb.com/genderw.htm (asserting that "combatants follow
orders").
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subordinates follow orders only some of the time, and it is
not necessarily easy to get them to follow certain orders,
especially those that are likely to result in their deaths.
Thus, combat leadership requires more than possession of
brass bits on one's collar. As S.L.A. Marshall observed: "In
so far as his ability to mold the character of troops is
concerned, the qualifying test of an officer is the judgment
placed upon his soldierly abilities by those who serve under
him. If they do not deem him fit to command, he cannot
train them to obey."26
Combat leaders can call upon a number of bases of
power. They can exact compliance with their orders through
reward, such as the prospect of medals or through
punishment for failure to follow the orders. 4Y7 Leaders can
also obtain compliance using "expert power," whereby the
soldier complies with the leader's orders because the leader
is perceived as having superior knowledge and ability.4 "
The most effective form of power for a combat leader,
however, seems to be "referent power," a form of power that
depends upon the soldier's intense identification with a
respected leader.429 In Darryl Henderson's words, "the
leader approaches the stature of beloved and respected
parent or of the charismatic leader who demonstrates
consistently the Weberian quality of 'Grace,' or the ability
to consistently handle difficult situations well."" °
Confidence in leadership is substantially related to both
individual morale and unit cohesion."3
Willingness to expose oneself to danger is a critical
attribute of effective combat leaders." The effective leader
426. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 168; see also WATSON, supra note 295, at
436 (noting the importance of personality in combat leaders and discounting the
view that leadership is merely a "role").
427. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 112.
428. Id. at 114.
429. Id. at 133.
430. Id. at 113.
431. Gal, supra note 344, at 561-62 (observing that during Israel's 1982 war
in Lebanon, which was perceived by many participants as illegitimate, the units
that preserved high morale were those that showed high confidence in their
commanders); see also Robert B. Smith, Why Soldiers Fight. Part I. Leadership,
Cohesion and Fighter Spirit, 18 QUANTrY & QUALITY 1, 16 (1983).
432. Dean E. Frost et al., The Role of Personal Risk-Taking in Effective
Leadership, 36 HuM. REL. 185 (1983); see also DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 304
("Leaders who are willing to get out front and get shot at, and often illed, are
respected and followed. Officers who stay to the rear find their troops following
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is one who leads by example-one who says "follow me" and
then shares equitably the risk of death.433 There must be no
question about the leader's courage because such questions
weaken the identification of the follower with the leader
and disincline the follower to risk his own life.4 4 According
to Darryl Henderson, "[leaders of front-line units must be
viewed as 'men of steel' professionally equal to meeting all
tasks demanded by the situation.'135 Douglas MacArthur-
notwithstanding the pejorative sobriquet "Dugout Doug"
pinned on him by his soldiers during his stay on
Corregidor-deliberately exposed himself to enemy fire
because he believed that his being seen taking chances
would inspire his men to take chances as well.436 George S.
Patton likewise "deliberately exposed himself to hostile fire
to create 6lan among his troops-and reassure himself that
he had not lost his nerve. " " Glenn Gray vividly described
the positive effect that coolness in the face of danger can
have on those who observe it. Describing his amphibious
landing on a beach in southern France, he wrote:
I crouched under my jeep on a landing craft that went in a few
hours after the first waves of infantry. Shells were exploding in
the water all around, and I felt sure the next one would land
squarely on us. It was silly to expect the jeep to afford any
protection against the German 88s, but I could not get up. Then
through the tangle of gear and machines I saw an American
officer, a captain, standing by the edge of our boat. He was
smoking a cigarette, and I watched fascinated as he flicked the
ashes in the water. His hand trembled not at all; he might have
been on the Staten Island ferry. Then I felt unreasonably grateful
to him. It was clear that he was exposing himself no more nor less
than I; but his reason was in control. I longed to creep through the
gear, clasp him around the knees, and look up to him worshipfully.
Yet the ridiculousness of such an action did not chain me so much
as the fancied danger of moving from my spot. Nevertheless, the
sight of him gradually calmed me, so that when our craft reached
the shore I was able to get into my jeep and drive it hurriedly
them in that direction also.").
433. Smith, supra note 431, at 4.
434. GRINKER & SPIEGEL, supra note 169, at 46-47.
435. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 114.
436. WiLuAM MANCHESTER, A~mRICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880-
1964, 226 (1978); see also DIXON, supra note 372, at 217 (stating that "[oither
things being equal, a man who is prepared to take risks makes a more popular
leader than one not so inclined").
437. HANSON, supra note 1, at 279.
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through the surf and up onto dry land.43 8
If combat soldiers are "brothers," the combat leader is a
"father"49 even if he is no older, or even younger, than the
men he leads. He is an authoritarian figure who may
reward and punish and to whom the soldier looks for
leadership and protection. As Grinker and Spiegel note,
"[w]hether he is a-good or bad father is reflected in the
morale of the unit."
A number of studies have suggested that women may
not evoke followership behavior (in either men or women) to
the same extent that men do."' Even from a young age,
girls find it difficult to influence boys, a fact that may be
one of the major reasons that boys and girls tend to
separate into single-sex groups.' In the civilian sector, it
has been found that women supervisors are trusted less by
both men and women.' Anthropologist David Jones, whose
book Women Warriors: A History is dedicated to proving
that women make good warriors, nonetheless acknowledges
that in his martial-arts teaching experience, considerably
more males than females can be taught "command
438. GRAY, supra note 249, at 13-14.; see also CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 187
(recounting the awe in which he held Major General Lew Walt, winner of three
Navy Crosses, and "one of those rare general officers who believed it was his job
to lead his army from up front, and not from a cushy command post so far
removed from the action that it was almost desertion ... [and who led] his men
from the cannon's mouth, where generals had positioned themselves in the days
when they were fighting-men like Lee, and not business managers like
Westmoreland").
439. KELLETT, supra note 351, at 153; DINTER, supra note 75, at 56.
440. GRINKER & SPIEGEL, supra note 169, at 25.
441. Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Effectiveness of Leaders: A Meta-
Analysis, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125 (1995) [hereinafter Eagly et al., Effectiveness
of Leaders]; see also Robert W. Rice et al, Leader Sex, Follower Attitudes
Toward Women, and Leadership Effectiveness: A Laboratory Experiment, 25
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 46, 47 (1980) (noting the "well-
replicated finding from research on sex roles and leadership [that] shows that
both men and women tend to believe that females, in comparison with males,
are less well suited for leadership positions, and are less effective when in such
positions").
442. Eleanor E. Maccoby, Gender and Relationships: A Developmental
Account, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 513, 516 (1990).
443. Sandy Jeanquart-Barone & Uma Sekaran, Effects of Supervisor's
Gender on American Women's Trust, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 253 (1994); cf. Dow
Scott, Trust Differences Between Men and Women in Superior-Subordinate
Relationships, 8 GROUP & ORG. STUDIES 319 (1983) (finding significantly higher
levels of trust toward same-sex superiors among both men and women).
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presence."' It is an important question-empirical, not
ideological-whether women can evoke followership
behavior among military personnel.
In studies of emergence of leaders, men tend to emerge
more frequently in initially leaderless groups to the extent
that leadership is defined by contribution to the group's
task, while women tended to emerge more frequently as
"social leaders.""' This trend toward male leadership
decreases to the extent that the group task is considered
"feminine." 6 Of course, military groups tend to be the
diametric opposite of leaderless, given the clearly
understood hierarchy. However, in the heat of combat,
leadership often emerges independent of rank. As one
veteran of the North African campaign told interviewers:
"Regardless of the situation, men turn to the officer for
leadership, and if he doesn't give it to them then they look
to the strongest personality who steps forward and becomes
a leader-maybe a staff sergeant if the platoon leader is a
weak leader.
'1 7
Men and women often exhibit different leadership
styles. Men are more likely to adopt an autocratic or
directive style and women to adopt a more democratic or
participatory style."8 That tendency is weakened, however,
in settings that are highly male dominated, where women
are less likely to adopt the more "feminine" leadership style.
Yet Alice Eagly and her colleagues found that although men
and women tend to be evaluated equally favorably when
they adopt a democratic style of leadership, women who
adopt an authoritarian style of leadership tend to be
devalued as leaders." 9 In a subsequent review of studies
444. JONES, supra note 266, at x.
445. Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Gender and the Emergence of
Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 685, 695-701
(1991). The most important attribute of a social leader is that he be liked, with
efficiency and task ability being of only secondary importance. DIXON, supra
note 372, at 216.
446. Eagly & Karau, supra note 445, at 704.
447. STOUFFER ET AL., supra note 280, at 117.
448. Alice H. Eagly & Blair T. Johnson, Gender and Leadership Style: A
Meta-Analysis, 108 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 233, 247 (1990).
449. Eagly et al, Evaluation of Leaders, supra note 441, at 3; see also Dora
Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 48, 57 (1990) (finding that female leaders elicited visible cues of
negative affect, despite subjects' egalitarian responses to questions about sex
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evaluating the effectiveness of leaders, overall results
indicated that men and women were equivalent in their
effectiveness.45 However, the military studies "deviated
strongly from all other classes of studies."' The researchers
concluded that "male leaders fared well in roles thought to
be congenial to men, and female leaders fared well in roles
thought to be congenial to women."' 2 Women were judged
more effective than men when the job required the ability to
cooperate and get along with other people, while men were
more effective in roles that required the ability to direct and
control people.45 Given that the military studies examined
by Eagly did not involve combat effectiveness, current
research probably substantially understates the size of sex
differences in leadership effectiveness.
The above studies suggest that women in the military
are in a bind. The role of military leader, at least as
currently constructed, calls for an authoritarian form of
leadership, a form that women are somewhat less likely to
employ than males even in roles that encourage it. If they
do employ this authoritarian form of leadership, however,
they tend to be negatively evaluated and less effective.
Even in the civilian workplace, both male and female
subordinates have a more negative reaction to the
imposition of discipline by female superiors than by male
superiors.454
One possible way out of this bind is to reconstruct
military leadership in a more democratic, participatory
direction. There is substantial reason to doubt, however,
that such a course is possible, or at least consistent with
combat effectiveness. In many combat contexts, leadership
decisions must be made on the spot-should a squad be
sent up a hill or should the fighter group pursue an
apparent enemy? A directive, rather than a democratic,
process is necessary in such circumstances. In other
contexts, though, the time pressure is lower. Is a more
bias, suggesting to the researchers that the negative response may not be
conscious).
450. Eagly et al, Effectiveness of Leaders, supra note 441, at 125.
451. Id. at 135.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 137.
454. Leanne E. Atwater et al., Gender and Discipline in the Workplace:
Wait Until Your Father Gets Home (Aug. 2000) (unpublished paper, presented
at the Academy of Management Meeting, Toronto).
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democratic style of leadership appropriate in those cases?
Edward Shils, who served in the Intelligence Section of the
Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF during World
War II,.. thought not. He argued that authoritarian
leadership can be a crucial component in primary groups
operating in situations that bring forth needs for "paternal
protection."45 Indeed, when faced with certain kinds of
tasks and threats, "primary-group solidarity might well be
disintegrated by democratic leadership."45" It is for that
reason that "[t]he basis of any army is discipline,
unquestioning obedience of the orders of one's superiors,"
and "any signs of democratic thinking or individualism that
might threaten such a response must be ruthlessly stamped
out.
4 58
Substantial evidence exists to show that women tend
not to be perceived by men as military leaders. Prior to the
introduction of women into the Naval Academy, an
important source of leadership ratings for midshipmen was
ratings by peers. These peer ratings were thought to be
valid measures of leadership ability and potential. After
women were admitted to the Academy, peer ratings were
discontinued because women consistently received lower
ratings than men.5 9 Now, evaluation of leadership is
exclusively in the hands of the officers, losing to the
Academy an important source of input on leadership
ability.40
The experience at Annapolis is subject to varying
interpretations. It could be that the men simply resented
the women and rated them unfairly. However, it is difficult
455. See Shils & Janowitz, supra note 330, at 280.
456. Edward A. Shils, The Study of the Primary Group, in THE POLICY
SCIENCES 65 n.60 (David Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1965); see also
DINTER, supra note 75, at 56 (noting that in stressful situations autocratic
leaders provide a feeling of protection and security).
457. Shils, supra note 456, at 65 n.60.
458. ELLIS, supra note 69, at 191; see also DIXON, supra note 372, at 216-17
(noting the preference for autocratic leadership under stress).
459. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 63; see also Robert W. Rice et al.,
Leadership Ratings for Male and Female Military Cadets, 10 SEx ROLES 885,
895-96, 899 (1984) (finding that males were rated higher on leadership at West
Point and noting that based upon present study and others, the leadership
evaluation process had been changed).
460. Studies of the Israeli Defense Forces suggest that peers are remarkably
good judges of leadership ability, producing results perhaps even better than
evaluation by superiors. WATSON, supra note 295, at 160-61.
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to know exactly what the term "unfair rating" means in this
context. Leadership involves more than objectively
measurable skills; it involves intangibles such as charisma
and the ability to evoke followership behavior in others. If
potential followers will not follow a potential leader for
whatever reason, then the potential leader cannot be
effective. Whether blame is assigned to the failed follower
or the failed leader is largely irrelevant. If the mission is
not being accomplished, the unit is ineffective.
A recent study concluding that stereotypes bias the
evaluation of women's leadership performance reveals how
difficult definitive studies can be in this area. 6' The study
examined evaluations of leadership competence of a group
of male and female Army captains at two different times (in
noncombat settings). At Time 1, upon initial contact, no sex
differences in leadership ability appeared, but at Time 2,
after three weeks of interactive contact, men were judged
more favorably than women.62 The researchers concluded
that the reason for the change was that at Time 1,
participants "may have felt they needed performance
evidence before assuming that women... would be less
competent than men," possibly driven by "'political
correctness' norms" that pervade the military.4 At Time 2,
the researchers speculate, the subjects "apparently had
seen enough evidence to confirm their stereotype-based
hypotheses."4 ' While this explanation is certainly possible,
most of the literature on reliance on stereotypes indicates
that reliance decreases as more individuating evidence
accumulates. 65
The research was designed in such a way that any
conceivable result could demonstrate that stereotypes were
at work. As it turned out, it was the increase in sex
differences over time that led the researchers to conclude
that evaluators were influenced by stereotypes. Yet, if they
had found that the sex difference declined over time, they
could just as well have concluded that stereotypes were also
461. Monica Biernat et al, All That You Can Be: Stereotyping of Self and
Others in a Military Context, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301 (1998).
462. Id. at 309.
463. Id. at 303, 309.
464. Id. at 309.
465. Lee J. Jussim et al., Why Study Stereotype Accuracy and Inaccuracy? 3,
13, in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOwARD APPRECIATING GROUP DIFFERENCES
(Yueh-Ting Lee et at eds., 1995).
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at work, but this time at Time 1, consistent with the usual
pattern of stereotype effect, which is that they operate most
strongly when people lack specific information about a
target person.46 If the sex differences remained constant
from Time 1 to Time 2, that could prove the intractability of
sex stereotypes. Even if there had been no sex differences at
either time, that might simply demonstrate the strength
(and importance) of the prevailing 'political correctness'
norms."
How is it that the researchers could conclude that the
reported differences in leadership competence at Time 2
were a consequence of reliance on stereotypes rather than
actual performance? Their answer is that they controlled
for factors that might legitimately be associated with actual
performance: "medals, badges, combat deployment, and
branch/specialty." What remains, they assert, is pure
bias. Yet the conclusion of "pure bias" requires that one
accept that "medals, badges, combat deployment, and
branchspecialty" completely capture "leadership ability," a
conclusion that no serious person could reach.
Followership behavior, at least in dangerous contexts,
rests to a large extent on an emotional bond with the
leader-sometimes called "hierarchical" or "vertical"
cohesion, 68 in contrast to the "horizontal" cohesion of
compatriots-rather than the mere fact that the follower is,
say, a private first class, and the platoon leader is a
lieutenant. The power that derives simply from the chain of
command is not terribly effective in motivating troops in
the circumstances that matter the most. William
Manchester describes a lieutenant, newly assigned to his
platoon on Tarawa, who attempted by authority of his rank
to induce his men to go over a seawall behind which they
were pinned down. The lieutenant proclaimed that he was
going to take the men "over the top." Manchester told him
that they had to wait until the units on the Japanese flank
took out the machine guns and that if the lieutenant
ordered the men to follow him, they would not do so.469 The
lieutenant then told the men that they must all follow him.
Manchester writes:
466. Id. at 12.
467. Biernat et Al, supra note 461, at 309.
468. Manning, supra note 345, at 457.
469. MANCHESTER, supra note 63, at 233-35.
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They looked up at him glassily. He hesitated, probably wondering
whether he should threaten them with courts-martial. Then he
turned and sprang at the seawall.... [He] rose till he stood
sideways. Both his hands were pointing. His left forefinger was
pointed down at us, his right forefinger at the Japanese. It was a
Frederic Remington painting. He breathed deeply and yelled,
"Follow me!"
The men's faces still were turned up, expressionless. Nobody
moved. I stood beneath the wall, my arms outstretched, waiting to
catch what would be left. At that moment the slugs hit him. It was
a Nambu; it stitched him vertically, from forehead to crotch. One
moment he was looming above us in that heroic pose; in the next
moment red pits blossomed down him, four on his face alone, and a
dozen others down his uniform. One was off center; it slammed
into the Marine Corps emblem over his heart; the gunner knew his
job.470
Despite the lieutenant's attempts to rely on rank, these
men simply refused to follow. 7'
Successful combat leaders, as opposed to simple
managers, evoke the followership of their subordinates;
they do not simply command it. James Calvert-then-
executive officer of a World War II submarine, later rising
to command of the Pacific fleet-recognized this quality in
the submarine's cook and took the unprecedented step of
naming a cook as Chief of the Boat, the top warrant officer
on the submarine.7 ' As Calvert recalled in his memoirs,
"Watson had that magical ingredient called leadership
ability, which is so hard to define and yet so immediately
recognizable. ' 71 It seems highly unlikely that if Calvert had
made the decision based upon "medals, badges, combat
deployment, and branch/specialty '174 that he would have
chosen the cook.
A striking and repetitive pattern in combat memoirs is
the reverence that many writers felt for their commanding
officers. Eugene Sledge, writing of his company commander,
470. Id. at 236-37.
471. It obviously did not help that not only was the lieutenant new to the
platoon and thus had had no opportunity to earn the trust of the men, but also
that this was his first combat command.
472. JAMES F. CALVERT, SILENT RUNNING: MY YEARS ON A WORLD WAR H
ATTACK SUBMARINE 229-30 (1995).
473. Id. at 230.
474. See supra text accompanying note 467.
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Captain Andy "Ack Ack" Haldane, reflected:
Although he insisted on strict discipline, the captain was a quiet
man who gave orders without shouting. He had a rare combination
of intelligence, courage, self-confidence, and compassion that
commanded our respect and admiration. We were thankful that
Ack Ack was our skipper, felt more secure in it, and felt sorry for
other companies not so fortunate. While some officers on Pavuvu
thought it necessary to strut or order us around to impress us with
their status, Haldane quietly told us what to do. We loved him for
it and did the best job we knew how.4
7 5
Haldane was later killed, and Sledge wrote:
"The Skipper is dead. Ack Ack has been killed," Johnny finally
blurted out, then looked quickly away from us. I was stunned and
sickened. Throwing my ammo bag down, I turned away from the
others, sat on my helmet, and sobbed quietly.
Never in my wildest imagination had I contemplated Captain
Haldane's death. We had a steady stream of killed and wounded
leaving us, but somehow I assumed Ack Ack was immortal. Our
company commander represented stability and direction in a
world of violence, death, and destruction. Now his life had been
snuffed out. We felt forlorn and lost. It was the worst grief I
endured during the entire war. The intervening years have not
lessened it any. Capt. Andy Haldane wasn't an idol. He was
human. But he commanded our individual destinies under the
most trying conditions with the utmost compassion. We knew he
could never be replaced. He was the finest Marine officer I ever
knew. The loss of many close friends grieved me deeply on Peleliu
and Okinawa. But to all of us the loss of our company commander
at Peleliu was like losing a parent we depended upon for
security-not our physical security, because we knew that was a
commodity beyond our reach in combat, but our mental security.
So ended the outstanding combat career of a fine officer who had
distinguished himself at Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and
Peleliu. We had lost our leader and our friend. Our lives would
never be the same. But we turned back to the ugly business at
hand.
4 7 6
Although Haldane was apparently a remarkable man,
he was one of many remarkable men who have led their
troops and earned in the process their undying devotion. It
475. SLEDGE, supra note 63, at 40.
476. Id. at 140-41.
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seems highly doubtful that women could evoke the same
kind of devotion and followership-especially from young
men-that effective male leaders can command. To the
extent that the combat leader is the "father," what is the
role of the female combat leader? A mother, a female father,
an androgynous "parent"? None of these roles seems to
work. The critical question is whether a young man, trying
to prove his manhood, would be as likely to follow a woman
as he would be to follow a man.
Even if there is some male resistance to taking orders
from women in combat situations, it is no doubt the case
that there is variation among men. Some will be more
willing to accept such orders than others.477 For example,
men with liberal attitudes toward women are more positive
toward female leaders than are men with more traditional
attitudes. While the military could attempt to exclude men
with traditional attitudes from the military, it seems quite
likely that such a course would deny the military many of
its most effective combat troops.
D. Female Combat Personnel Face a High Risk of Rape
Another risk of opening combat positions to women is
the risk of sexual mistreatment by the enemy. It is
inevitable that if women are taken as prisoners of war in
substantial numbers and held for a prolonged period of time
they will be sexually mistreated.478 Rape and warfare have
gone hand in hand probably as long as there have been
humans and perhaps even before that. The Old Testament
is a virtual compendium of such stories. Red Army soldiers
on the eastern front toward the end of World War II were
told that German women were theirs by right and were
urged to "take them as your lawful prey."' Indeed, there
was widespread rape by Germans (especially on the eastern
front), Russians and Japanese, and occasional rape by the
western Allies. o The Serbs engaged in widespread rape
477. See Rice et al, supra note 441, at 71.
478. But see Kornblum, supra note 10, at 398 (arguing that fears of sexual
mistreatment by the enemy are based on "racist assumptions"). The "racist
assumption" seems to be not that the enemy will mistreat captives, but rather
that the enemy will treat female captives more harshly than males.
479. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 389-90.
480. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
48-78 (1975).
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more recently.48' Thus, the story of war is in substantial
part a story of rape. Indeed, Susan Brownmiller's
influential book Against Our Will devotes its longest
chapter to war.
48 2
Many seem to assume that because female soldiers will
be "combatants," they will escape the treatment that armies
have in the past inflicted on women. Perhaps if we are
dealing with an enemy who obeys the laws of war, this is
true, but few do routinely and none do always. Prisoners of
war are often cruelly mistreated, as those who survived the
Bataan Death March or the prison camps of North Vietnam
can attest. The notion that women will be spared-or that
they will not be subjected to any greater burden than male
prisoners-is simply a fantasy born of wishful thinking.483
The response to concerns about rape of female prisoners
by many proponents of women in combat approaches the
bizarre. They do not deny that rape will occur, but they
point to the true but irrelevant fact that rape is not
confined to POWs. Referring to a woman taken prisoner
during the Gulf War, Linda Bird Francke asserts that she
"was, in fact, safer from sexual abuse in Baghdad than were
her fellow female soldiers in the field.""'84 The justification
for that surprising conclusion was that "at least twenty-five
servicewomen were sexually assaulted in the Gulf, while
[the woman prisoner] had only one minor and brief sexual
incident as a POW.""85 The fact is that two women were
taken prisoner during the Gulf War and both were
reportedly sexually abused. The woman just mentioned
reported that her breasts had been pawed,4"6 and the other
woman reported that she had been digitally penetrated but
had not been raped because her attacker could not get her
481. See Marlise Simons, Bosnian Rapes Go Untried by the U.N., N.Y.
TAIES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A12 (reporting that European Community investigators
concluded that 20,000 Muslim women and girls were raped by Bosnian Serb
soldiers).
482. BROWNMILLER, supra note 480, at 31-113.
483. Even in the absence of war, of course, incarcerated females are often
subjected to sexual exploitation. GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, WOMEN IN
PRISON: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY CORRECTIONAL STAFF, 1999 GEN. ACCT. OFF.
104.
484. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 96. No American military women were
captured in Vietnam. PRESIDENTIAL COAMIN, supra note 67, at C-123.
485. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 96.
486. She later denied that this had happened. Elaine Sciolino, Female
P.O.W. Is Abused, Kindling Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1992, at Al.
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flight suit off because of her injuries.4 7 Thus, two out of two
female POWs, or 100%, were subjected to some form of
sexual assault, while approximately 25 of the over 30,000
women who served in the Gulf, or less than one-tenth of 1%,
reported being subjected to sexual assault by their own
side. It is hard to understand how one can sensibly argue
that female POWs are not at heightened risk of rape. 8
Others have attempted to convert soldiers' propensity to
rape the enemy into an argument in favor of placing women
in combat positions. Gerard de Groot argues:
Extensive studies have cast doubt upon the effectiveness of male
soldiers who face female enemies, doubts confirmed by American
experience in Vietnam. American GIs, on encountering female Viet
Cong, often reacted not by killing but by attempting to capture and
rape. Leaving aside the obvious moral issues, this reaction
rendered the soldier less effective and more vulnerable.4 89
The notion that enough enemy soldiers are going to be
fumbling with their zippers instead of protecting
themselves from our troops' fire that the U.S. would gain a
tactical advantage by including women in combat units is
grotesque, not to mention almost certainly incorrect.
It is often argued that men as well as women may be
mistreated, even if the mistreatment of men usually takes a
nonsexual form. 9° However, rape is generally considered a
more serious imposition than nonsexual assault. Certainly,
our domestic criminal law treats it as such. Moreover, there
is greater incentive to mistreat female prisoners sexually
487. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 98-99.
488. The argument that we should not be overly concerned about the rape of
women prisoners because, after all, women get raped in the U.S. is surprisingly
frequent, given its lack of cogency. See, e.g., Peach, supra note 57, at 170(stating that "[tihe rationale that women need to be protected from the horrors
of capture and imprisonment ignores the reality that men as well as women are
raped in war and that women are subject to such sexual violence at home and
by their fellow troops, as well as in the field of combat"); Francine D'Amico,
Women at Arms: The Combat Controversy, 8 MINERVA Q. 1 (1990), avaialable at
http://vww.softlineweb.com/genderw.htm (stating that because in civilian
society women are frequently raped, "[k]eeping women at home doesn't keep
them safe").
489. De Groot, supra note 57, at 259.
490. See FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 252-53. According to the Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, there were no
documented cases of male service personnel being sexually abused in Vietnam
or any subsequent conflict. PRESIDENTIAL COMMI'N, supra note 67, at C-46.
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than there is to mistreat male prisoner nonsexually. Male
prisoners may be tortured for instrumental reasons, such as
to extract information or punish transgressions, and they
may be tortured for the pleasure of their sadistic
tormenters. All of this is true of women as well. In addition,
however, is the sexual motive for rape. If our military
culture encourages rape, as Madeline Morris has
asserted,49' there is no reason to think that any other
military is less inclined in that direction.
There is some irony in the simultaneous assertions of
proponents of sexual integration that women need no
special protection from the enemy and that they need
special protection from their own comrades. Tailhook,
Aberdeen, and a host of less-visible problems all are
attributable to sexual integration. Indeed, the following
description of security precautions designed to protect
female Air Force recruits from their male colleagues sounds
more like a maximum-security prison than residential
quarters:
In BMT [Basic Military Training], security is tight in the one
thousand person living quarters with strict, but fair, rules of social
conduct and access control. Men and women live in separate bays
and are separated by steel doors, locks, and permanent party
monitors twenty-four hours per day. Control rosters and
identification badges limit access to the building and
routine/random inspections are performed to ensure compliance.
BMT leadership is actively involved to ensure trainee security and
safety and hold the permanent party personnel and students
themselves accountable to properly manage the barracks' security
491. Morris, supra note 10. Morris's thesis that the military is a "rape
culture" is peculiar in itself. It is based in large part on her assertion that rates
of rape perpetrated by military personnel are "elevated," but her support for
that proposition is unusual, if not bizarre. Age-adjusted rape rates in the
military range from 19% (Navy) to 47% (Army) of civilian rates. Most people
would probably view these as diminished, rather than elevated, rape rates.
Morris's alarm comes from the fact that while rape rates in the military are
indeed substantially lower than civilian rates, they are not as much lower as
rates for other violent crimes. Id. at 660. For example, rates for murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter range from 5% (Air Force) to 20% (Army) of civilian
rates. One might just as well laud the military for the discipline that reduces
violent crime rates overall, but recognize that propensity to rape might simply
be somewhat more unmanageable than the propensity to commit other crimes.
Perhaps there is a biological explanation for this phenomenon. See generally
Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and The Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation
and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827 (1999).
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programs. Security is a top priority, and we continue to seek new
492and innovative ways, with enhanced technology, to improve.
It seems very unlikely that our enemies will be as solicitous
of the safety of our female personnel as the Air Force is.
E. The Male as Protector
Combat effectiveness may also be diminished if men are
overly protective of their female colleagues. The role of
males as protectors of women is strongly ingrained. Even
Margaret Mead believed that there might be a biological
component to the protective impulses of males toward
females. 3 It is quite plausible that a predisposition to act
protectively toward someone who is a potential mate would
have tended, over human history, to enhance a male's
reproductive success; certainly acting protectively toward
someone who is an actual mate would tend to do so.414 The
advantage that women have traditionally obtained from
male protection is thought to be responsible for the
preference of women for tall, strong men. 9
The male protective impulse toward women is
responsible in large part for Israel's policy of excluding
women from combat positions. Women played an active role
492. See Air Force Response to the Congressional Commission on Military
Training and Gender Related Issues, STATEMENT AND STATUS REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED
ISSUES (1999), available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/
99-03-17commissionl.htm.
493. MEAD, supra note 226, at 23. But see Peach, supra note 57, at 156, 161(referring to the notion that men are protectors as an "ideologically biased
myth").
494. It would be interesting to test whether a male's protective impulses
toward women varied with their reproductive potential. It would not be
surprising, for example, to find that men would exhibit more protective
behavior toward attractive women than unattractive women, toward young
women rather than old women, or toward more normally proportioned women
over obese women. When the State of Texas was preparing to execute a woman
for a double murder, many people thought it highly relevant that she was
considered to be physically attractive. See Nat Hentoff, Not Too Young to Be
Executed, WASH. POST, June 13, 1998, at A21; Eric Zorn, Death Row Beauty
Shows Execution Is Always Unfair, CI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1998, at N1.
495. See Buss, supra note 104, at 39; B. Pawlowski, Evolutionary Fitness:
Tall Men Have More Reproductive Success, 403 NATURE 156 (Jan. 13, 2000)
(finding that taller men had more offspring than shorter men).
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in the struggle for independence against the British.46 They
served in the Palmach, which was an underground
paramilitary force. They were especially useful in
undercover missions, surveillance missions, and smuggling
weapons, because British soldiers were reluctant to search
them.4 ' However, when the Palmach undertook large
missions, such as retaliatory raids against Arab villages,
women did not generally participate. They did, however,
fight shoulder to shoulder alongside the men when their
isolated settlements were attacked by Arabs.498 Still, the
number of women who actually employed weapons was
"very small" and combat deaths were relatively low, as
well.499 When the Israeli Defense Force was established in
1948, it excluded all women from combat positions."'0
Much of the Israeli dissatisfaction with women soldiers
came not from the women's inability to fight, but from the
reaction of male soldiers to female casualties: "Men who
might have found the wounding of a male comrade
comparatively tolerable were shocked by the injury of a
woman, and the mission tended to get forgotten in a general
scramble to ensure that she received medical aid."5 There
was also concern that female POWs would demoralize the
Israeli people."0 2 Moreover, the Israelis found that Arabs
would not surrender to units containing women.
These same concerns about over-protectiveness are
present in the U.S. military. As Stephanie Gutmann has
observed, soldiers live by two codes- good soldiers obey
orders and display courage, and honorable men do not
expose women to danger while they sit in safety. "Only a
496. See van Creveld, supra note 81, at 65-67.
497. See id. at 65.
498. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE SWORD AND THE OLIVE: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE 117-18 (1998).
499. Israel suffered 4520 combat casualties in the War of Independence,
and, although women constituted 10.6% of the armed forces, only 2.4% of
combat deaths were female. Id. at 99.
500. See id. at 119.
501. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 104; see also LESLEY HAZLETON, ISRAELI
WOMEN: THE REALITY BEHIND THE MYTHS 140 (1977) (noting Israeli sensitivity
to female casualties and prisoners).
502. PRESIDENTIAL COAMl&N, supra note 67, at C-29 (noting that the post-war
German constitution prohibits the assignment of women in the military, except
to medical posts and the military band). A large number of German women
auxiliaries were captured by the Russians toward the end of the war, many of
whom were abused, executed, or both.
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coward," she notes, "would send a woman out to do a very
dangerous job when he is there to help her.""3 A Roper Poll
taken after the Gulf War found that two-thirds of military
respondents believed that inclusion of women in combat
units would lead to reduced effectiveness and increased risk
of death on the part of men because of their protective
impulses toward women.0 4 One Marine colonel expressed a
common sentiment:
We're still old-fashioned enough to think we ought to protect our
women. With a woman flying on your wing in combat, you've gotta
worry about her. It's just natural. You're gonna feel a need to keep
her from getting shot down. It's gonna take away the combat
edge.05
Inclusion of women in combat units will likely
exacerbate an already well-recognized problem. It is always
difficult for a combat soldier to continue with a mission
"when all one's instincts are to help" a wounded comrade,
and despite orders not to stop for the wounded, soldiers
frequently disobey.06 Thus, the battle may be abandoned
and the objective lost because of a single individual. As
Richard Holmes has noted, "[flew soldiers can remain deaf
to the pleadings of a wounded man.""7 This natural
tendency to aid a wounded comrade may intensify if the
pleadings come from a wounded woman, resulting in even
greater impairment of operational goals.
Male pilots who take the Air Force's Survival, Evasion,
Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training behave much like
the Israeli soldiers. In SERE school, pilots are taught how
503. GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 43.
504. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 67, at C-86. A study of male and
female Army and Air Force aircrew revealed that both men and women were
worried about the responses of men to maltreatment of women. Victoria M.
Voge & Raymond E. King, Interpersonal Relationship and Prisoner of War
Concerns of Rated Military Male and Female Aircrew, 68 AvIATION, SPACE &
ENvTL. M.ED. 879, 884 (1997). A GAO study performed after the Gulf War found
substantial sentiment in both male and female focus groups that men feel a
need to protect women. The two most prevalent threats from which men were
predicted to protect women were hostile fire and other men. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OPERATION DESERT STORM!: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE
DEPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, GAO/NSIAD-93-93, at 25 (1993)
[hereinafter GAO, DEPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY].
505. ROBERT GANDT, BOGEYS AND BANDITS 36 (1997).
506. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 194.
507. Id. at 195.
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to survive after being shot down, how to evade capture, how
to resist the enemy if they are captured, and how to escape
from captivity. Even in simulations, men try to protect
women pilots to the detriment of the unit."' Indeed, the
male students are reported to be more concerned about the
potential for sexual exploitation of female prisoners than
the women are themselves.0 9 According to Linda Bird
Francke, "[t]he women recognized the danger in the men's
reaction to their sexual exploitation [because if] the enemy
technique worked the women prisoners would be subject to
repetitive abuse." h'° One obvious flaw in that reasoning is
its implicit assumption that if the men did not react to the
sexual exploitation, the women prisoners would not be
subject to repetitive abuse. That assumption in turn rests
on the view that the sole motivation for rape is an
instrumental one, that the raping soldier is doing it only for
the military advantage that the rape might bring.5 ' In
other words, the rapist's motivations are not really sexual.
While the argument that "rape is not about sex" has been
around a long time, it has been convincingly refuted."
No matter what the source of male protective behavior
toward women, it can probably be diminished or heightened
through either negative or positive reinforcement. The
response of the Air Force to male protectiveness in SERE
training was to add a component desensitizing male pilots
508. The North Vietnamese often used harm and threats of harm to other
POWs during interrogation. Robert J. Ursano et al., The Prisoner of War: Stress,
Illness and Resiliency, 17 PSYCHOL. ANNALS 532 (1985). After the 1974
revolution in Portugal, the political police apparently had success using
recordings of women's screams to convince prisoners that their wives and
girlfriends were being tortured nearby. WATSON, supra note 295, at 266.
509. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 89.
510. Id.
511. History does not support the view that soldiers who rape do it only, or
even primarily, for military purposes. After the international outcries against
widespread rape by the Japanese in Nanking in 1937, the Japanese high
command ordered the establishment of "comfort houses" by "luring, purchasing,
or kidnapping between eighty thousand and two hundred thousand women,"
mostly from Korea, but also from elsewhere in Asia. See CHANG, supra note 64,
at 52. Although the Japanese in Nanking raped females ranging from children
to octogenarians, they had a preference for younger women. Id. at 91-96.
Younger women would often disguise themselves as old women to avoid being
raped. Id. at 96.
512. See generally Jones, supra note 491. This same erroneous assumption
underlies much of the discussion about sexual harassment. See Browne, An
Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment, supra note 4.
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to violence against women.513 Perhaps this indoctrination
will work, but there must be some question about whether
it is a good idea. Do we really want to desensitize men to
violence against women? If so, does this desire also include
the pilots who participated in the Tailhook convention of
1991? Surely, an increase in men's tolerance of sexual
violence against women must be counted as a cost of sexual
integration in the military.
One of the central questions that must be addressed by
any society that contemplates placing women in combat is
what attitude society should have toward violence by and
against women. Many feminists complain about the "male
monopoly" on the use of physical force and believe that
inclusion of women in combat will break down that
monopoly.514 But it must be understood that there is a
certain symmetry in traditional arrangements. While the
circumstances in which force could legitimately be
employed by women were restricted, so were the
circumstances in which force could legitimately be used
against them. If women are considered proper
combatants-and little boys play with GI Jane, as well as
GI Joe, action figures-how do we continue to teach boys
that it is unacceptable to hit girls even if the girls hit them
first? While one might simply say that we should teach boys
not to hit anyone, we already know that that course does
not work very well. Besides, there is a substantial question
whether boys should be taught not to defend themselves. If
women are to be viewed as just like men when it comes to
violence, however, should we not view a man's punching a
woman in a bar as morally equivalent to his punching
another man?
Male protectiveness towards women-whether
biologically predisposed, culturally conditioned, or both-is
certainly a feature of our society. If a couple strolling along
the street is attacked by a group of assailants, few would
assert that it is the duty of the woman to protect the man;
most would hold the man responsible for the woman's
protection. A woman who ran away from the attack and left
her companion behind-whether simply to avoid being
513. See FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 91.
514. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, "A Constitutional Right to be Treated
Like... Ladies": Women, Civic Obligation, and Military Service, 1993 U. CI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 125 (1993).
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injured or to seek assistance-would suffer little stigma. On
the other hand, a man who ran away from the attack,
leaving his companion behind, would likely be branded a
coward even if the only reason he left was to get help.
A recent news story in Michigan unintentionally
illustrated the different views that people have about sex
differences in courage and protectiveness. A man confronted
four teenage boys who had been tearing up his lawn in
retaliation for his having intervened earlier to prevent
them from harassing two teenage girls.515 They left him
unconscious in the middle of the road, suffering from head
trauma, a collapsed lung, and several broken bones. A 17-
year-old girl came upon the victim and stopped her car so as
to protect him from traffic, but she remained in the car with
the windows up and the doors locked. Although she did not
know how he came to be in the middle of the road, she was
afraid that he might have been attacked and that the same
fate might be in store for her. She got out of her car only
when another passing motorist stopped to help. Front-page
headlines in the local newspaper lauded her as a "hero." '
Why? It seems that she was viewed as having displayed
extraordinary courage to assist another. But was it truly
"extraordinary"?
Suppose that the sexes in the above scenario were
reversed. The victim in the road is a woman, and a 17-year-
old boy drives up and sits in his car with his doors locked,
while, for all he knows, the woman may bleed to death. It
seems highly doubtful that the boy would be labeled a hero.
Indeed, if any moral judgment were attached to his actions
at all, he would probably be labeled a coward. After all,
wasn't it his moral obligation to aid the woman? Yet the
female "rescuer" was clearly viewed as acting "above and
beyond the call of duty." The difference cannot be just that
the boy is probably stronger than the girl and better able to
protect himself; after all, whoever had attacked the adult
victim had been sufficiently powerful to render him
unconscious. One might also ask why the victim himself
was not labeled a hero for being willing to stand up against
the actions of the four attackers despite being substantially
outnumbered? The reason that the story was newsworthy is
515. See Scott Anderson & Susan Oppat, Young Hero Praised for Aid to
Victim of Prank, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Sept. 8, 1999, at Al.
516. To her credit, the girl demurred to the "hero" label. Id.
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that everyone viewed it as a "man bites dog" story in a way
that it would not have been had the sexes been reversed. A
girl placing her car in a position to protect the man from
traffic and sitting in the car until help came along was
newsworthy; a lone man standing up to four young toughs
was not. No one, it seems, expects much in the way of
physical courage from a female, demonstrating the validity
of Aristotle's observation that "a man would be thought a
coward if he had no more courage than a courageous
woman."517 While stories of men engaging in heroic rescue
attempts are relatively commonplace, one seldom sees such
actions by women unless they are attempting to rescue
intimates.51
Much of warfare is psychological and we can be sure
that some of our potential enemies will exploit our
protectiveness toward women. One way the Japanese
attempted to demoralize and frighten our soldiers in the
Pacific was to capture a soldier and then toss him back
toward our lines in pieces.519 In his memoir of his experience
as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam, Robert Mason describes a
scene in which he objected to the killing of a North
Vietnamese prisoner. One of the Americans argued that it
was not murder; it was justice:
ey cut off Sergeant Rocci's cock and stuck it in his mouth. And
five of his men," said the voice. "After they spent the night slowly
shoving knives into their guts. If you had been here to hear the
screams... They screamed all night. This morning they were all
dead, all gagged with their cocks." 0
There is every reason to believe that a foe willing to do such
things would also sexually exploit captured women.
While many feminists may challenge the notion that
men should protect women-with its implicit assumption
that women's lives are somehow more important than
men's-that is an assumption that is in many ways
embraced not only by our culture but by most feminists as
well. After all, we have a federal Violence Against Women
Act,52' and the phrase "violence against women" rolls
517. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 134 (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (1943).
518. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
519. See LINDER AN, supra note 304, at 159.
520. MASON, supra note 73, at 309-10.
521. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 40111(a)-
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smoothly off of virtually everyone's tongue. Yet most school
children and even many adults would be surprised to learn
that there is substantially more violence against men than
there is against women."2 Our enemies can easily exploit
this special sensitivity we have to the violent victimization
of women.
F. The "Special Case" of Aviation
The key to success in air-to-air combat is the pilot, his ability,
training, and aggressiveness, with a little luck thrown in. You
cannot enter the air thinking you will lose. Personality
characteristics have to be oriented toward the mission, and
concentration directed to maximum performance. There are no
points for second place. The pilot must have a three-dimensional
sense of awareness and feel time, distance and relative motion as if
they were part of his soul.
-Randall Cunningham5
One of the most contentious issues about women in
combat involves their inclusion in combat aviation. Many
who acknowledge that differences in physical strength and
potential negative effects on unit cohesion may warrant
continued exclusion of women from ground combat
nonetheless believe that women's admission to combat
aviation poses little risk.524 This argument rests to a large
extent on two assumptions, however, neither of which may
be true: first, that unit cohesion is not as important, or is
somehow importantly different, in aviation, and second,
that the only individual differences between men and
women that are relevant to combat involve physical
strength, which is not an issue in aviation.525
40611, 108 Stat. 1796, 1903-53 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Although its prohibitions are phrased in a sex-neutral
way, the title of the Act and the atmospherics surrounding its passage make
clear that it is violence against women, and not violence against men, that was
the target.
522. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Sex Differences
in Violent Victimization, 1994, NCJ-164508 (Sept. 1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sdvv.pdf (reporting that for every two
violent victimizations of females, there were three of males).
523. SPICK, supra note 365, at 152 (quoting Randall Cunningham, Air-to-Air
Tactics). Cunningham, a Navy aviator, became the first "ace" of the Vietnam
War, an event that did not occur until 1972. Id. at 151.
524. See, e.g., BINmN, supra note 295, at 40.
525. See Shields et al., supra note 425, at 23:
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Preliminarily, it is worth noting that strength is not
irrelevant to modern aviation. While strength is not usually
a major issue in flying modern airplanes under ordinary
circumstances, when things go wrong the situation changes.
In the words of the principal investigator of a study of
strength requirements of aviators, "[i]f they lose hydraulics
or an engine or two engines, it gets really tough to fly the
plane."52 It is in the nature of combat, of course, for things
to go very wrong.
Over and above strength, however, much combat
aviation requires the same combination of readiness to kill
and willingness to expose oneself to physical danger that is
required of the infantryman. Consider Hugh Mills'
description of life as a scout helicopter pilot in Vietnam:
repeated low level missions over enemy concentrations,
taking heavy ground fire, day after day.52 Indeed, drawing
fire was an important part of the scout helicopter's function,
because that was a way of locating the enemy.52 Mills was
shot down sixteen times, wounded three times, earning
three Silver Stars, four Distinguished Flying Crosses, and
three Bronze Stars.29 Helicopter pilots in Vietnam took
extraordinary risks, often landing under fire and spending
a great deal of time on or near the ground, whether
rescuing wounded, bringing in reinforcements, or supplying
an isolated firebase with cold beer and hot pizza.' In
Vietnam, they were known for taking great risks and doing
[Tihe game [of air combat] is far from a contact sport. Rather the
players are increasingly surrounded by high technology. The
instruments of violence and their successful implementation require
brain versus brawn. This is a playing field where men and women are
more clearly equivalent. Are the facts that men can run faster and lift
more weight relevant to whether women should be on combat units?
But see ROBERT WILCOX, WINGS OF FURY 38 (1996) (asserting, contrary to
Shields, that air combat "is a contact sport").
526. Becky Garrison, One Size Jet Doesn't Fit All: Modifications Are Needed
for Some Women Aviators, NAVY TiMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at 34.
527. HUGH L. MILLS, JR. (WITH ROBERT A. ANDERSON), Low LEVEL HELL: A
SCOUT PILOT IN THE BIG RED ONE (1992).
528. See also MASON, supra note 73, at 128.
529. MILLS, supra note 527, at ix (Foreword by Maj. Gen. (Ret.) A. E.
milloy).
530. DUNNIGAN & NOFI, supra note 39, at 116; see also CHUCK CARLOCK,
FIREBIRDS (1995) (describing experiences as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam,
mostly as a pilot of gunships); MASON, supra note 73, at 67-68 (describing
Vietnam experiences as a pilot of "slicks," the troop-carrying helicopters used in
airmobile assaults).
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things with their helicopters "that no one thought possible
(or prudent).""' Needless to say, this risk-taking made them
very popular with the troops. Although many men and
women could learn to fly a helicopter, to say that one can fly
a helicopter says little about whether one can fly the
helicopter in combat.53
Flying jet fighters requires many of the same traits as
flying helicopters, even though the flying is generally at a
much higher altitude and the pilots may never get within
visual range of their opponent. Many seem to believe that
because most encounters between modem fighter aircraft
are decided by long-range missiles without the pilots ever
having visually observed their enemies that the immediacy
is removed from combat: just two guys up in the sky playing
video games trying to make the flicker of light displayed on
their radar screen disappear.533 But a willingness to close
with the enemy is still required; it is just that "closing" with
the enemy may no longer be quite so close. Moreover, the
era of close-range air combat is not over, and the modern
pilot "must be prepared to oppose the enemy face to face
and at close quarters, just as his grandfathers did in the
skies above Flanders."" 4 Either close up or at a distance,
the individual attributes of pilots are critical-according to
some even more important than technological advantages,
for "[sluperior aircraft and inferior pilots generally equal
defeat."
5 5
531. DUNNIGAN & NOFI, supra note 39, at 116; see also BOWDEN, supra note
264, at 245-46 (describing activities of helicopter pilots in Somalia).
532. In explaining his reasons for supporting continued exclusion of women
from combat aviation, Presidential Commission member General Maxwell
Thurman, U.S. Army (Ret.) stated: "I am convinced by the polling data... that
the American public doesn't fully appreciate the similarity between direct
combat land forces and combat air crews and pilots"). PRESmENTIAL COMMN,
supra note 67, at 117.
533. It was this same belief in the primacy of missiles and obsolescence of
close-in fighting that led the Air Force after the Korean War to cease teaching
dogfighting skills. That decision led to many combat deaths in Vietnam and
ultimately the rejection of that judgment embodied in the establishment of the
Navy's Top Gun school and later the Air Force Aggressor program. See WILCOX,
supra note 525, at 3-4; SPICE, supra note 365, at 152.
534. SPICE, supra note 365, at ii; see also DUNIGAN, supra note 7, at 171
(noting that "[c]lose-range combat continues to be a possibility, however, and
success depends on agility").
535. DUNLGAN, supra note 7, at 156; see also SPICK, supra note 365, at 28
(noting that "[a] better fighter is undoubtedly an advantage to its pilot, but the
advantage has historically been marginal at best").
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The desire to prove oneself and to engage in the thrill of
the hunt that leads so many young men to infantry service
is present in the fighter pilot as well.536 One Desert Storm
pilot wrote in his journal:
I'm in a situation where I could die very quickly. I could be shot
down by SAMs or bogeys. Killed or interned as a POW. With all
this, I still welcome the flights, the challenge, the chance to shoot
down another bogey. I'm not sadistic but why do I want to go....
It's almost scary.... I have a family yet I'm laying it on the line
and at times enjoying the risk. Crazy!!"
Cohesion is important among comrades in the air, just
as it is among comrades on the ground. Indeed, according to
one observer, "there was probably no closer military
comradery than that between the aeroscout crew chief and
his pilot."38 But cohesion is important not only between
pilot and crew, but also between pilots who are flying
together.539 As Mike Spick has observed, "[flighting in the
air is to a great degree a matter of teamwork, and just one
member of the team performing below his best will
jeopardize the entire formation." That teamwork is
ultimately based upon trust. A pilot must be able to depend
on his wing man and on his crew.
In a remarkably courageous statement, given the
political climate of the times, twenty-one of the twenty-
three Navy Top Gun instructors signed a letter to the
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in
the Armed Forces opposing the introduction of women into
combat aviation. The pilot who made the presentation to
the Commission stated:
When you are out there in your fleet squadron, it is very important
that you act as one, and you believe and you share your
experiences with each and every member, and you expect a lot out
of that person, and you have to act as a unit. And if you can't do
that-and we don't believe you can act as a unit unless you keep it
536. WiLcox, supra note 525, at 293 (observing that for some pilots in
Vietnam, "the challenge-putting themselves in harm's way to see how they
would perform-was at the heart of their desire to fly fighters. To a few...
testing themselves, feeling the thrills of that testing, had become almost a
lust").
537. Id.
538. MILLS, supra note 527, at 299 (Postscript by Robert A. Anderson).
539. See GRINKER & SPIEGEL, supra note 169, at 23-24.
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the way it is, where it's the bonding-it's that intangible, the
bonding, that makes a squadron good, better, and we don't believe
. . 540you can have that go on if we have females in aviation.
Significantly, it was the Navy lieutenants and Marine
captains-those whose lives are most clearly on the line-
who most strongly opposed sexual integration. 4'
Critical questions are what is it that makes a good
combat pilot, and is it reasonable to believe that there are
many potentially outstanding female pilots? A complete
answer to the former question leads to a negative answer to
the latter.
The services devote tremendous resources to the
selection and training of pilots,5 4 but they never know for
sure who is going to excel in combat until the shooting
starts.543  Although combat aircraft are extremely
complicated machines, it is not merely technical competence
that separates the average from the superior pilot. A cluster
of temperamental and cognitive traits seems to be
important to a pilot's success. Among the temperamental
attributes that are closely related to successful flying of
fighter/attack aircraft are:
1. A substantial affinity for flying, and strong motivation to fly
fighter aircraft;
2. A strong need to demonstrate their exceptional capabilities;
3. A willingness to push the weapons system to the limits of its
performance envelope;
4. A strong, competitive aggressiveness;
5. A fierce independence in thought and action;
540. PRESIDENTIAL COMI'N, supra note 67, at 71.
541. See id; see also CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
AiERICAN MILITARY CULTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000) [hereinafter
CSIS] (reporting greater concern about sexual integration expressed by less
senior personnel).
542. See Thomas F. Hilton & Daniel D. Dolgin, Pilot Selection in the
Military of the Free World, in GAL & MANGELSDORFF, supra note 170, at 81
(noting that "[pirobably no occupation benefits more from personnel selection
technology than that of military pilot").
543. See id. at 95 (suggesting that personality assessment may not have
achieved its full potential because "psychology may have been pursuing the
right stuff but with the wrong scales").
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6. An ability to tolerate and manage high levels of stress.5 "
These are not the attributes of even the typical man, let
alone the typical woman.
The gulf between the combat pilot and the average man
is itself large. A study of the personalities of Navy jet pilots
showed them to have "greater manifest needs in the areas
of Heterosexuality, Dominance, Change, Achievement, and
Exhibition, while expressing lower manifest needs in the
areas of Nurturance, Abasement, Deference, Order and
Succorance" compared to the average male adult." What is
particularly striking is the magnitude of the difference
between the two groups, with effect sizes ranging from .8 to
1.4. " Given that these attributes are highly differentiated
by sex, one can only conclude that the temperamental
difference between the average fighter pilot and the
average woman is huge.
Pilots are a special breed. According to Captain Frank
Dully, then-commander of the Naval Aerospace Medical
Institute in Pensacola, pilots tend to be distant, perceiving
emotions and attachments as signs of weakness.547 While
difficult on the home life, this quality is beneficial to the job
because it allows them to stay cool and focused on the
mission. They tend to "compartmentalize" and not be
distracted, for example, by the concerns of their wives or
children: "Feelings screw things up. On a mission, he's only
to be thinking of safety, flying, and getting the job done."5 8
One set of investigators, recognizing sex differences in the
ability to compartmentalize, has suggested that "men may
need to become desensitized to crying during combat
training"549 (and presumably during combat as well).
Combat pilots are differentiated from the general public
not only by temperamental traits but also by cognitive
profiles. Authorities on air combat generally agree that the
successful pilot is high in what is called "situational
544. Bryce 0. Hartman & Grant E. Secrist, Situational Awareness is More
than Exceptional Vision, 62 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 1084, 1085 (1991).
545. G.E. Fry & R.F. Reinhardt, Personality Characteristics of Jet Pilots as
Measured by the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, 40 AEROSPACE MED.
484, 486 (1969).
546. Id. at 485.
547. See WILCOx, supra note 525, at 165-66.
548. Id. at 166.
549. Voge & King, supra note 504, at 884.
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awareness" or "SA." "Situational awareness" is often
referred to as a "sixth sense,""5 ' and it has been variously
defined as "the ability of the pilot to keep track of events
and foresee occurrences in the fast-moving, dynamic
scenario of air warfare,"5 ' the "capacity to anticipate
changes in aircraft systems states and operational
conditions,"552 and the "continuous perception of self and
aircraft in relation to the dynamic environment of flight,
threats, and mission and the ability to forecast and then
execute tasks based on that perception."55 A study of a large
number of combat simulations found that the winners had
heightened situational awareness, as demonstrated by:
greater knowledge of the relative velocities and acceleration rates
of engaged aircraft, more accurate anticipation of aircraft position
changes, increased precision in predicting entry into weaponry
effectiveness envelopes, the ability to foresee weapons selection
requirements, more skilled timesharing of attention among tasks,
and greater sensitivity to fuel and energy status without the need
to refer to cockpit instruments.55 4
In short, situational awareness is the ability to know where
you are; where your opponent is; where the ground is; what
your opponent is going to do; and when, where, and how
you can get the enemy in your sights and kill him.
The identity of all of the components of situational
awareness is unknown.. and, given what may be a
substantial intuitive component, may never be fully
understood. Not surprisingly, however, spatial ability is
known to be a major contributor, especially the
understanding of spatial relationships "between dynamic
550. See Hartman & Secrist, supra note 544, at 1084; Thomas R. Carretta et
al., Prediction of Situational Awareness in F-15 Pilots, 6 ITL J. AVIATION
PSYCHOL. 21, 21 (1996); SPICK supra note 365, at 63.
551. SPICK, supra note 365, at vi.
552. Hartman & Secrist, supra note 544, at 1089.
553. Carretta et a]., supra note 550, at 22. The most prevalent cause of
aircraft accidents that are due to human error is an error in situational
awareness. See Debra G. Jones & Mica R. Endsley, Sources of Situation
Awareness Errors in Aviation, 67 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVTL MED. 507, 507-08
(1996).
554. Hartman & Secrist, supra note 544, at 1089 (emphasis in original).
555. Carretta et al, supra note 550, at 21 (stating that despite an
agreement on some of the components, "there is little agreement about what SA
is").
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objects in three-dimensional space."556 Given the fact that
spatial abilities, of all cognitive abilities, most distinguish
the sexes, especially at the high end,"5 ' it is predictable that
few women will be competitive on this dimension.
Sex differences in performance on the Air Force Officer
Qualification Test (AFOQT) bear the above prediction out.558
That test is used to select officer candidates from both
civilian and military applicants.5 9 It contains 16 subtests
that measure general cognitive ability and the five lower-
order factors of verbal, quantitative, spatial, aircrew
interest/aptitude, and perceptual speed.56 Five composite
scores are computed from the various subtests: Pilot,
Navigator-Technical, Verbal, Quantitative, and Academic
Aptitude. A large-scale study found that males
outperformed females on all five composites and all subtests
but one (Verbal Analogies), for which no sex difference
appeared, with the greatest differences in spatial and
aircrew interest/aptitude tests. On the Pilot Composite, the
effect size was .69,561 and, as is typical on standardized
tests, male variability was greater.5"2-Because of the higher
mean and greater variance for males, less than 1% of
556. Mica R. Endsley & Cheryl A. Bolstad, Individual Differences in Pilot
Situation Awareness, 4 INT'L J. AvIATION PSYCHOL. 241, 244 (1994). For a
description of the importance of spatial ability to pilots, see Louis C. Boer,
Spatial Ability and Orientation of Pilots, in GAL & MANGELSDORFF, supra note
170, at 103.
557. See infra text accompanying notes 186-95.
558. See Carretta, supra note 203.
559. This particular study examined the results of the 269,968 Air Force
applicants tested between 1981 and 1992 (Males=219,887; Females=50,081). Id.
at 116.
560. The sixteen subtests and the associated effect sizes are: (1) Verbal
Tests: Verbal Analogies (.02), Reading Comprehension (.09), and Word
Knowledge (.08); (2) Quantitative Tests: Arithmetic Reasoning (.44), Data
Interpretation (.30), and Math Knowledge (.30); (3) Spatial Tests: Mechanical
Comprehension (.95), Electrical Maze (.56), Block Counting (.43), Rotated
Blocks (.74), and Hidden Figures (.24); (4) Aircrew Interest/Aptitude Tests:
Instrument Comprehension (.78), Aviation Information (.78), and General
Science (.69); and (5) Perceptual Speed Tests: Scale Reading (.49) and Table
Reading (.07). The Aircrew InterestlAptitude Tests are the only AFOQT tests
that measure specific knowledge. All differences are statistically significant,
except for Verbal Analogies. Id. at 118.
561. Id. The Pilot composite consists of Verbal Analogies, Mechanical
Comprehension, Electrical Maze, Scale Reading, Instrument Comprehension,
Block Counting, Table Reading, and Aviation Information.
562. The male mean and standard deviation were 49.42 and 25.53,
respectively, while those for females were 32.15 and 21.37. Id. at 118.
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women scored as high as the top 10% of men.
Even when the study looked only at pilot trainees-who
had been pre-screened on such factors as physical and
medical fitness, academic performance, aptitude test scores,
and previous flying experience-significant differences still
existed. 63 Although the difference between men and women
on the Pilot Composite was not statistically significant
(d=.17), there were substantial and statistically significant
differences on several of the subtests: Mechanical
Comprehension (d=.84), Electrical Maze (d=.41),
Instrument Comprehension (d=.45), Rotated Block (d=.56),
and General Science (d=.47). Thus, even within this
restricted sample in which the women are in a sense an
"ultra elite"--with a sex ratio of approximately 39 men for
every woman--differences were quite dramatic.
Substantial sex differences also appear on the Basic
Attributes Test (BAT), a test used for pilot selection. The
BAT consists of five tests that measure psychomotor
coordination, short-term memory, and attitudes toward
risk-taking. U4 The tests are Two-Handed Coordination,
Complex Coordination, Item Recognition, Time Sharing,
and Activities Interest Inventory. The largest differences
are found on a composite of the two coordination tests
(d=1.68) and for Time Sharing (d=1.04).565 Time-sharing
involves the ability to shift attention between different
tasks, and is a component of situational awareness that is
positively associated with flight performance. 6
Thus, combat pilots are differentiated by at least two
patterns. Their cognitive pattern is characteristic of
mathematicians and engineers, but their temperamental
pattern is more akin to that of mountain climbers. Because
the cognitive and temperamental patterns are probably
largely independent, the number of individuals who will
satisfy both is very small, and, one suspects, vanishingly so
563. While the sex ratio for all takers of the AFOQT was approximately 4.4
males for every female, among pilot trainees, the ratio was about 39:1
(males=9239; females=237). Id. at 119.
564. Thomas R. Carretta, Male-Female Performance on U.S. Air Force Pilot
Selection Tests, 68 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 818, 818-19 (1997).
565. See id. at 820.
566. Thomas R. Carretta et al., Prediction of Situational Awareness in F-15
Pilots, 6 INT'L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 21, 28 (1996); see also Robert A. North &
Daniel Gopher, Measures of Attention as Predictors of Flight Performance, 18
HUITI. FACTORS 1 (1976).
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for females.
Given the cognitive and temperamental patterns
required, it is not surprising to find that the ability to fly
aircraft successfully in combat is an ability that not many
have. Indeed, it is not an ability that even all combat pilots
have. Aviation analysts recognize that the majority of
combat kills are scored by a small minority of pilots."7 Mike
Spick has observed: "The gulf between the average fighter
pilot and the successful one is very wide. In fact it is
arguable that there are almost no average fighter pilots;
just aces and turkeys; killers and victims."56 As one Air
Force pilot stated, 'Most guys can master the mechanics of
the systems, but it's instinctive to be able to assimilate all
the data, get a big gicture, and react offensively. Not a lot of
guys can do that."' Analogously, though almost anyone can
drive a car, very few can drive competitively in the Daytona
500.
Ideally, one would have only "aces" or "killers," leaving
the "turkeys" and "victims" to another career path. The
difficulty lies, however, in the fact that there is no known
way to separate the aces and the turkeys prior to combat.
Unfortunately, many of those who will end up being turkeys
often do not know what they are getting into. These pilots
may have the ability, intelligence, and know-how to fly the
plane well, but they ultimately lack the "fighting spirit"
that they will need in combat."0 "Competent" flying is not
enough; there are, as fighter pilots like to say, "no points for
second place." "
Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the pressure to
567. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 156.
568. SPIOK, supra note 365, at vi-vii; see also WILCOX, supra note 525, at 44
(noting that fighter pilots fall into two categories: "[lt]hose who are going to
shoot and those who secretly and desperately know they will be shot at; the
hunters and the hunted") (quoting Navy pilot Joe "Hoser" Satrapa). In every
armed conflict from World War I through Vietnam, four to five percent of pilots
have accounted for about 40% of kills. Hartman & Secrist, supra note 544, at
1084.
569. WILcOx, supra note 525, at 67 (quoting Air Force Lt. Rob Graeter).
570. Id. at 44.
571. Id. at 6. Given the risks involved, the finding that 80% of Vietnam
combat pilots reported that they never dreaded going on a combat mission is
quite remarkable. See Anne Hoiberg & Ralph G. Burr, Longitudinal Study of
the Health Status of U.S. Navy Combat Pilots, NAVAL HEALTH RES. CENTER,
RPT. No. 85-12. Investigators attributed this attitude to the pilots' "intense
motivation to fly." Id. at 4.
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get female pilots through flight training,"2 women fail Navy
jet fighter training at a rate four times that of men."'
Moreover, from 1993 to 1997, the total female attrition rate
for Naval combat aviators was 32% compared to 16% for
men."4 Attrition carries a heavy price, given that it costs
approximately a million dollars to train a pilot through
basic flight training, and as much as nine million dollars to
fully train a pilot with operational experience.5  Victoria
Voge found that female pilots who remain on the job are
more than twice as likely to be medically grounded as male
pilots, about half due to pregnancy, and female pilots are
often grounded multiple times, while most men are
grounded only once.7 6 Voge expressed surprise at the level
of groundings due to pregnancy, with some women
reporting three to four pregnancies during their flying
careers, with each uncomplicated pregnancy putting the
female aircrew member off flight status for as much as six
months. The readiness implications, especially with women
now flying combat aircraft, are obvious.
In order to ensure air superiority, the military needs as
many of the exceptional pilots as it can get. The question is
how to maximize that number, given the inability to
identify with any certainty who among the many
individuals fully trainable to fly the airplane can fight the
airplane. Unfortunately, "[o]nly in war, when things are for
keeps and you can't go back to the officer's club and review
your mistakes, does the lack of aggressiveness become
obvious ,"'
The foregoing suggests that the "special case" of
aviation is not so special after all. Most of the justifications
for excluding women from ground combat apply to aviation
as well. Just as few women have the individual physical
and temperamental traits required for ground combat, few
572. Ernest Blazar, Wing of Fate: What Went Wrong: IG Report Details
Mistakes in Rushing Women Onto Carriers, NAVY TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 4.
573. Vivienne Heines, A Striking Difference: Is Navy Combat Jet Training
Fair to Women and Blacks?, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at 12 (revealing a pass
rate for men of 95% and a pass rate for women of 80%).
574. Blazar, supra note 572.
575. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO BETTER DEFINE PILOT REQUIREMENTS AND PRO1ioTE RETENTION, 1999
GEN. ACCT. OFF. NATL SECURITyAND INTL AFF. DIVISION REP. 211, at 3.
576. Victoria M. Voge, General Characteristics of U.S. Air Force and U.S.
Army Rated Male and Female Aircrew, 161 MIL. MED. 654 (1996).
577. WILCOX, supra note 525, at 44.
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women-and far fewer women than men-have the
individual temperamental and cognitive traits that are
necessary for combat aviation.
If one could effectively determine through advance
screening who would be a good pilot, the fact that more men
than women would qualify would not be sufficient reason to
exclude women. After all, if a job requires lifting 100
pounds, the sensible way to hire for the job is to test to see
if the applicant can lift the weight rather than to rely on sex
as a proxy. As pre-screening becomes more difficult and less
effective, however, the rationale for relying on such proxies
is strengthened. Moreover, it is not just individual traits
that are relevant. There is good reason to believe that the
same kind of cohesion that is so important to ground forces
is important in aviation as well. Thus, introduction of
women can interfere with the mission even if the individual
women have all of the necessary traits of an effective pilot.
The question for the military is whether it is more
likely to maximize the number of top pilots by opening
flying billets to women-with the concomitant pressure to
have them succeed-or by closing them. Put another way,
how many female "aces" are there likely to be and at what
cost in dollars, morale, and human lives?
G. The Central Function of the Military Is to Prepare for
and, If Necessary, Engage in Warfare
The primary function of the U.S. military is to deter
war.y The means of fulfilling that function is to establish a
credible threat of force, which requires an effective military
and a perceived willingness to use it in appropriate
contexts. Manpower policies in pursuit of some goal other
than war-fighting ability are likely to have adverse
consequences for military readiness.
Some have argued that given the variety of
peacekeeping tasks that it has been called upon lately to
perform, the military's primary function is no longer to
engage in warfare."' M. C. Devilbiss argues that it is a
578. See Chodoff, supra note 340, at 569.
579. See M.C. Devilbiss, To Fight, to Defend, and to Preserve the Peace: The
Evolution of the U.S. Military and the Role of Women Within It, in STIEHM,
supra note 57, at 195, 198 (asserting that the military "is almost becoming a
conflict-management institution rather than a war-waging institution"); see also
Segal & Segal, supra note 12, at 239 (noting that "[t]he change in mission
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"problem... when the military sees these peacekeeping
tasks as not its 'real mission' or "worse [when] it... sees
such tasks as antithetical to its mission."58 ° Because the
military's "true" function is now more akin to that of
policeman, the argument goes, women are made for the job
because they have proven themselves adept at preventing
confrontations from turning violent.58
Some have gone even farther and argued that including
women in combat would be a step toward world peace.
According to this argument, women's basic pacifism and
concern with cementing relationships will lead them to
resolve conflicts peacefully.582  Such arguments
fundamentally misconceive the role of the military. Front-
line soldiers (or Pentagon brass, for that matter) do not get
to decide whether there will be war or peace; that is a
decision that we entrust to our elected civilian leaders. A
soldier's job is to fight even if he would rather that the
conflict be decided peacefully. Soldiers opposing each other
in the trenches in World War I sometimes developed
friendly relationships with their opposite numbers,5" and
no doubt would have been more than happy to shake hands
and go home. But they stayed, and they fought, and they
died.
A study of peacekeeping in Somalia by Laura Miller
and Charles Moskos does seem to reveal sex differences in
definition, away from overt conflict and toward constabulary, police-type
operations, suggests a structure amenable to increased female participation,
parallel to the trend in civilian peace-keeping forces in America"); Gerard J.
DeGroot, More Blessed Are These Peacekeepers: Testosterone Flows Too Freely
When the Job Is Left to Male Soldiers, Says an Historian of Women in the
Military, TORONTO STAR, July 25, 1999 (arguing for female soldiers in
peacekeeping operations because "[flew male military personnel combine the
qualities of soldier and social worker essential to the job").
580. Devilbiss, supra note 579, at 201.
581. See Kornblum, supra note 10, at 383 n.166.
582. See id. at 383 (arguing that "[tihe combat exclusion may also cause
society to lose the potential to decrease the amount of armed conflict in the
world [because] women generally are more concerned about preserving
relationships and resolving conflicts peacefully"); see also Sara Ruddick,
Pacifying the Forces: Drafting Women in the Interests of Peace, 8 SIGNs 471, 477
(1983) (noting that a "peaceful" army "fights only the most necessary and
clearly just battles, fights them as humanely and as briefly as possible... [and
has as its aim] not defeat of an enemy but reconciliation with opponents and
restoration of connection and community").
583. See generally TONY ASHWORTH, TRENCH WARFARE 1914-1918: THE LIVE
AND LET LIVE SYsTEM (1980).
2001] 167
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
reactions to peacekeeping assignments."s They found that
two divergent patterns of response to such assignments
developed. One pattern reflected what they called a
"warrior strategy," according to which soldiers treated all
Somalis as potential enemies, and the other pattern they
called a "humanitarian strategy," which led soldiers to be
offended by negative stereotypes of Somalis, avoid the use
of force, and seek cultural and political explanations for
Somali behavior.585 The tension between war-fighting and
humanitarian missions may thus be a relatively stark one.
Humanitarian missions require cooperation with the local
population and, generally, a measure of empathy for it.
War, on the other hand, requires the soldier to view the
"other" as an enemy and be sufficiently detached
emotionally as to be capable of killing him.58 Few soldiers
want to die in combat, but even less glory is attached to
dying during a peacekeeping operation. 87 Nonetheless,
peacekeeping can be dangerous, as reflected by the fact that
there was a higher rate of combat casualties in Somalia
than in the Gulf War. 8
The fact that the military has recently engaged in
numerous peacekeeping operations does not demonstrate
that peacekeeping has become its "primary function." 9 If
peacekeeping were the primary reason for having a
military-that is, as a foreign aid institution, a sort of Red
Cross with guns, rather than as a national security
institution-it is doubtful that the American people would
be willing to assume the tremendous tax burden necessary
to fund the Defense Department.59 Moreover, peacekeeping
584. See Miller & Moskos, supra note 38, at 625-31.
585. See id. at 625-26.
586. See id. at 625.
587. Cf. Manning, supra note 349, at 464-65 (noting that in the latter years
of the Vietnam war "[interpersonal bonding at the small unit level could not
overcome the quite rational desire not to be the last one killed in an effort
without glory or thanks").
588. See Miller & Moskos, supra note 38, at 636 n.20.
589. It should be noted that observations about a trend toward
"constabulary forces" rather than military forces are not new. See MORRIs
JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 417-42 (1960).
590. See Goldich, supra note 424, at 129 (noting that "the high public
esteem for the military over the past decade or so has resulted from precisely
the extent to which the military remains 'the military'-an organization with a
purpose and ethos of fighting wars. It may gain kudos to the extent that it
successfully executes humanitarian relief... [but these secondary
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is in some sense antithetical to the core mission of the
military, which is to be prepared to wage war. Many people
appear to believe that as long as there is no war, then the
military is just sitting around with nothing to do. So why
not use them for something productive? The answer is that
being prepared for war requires constant training; as
General George Patton observed "the more you sweat in
peace, the less you bleed in war."5?1 Serving on peacekeeping
duty does not generally provide that training,92 as the
soldiers serving soft occupation duty in Japan found when
transferred to Korea at the outset of the Korean War.593
A recent GAO study found that "operations other than
war""' have adversely affected the combat capability of all
four services, especially the Army and the Air Force."9 Such
operations erode the combat skills of the deployed troops,
because the tasks that they are called upon to perform often
require little skill. Moreover, these operations degrade the
skills of the non-deploying portions of units remaining at
their home stations, who have to do both their own work
and the work of the deployed personnel, leading to longer
hours and less time for training.596
characteristics and achievements will count for little... if, when it engages the
enemy-no matter who that enemy might be-it does not defeat him").
591. STOKESBURY, supra note 71, at 52.
592. See VAN CREVELD, supra note 498, at 362-63 (expressing concern that
ten years of trying to deal with the Intifada has deprived the IDF of readiness
for "anything more dangerous than police-type operations").
593. STOKESBURY, supra note 71, at 53 (noting that the troops in Japan "had
done little sweating there, and they paid for it with a lot of blood in Korea").
594. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Military Operations: Impact of
Operations Other than War on the Services Varies, 1999 GEN. ACCT. OFF. NATL
SECURITY AND INT'L AFF. DrwsIoN REP. 69, at 1 n.1 (stating that "operations
other than war" include "low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as
military observer duty, and counterdrug and high-intensity peace enforcement
operations").
595. See generally id; see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Peace
Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Combat
Capability, 1999 GEN. ACCT. OFF. NATL SECURITY AND INT'L AFF. DIVISION REP.
14, at 28-39 (finding that extended peace operations tend to result in atrophy of
combat skills); Carl A. Castro & Amy B. Adler, OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier
and Unit Readiness, PARAIETERS: U.S. AR1Y WAR C. Q., Autumn 1999, at 86
(describing the effects of the increasing number of overseas deployments on
military readiness).
596. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
similarly found that increased emphasis on operations other than war "has
challenged the services' focus on traditional combat, the armed forces primary
responsibility." See CSIS, supra note 541.
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Ideally, one might create and maintain two separate
forces-a peacekeeping force and a war-fighting force"'-
but we may not have that luxury. So, the question is how
much combat effectiveness we are willing to trade for
peacekeeping goals, in light of the fact that our national
security is probably more fundamentally related to combat
readiness than peacekeeping ability. That is a policy
question about which there is much room for reasonable
people to differ. However, emphasizing peacekeeping goals
because of peacekeeping's perceived compatibility with
women's military capacities would be shortsighted indeed.
VI. POTENTIAL DISRUPTION OF UNIT COHESION AND
EFFECTIVENESS
Inclusion of women into combat units can have other
adverse impacts on morale and group cohesion. Integration
of women, for example, may cause tensions between
members of the group resulting from sexual jealousy or
from a perception that women are somehow favored
members of the group. Pregnancy leads to lower rates of
deployability and potentially reduced readiness. Finally,
there is the question of how to train a sexually integrated
force. It is to these issues that we now turn.
A. Sexual Integration Disrupts Cohesion by Creating Sexual
Jealousy and Frustration
To achieve tolerance and cooperation, the conflict over
reproductive interests has to become subordinate to other
interests.
598
-Jan A.R.A.M. Van Hooff & Carel P. Van Schaik
One of the principal concerns about integration of
women involves the effects of women on military cohesion.
Introduction of women can disrupt bonds among men in a
number of ways.599 It has long been recognized that specific
597. See DINTER, supra note 75, at 114.
598. Jan A.R.A.M. Van Hooff & Carel P. Van Schaik, Male Bonds: Affiliative
Relationships Among Nonhuman Primate Males, 130 BEHAv. 309, 317 (1994)
(referring to non-human primates, but the sentiment is equally applicable to
humans).
599. See HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 71 (discussing the various ways that
women affect unit cohesion).
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bonds between individuals may actually impair group
cohesion. For example, in a squad of special forces troops, a
close personal friendship between two individuals is viewed
as harmful to the group because of the division of loyalties
between the friendship and the unit."0 Similarly, a study of
"buddy" relationships among Korean War troops found that
only because the choice of a special "buddy" was private did
buddy relationships not upset unit cohesion.6"' In a sexually
integrated group, the stakes are higher. The personal
relationship may be a sexual one, which may lead not only
to greater pair-versus-group conflict but also to conflicts
related to sexual jealousy.'02 In circumstances in which
teamwork is essential, competition within military units
leads to friction and loss of efficiency.0 3 And, among young
men and women, there is little that they compete for harder
than members of the opposite sex.' °4
It should hardly be surprising that when young men
and women, mostly in their late teens and twenties, are
living together in close quarters, sexual and romantic
relationships will develop. A Roper poll conducted after the
Gulf War revealed that about two-thirds reported sexual
activity in their integrated units in the Gulf.0 5 Of those
reporting sexual activity, 55% believed that it had harmed
morale and 36% believed that it had degraded unit
readiness."6
The RAND study on integration likewise found that
dating and sexual relationships were perceived to reduce
morale, especially on ships and on overseas deployment.
60 7
600. ANNA SIMONS, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: LIFE INSIDE THE U.S. ARMY
SPECIAL FORCES 184-85 (1997).
601. See Little, supra note 285, at 198-201; see also KELLETT, supra note
351, at 264 (noting that "Itihe fear that close friends may become casualties has
tended to discourage soldiers on active service from making too profound an
emotional investment in their fellows-a factor that should be borne in mind in
any examination of the military group").
602. See DINTER, supra note 75, at 45-46 (noting that romantic relationships
undermine group cohesion, stating that "[tihe men in question no longer fought
for the group, but for their much stronger relationship with their girlfriend").
603. KELLETT, supra note 351, at 43.
604. Recent experience of the Army demonstrates that sexual harassment
and sexual assault are also costs of a sexually integrated military. See Bradley
Graham & Fern Shen, Army Suspends More Trainers at Aberdeen: Sex Assault
Allegations By Recruits Increase, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at A-1.
605. BINEIN, supra note 295, at 44.
606. Id.
607. See HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 81.
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The study found that these relationships created a number
of problems. The "sexualization" of the atmosphere makes it
difficult for colleagues to regard one another as just co-
workers and thereby undermines cohesion."' One
respondent complained that "[t]he mess.., at night [for]
this unit looks more like a singles club or promenade deck
than a mess hall." "°9 Another complaint was:
I get tired of seeing a junior enlisted female and her boyfriend [at
mess]. Both are attached to [this unit]. This place is like high
school all over again. Everyone is dating others. To me this is not
the military. We are here to do a job not meet our spouse. Guys
seem more worried about getting a girl than doing their job.6 10
Not only are these relationships viewed as
unprofessional by some, they also can create resentments
based upon jealousy and sexual frustration.' Moreover,
when the relationships terminate, the morale of both the
individuals involved and the unit suffers, and the man is
often left vulnerable to charges of sexual harassment or
even rape. 2 For example, a male and female Naval
Academy midshipman were found in the woman's room
"after a long night of drinking and socializing.""3 The man
admitted to consensual sex; the woman contended that she
was heavily intoxicated that night and had no memory of
having sex with the man but "suspected" that maybe she
had been sexually assaulted. Because Academy rules forbid
sex on campus, the man was expelled. The woman, by
denying engaging in consensual sex, had admitted no
wrongdoing and therefore was not prosecuted. The man
found himself working in a warehouse to pay off the
$76,000 he owed the Navy to reimburse it for education
costs, while the woman graduated to the fleet. "
When sexual relationships occur between members of
different ranks, the military chain of command may be
compromised by the appearance of partiality.6 15 Even
608. See id.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 81-82.
611. Id. at 82.
612. See id.
613. David Brown, Danzig Seals Midshipman's Expulsion, NAvY TIMES,
June 21, 1999, at 17.
614. Id.
615. BINKI, supra note 295, at 42.
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relationships between members of different units can be
harmful. For example, if a member of one unit is dating a
member of another unit, there can be resentments between
units based upon either jealousy or perceptions that the
member of one's own unit is being mistreated by a member
of the other unit.
This is not to suggest that in the heat of combat male
and female troops will be focusing on sexual relations
rather than fighting. Indeed, many report that combat
zones are the least erotic of places. For example, Samuel
Hynes, a Marine pilot in the Pacific war, recalls that the
pilots "felt no sexual need even though being apart from
women for a year" and asked, "Were we living our sexual
lives strafing or in the all-male committed life of the
squadron?"61  Similarly, in discussing a poem about
masturbation, Paul Fussell notes that "it is notably what
front-line troops would stigmatize as a rear-echelon
problem" because at the front the men were "too scared,
busy, hungry, tired, and demoralized to think about sex at
all.""I Indeed, he wrote, "the front was the one wartime
place that was sexless." 1 ' Nonetheless, relationships that
have developed away from the front can have substantial
effect at the front. Moreover, in a war like the Vietnam
War, where combatants may return to positions of relative
safety at night or every few days, it does not take long
before they are thinking about sex, as demonstrated by the
ready availability of prostitutes in such areas."9
Recognizing the disruptive potential of sexual and
romantic relations, some have suggested that this problem
can be adequately dealt with by extending anti-
fraternization rules to all sexual relationships within a unit
even if the participants are of equal rank.62 Madeline
616. HYNES, supra note 250, at 246.
617. FUSSELL, supra note 85, at 108; see also Charles C. Moskos, Female GIs
in the Field, SOCIETY, SeptJOct. 1985, at 28, 31 (noting that "field conditions
depress eroticism"). But see BOWDEN, supra note 263, at 254 (during a lull in
combat operations in Mogadishu, one Ranger suggested to the other that they
"get a Combat Jack," meaning that they masturbate, as there was a running
joke about masturbating in exotic locations).
618. Id.
619. See MASON, supra note 73, at 159-60 (noting the experiences of one unit
with regard to sexual promiscuity and the contraction of venereal disease); see
also BOWDEN, supra note 263, at 153 (describing the lack of women and the
consequent focus on pornography and masturbation at a base in Mogadishu).
620. Morris, supra note 10.
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Morris, in her call for greater integration of women into
combat units, urges a "military 'incest taboo" that would
define members of sexually integrated units as "brothers
and sisters between whom sexual relationships would be
unacceptable."62 ' This approach "would amount to a
broadened fraternization policy, prohibiting not only
inappropriate relationships between ranks but also sexual
relationships regardless of rank within military units."'2
However, there are several reasons to think that this
approach will not work.
First, it treats the incest taboo as an arbitrary social
rule that can be extended at our whim to other contexts.
Under this view, brothers and sisters abstain from sexual
relations with each other because there is a rule against it;
therefore, we can simply expand the group to which the rule
applies. Freud notwithstanding, however, the primary
reason that brothers and sisters do not engage in sexual
relations is not that society has created a rule against it,
but rather that brothers and sisters (and others who are
reared together from an early age) are not ordinarily
attracted to each other.6' This lack of attraction appears to
be an evolved psychological mechanism designed to avoid
inbreeding with its attendant reduction in offspring
viability.6 The notion that the incest taboo can simply be
redefined rests on an inadequate understanding of human
psychology.
The military "incest taboo" is different in nature from
the aversion that brothers and sisters experience for each
other. It is neither a biologically predisposed aversion nor
even a norm that has been instilled in individuals
throughout their lives. Rather, it is an externally applied
rule to which the parties are first exposed in their late teens
and early twenties, a period of peak sexual interest. As
numerous parents seeking to control or channel their
621. Id. at 756-57. Morris does not specify at what unit level this rule would
apply-squad, platoon, company, etc.
622. Id. at 757.
623. See generally Pierre L. van den Berghe, Human Inbreeding Avoidance:
Culture in Nature, 6 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 91 (1983).
624. See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 305
(2d ed. 1983). Such mechanisms are a commonplace among nonhumans. See
RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 193 (1979) (noting that
"among sexual organisms all but a few particular species consistently
outbreed").
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children's sexual and romantic inclinations have found,
attempts to define the class of people with whom they can
have relationships are typically doomed to failure.
The second reason that redefining the incest taboo is
not likely to avoid the impairment of cohesion caused by
relationships between male and female personnel is that
the interests sought to be protected by fraternization rules
extend beyond consummated sexual activity. Although in
today's politicized climate, the term "fraternization" is often
shorthand for illicit sexual relations, rules against
fraternization long preceded the integration of women into
the military. "Fraternization" entails the association of
officers and enlisted personnel (or sometimes even of
officers or enlisted personnel of different ranks) "on terms of
military equality."' A male officer who enters into financial
arrangements or gambles with male enlisted personnel
violates the anti-fraternization rules."6  Thus, anti-
fraternization rules are a method of reinforcing the military
hierarchy, a hierarchy that facilitates the efficient
operation of the military."
The somewhat impersonal relations between personnel
at different levels are believed to be necessary because
superiors must sometimes order subordinates into the jaws
of death. As British military historian Richard Holmes has
observed:
625. United States v. Nunes, 39 M.J. 889, 890 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994) (stating
that "it is the illicit association between officers and enlisted personnel on terms
of equality, not any particular sexual relationship (or any such relationship at
all) that is the gravamen of the offense"); see also William Matthews, New Rules
Restrict Dating, Gambling, AIRMY T MEs, Feb. 22, 1999, at 8 (announcing new
Department of Defense policy that will bring Army anti-fraternization rules in
line with those of the other services).
626. See, e.g., United States v. McCreight, 43 M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(upholding charge of fraternization based on male officer's relationship with
enlisted man):
Appellant and W became companions for watching "Monday night
football," dinner, drinking, and gambling. Additionally, W spent
several nights at appellant's residence. He drove appeUant's car and
house-sat for him. Off-duty W referred to appellant by his first name
and even called him by his first name once at work. The two went out
to breakfast, church, and the mall together. On at least one occasion,
appellant asked W to be the "designated driver" while appellant was
the "designated drunk."
Id.
627. See generally Kevin W. Carter, Fraternization, 113 MIL. L. REV. 61
(1986).
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There may come a moment in even the best-conducted, most
democratic of armies, when a leader gives an order which will
result in the certain death of his subordinates, and a framework of
discipline which does not preare for this eventuality does both
army and society a disservice.
"Undue familiarity," wrote John Ellis, "might lead the men
to question one's orders or even one's right to give them."29
Anti-fraternization rules may not be consistent with
civilian mores,630 but the judgment of those most familiar
with the problems of military discipline view them as
critical to the maintenance of good order and discipline.
Unfortunately for military discipline, however, the
increasing prevalence of an "occupational" orientation leads
to the same kind of resentment of such rules that would
attend them in civilian life. In his study of extended field
maneuvers in Honduras, for example, Charles Moskos
found a widespread attitude among junior enlisted
personnel of both sexes that what they did in their "private
lives" was their own business, rather than the Army's."'
Given the favorable sex ratio for women, it is hardly
surprising that they are the ones who most strongly object
to the anti-fraternization rules. 2
Sexual relationships can create other special problems
in the military. In 1997, Kelly Flinn, a female B-52 pilot,
was threatened with court martial for having committed
adultery by having an affair with the civilian husband of a
female airman, disobeying a direct order from a superior
not to see him again, lying to investigators about the
relationship, and fraternizing (in the form of a two-night
sexual relationship) with an enlisted man.633 The most
visible reaction from the civilian community focused on the
adultery charge and took the position that Flinn should not
be punished for having had a sexual relationship with a
married man; after all, her private life is her own
628. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 336.
629. ELLIS, supra note 69, at 229.
630. See Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex
Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305, 353 (1998) (suggesting that
"[tihe policy rationales behind the prohibitions on fraternization are not self-
evident").
631. Moskos, supra note 617, at 31.
632. See id.
633. See Elaine Sciolino, Pilot Facing Adultery Charge Agrees to a General
Discharge, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1997, at Al.
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business.' The position of the military and most of its
defenders was that the adultery charge was only a small
part of the transgression; although inappropriate, more
threatening to military discipline was Flinn's disobeying an
order and lying to her superior.0' What may have been the
greatest threat to military discipline, however, got
somewhat less attention: Flinn was having an affair not
just with any married man, but with the husband of a
female airman. It is hard to imagine a greater threat to
morale and discipline in the enlisted ranks than "poaching"
of their spouses by officers.3 6 Had the sexes been reversed,
and a male Air Force pilot had been having an affair with
the wife of an enlisted man, one doubts that the national
media and congressional leaders 7 would have rushed to the
pilot's defense or that he would have been favored with a
lucrative book contract.09
Even successful enforcement of a prohibition of within-
unit sexual relations will not solve the problem of sexual
attractions. The military can regulate, or at least attempt to
regulate, behavior, but it cannot regulate thoughts. The
male and female soldier who fall in love with each other but
obey the strictures of the "incest taboo" pose little less risk
to the group than a couple that consummates that love. The
pair-versus-group conflict will continue to exist-perhaps in
heightened form because of resentment over the limitation
634. See Elaine Sciolino, From a Love Affair to a Court-Martial, N.Y. TImEs,
May 11, 1997, at Al.
635. See Elaine Sciolino, Air Force Chief Has Harsh Words for Pilot Facing
Adultery Charge, N.Y. TIEs, May 22, 1997, at Al (reporting that the Air Force
Chief of Staff suggested that Flinn was an "insubordinate liar"). Flinn faced a
total of nine-and-a-half years in prison: five years for giving a false statement to
investigators, two years for fraternization, one year each for adultery and
conduct unbecoming an officer, and six months for disobeying a lawful order.
See Sciolino, supra note 633.
636. See Carter, supra note 627, at 79 & n.107 (noting a number of
prosecuted cases involving officers who had made sexual advances toward
enlisted men's wives).
637. See Elaine Sciolino, Air Force to Postpone Its Court-Martial of Female
Pilot, N.Y. TIIES, May 21, 1997, at A16 (noting that Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott expressed the view that the Air Force had "badly abused" Flinn and
that she should be granted an honorable discharge).
638. See Editorial, Trent Lott's Military Mind, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1997, at
A22 (characterizing Flinn's conduct as "lovesick blundering").
639. See Judy Quinn, A "Big Book" Correction, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Mar. 23,
1998, at 41 (noting the "rumored million-dollar contract" for Flinn's book, Proud
to Be).
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on their love-and to the extent that other members of the
unit are aware of the mutual attraction, they are likely to
suspect that the couple is engaging in sexual relations
anyway," with the same negative consequences that would
flow from a consummated physical relationship.
The impossibility of preventing within-unit romantic
and sexual relationships places the military in a serious
bind. The harm from such relationships may be widely
recognized, but if an expanded fraternization policy is
unlikely to be followed, then it is not in the military's
interest to adopt one, other than to satisfy political
demands. As Richard Holmes has observed, "Wise leaders
know that nothing is so destructive of cooperation as the
giving of orders that cannot or will not be obeyed."" 1 Indeed,
it was exactly this concern that led Douglas MacArthur,
while Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to refuse
to institute a policy banning fraternization between
American military personnel and Japanese women. He
said, "My father [also an Army general] told me never to
give an order unless I was certain it would be carried out. I
wouldn't issue a no-fraternization order for all the tea in
China." 2
Sexual attractions, tensions, jealousies, and
frustrations comprise much of the emotional repertoire of
young men and women and can substantially disrupt the
performance of an organization that relies on teamwork.
Yet, at the same time, they are an inevitable consequence of
sexual integration.
B. Perceived Special Treatment of Women Disrupts
Cohesion
One of the most significant obstacles to achieving a
cohesive group is the belief that some members have
640. See HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 64 (noting the difficulty of
military women having male friends, because of rumors of romantic
involvement and discouragement of interacting with men by their superiors).
641. HOLMES, supra note 60, at 334.
642. MANCHESTER, supra note 436, at 469. In contrast, during the
occupation of Germany, the high command did order such a policy, about which
Steven Ambrose commented: "This absurd order, which flew in the face of
human nature in so obvious a way, was impossible to enforce." AMBROSE, supra
note 70, at 449.
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privileges that others do not. 3 The "we're all in this
together" feeling that cohesive groups experience cannot
endure when it is clear that some are "more equal" than
others.' Many male personnel believe, with some basis,
that women are "more equal" in the eyes of the military and
civilian leadership." The RAND study found that this
belief is enhanced by such things as "an unofficial Army
policy" under which women were to receive showers every
72 hours while in the field.' One need not invoke sexism to
understand why there would be resentment "among the
men, who endure a heavier workload when the women, the
vehicles, and the drivers return to base so that women can
take showers." 7
Lower physical standards for women are a perpetual
source of resentment among men. Physical fitness grades
are considered at promotion time, and men feel that they
have to work very hard to "max"e the fitness tests while
women can meet their lower standards much more easily.
As one female Army captain complained, "My fifty-one-year
old father has to run faster and do more push-ups than I do
to max/pass the APFT [annual personal fitness test]," and
she noted that a "lame female in my age group still is
allowed to virtually walk the two-mile run and still past the
test.
, 6 8
Many men also resent the fact that women can avoid
deployment-or even their service contracts-simply by
getting pregnant. 9  Any other act by which one
643. See GRINKER & SPIEGEL, supra note 169, at 47 (noting the destructive
effect on cohesion if rewards are given out on the basis of personal friendship or
political considerations).
644. See Little, supra note 285, at 218 (noting that the primary basis for
solidarity at the platoon and company level is the recognition of mutual risk).
645. A RAND Corporation study that concluded overall that "gender
integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion,
and morale" in the units studied nonetheless reported a widespread belief that
a double standard existed for the two sexes. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13,
at 99.
646. Id. at 80-81; see also Laura L. Miller, Not Just Weapons of the Weak:
Gender Harassment as a Form of Protest for Army Men, 60 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 32,
47 (1997) (recounting complaint of respondent to a survey that notwithstanding
orders in the Gulf to use water only for drinking, female soldiers used it for
bathing).
647. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 81.
648. GUTiANN, supra note 76, at 260.
649. See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 204-06; see also Miller, supra note 646,
at 45.
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intentionally makes oneself nondeployable is a court-
martial offense. 5 ° There was a widespread perception that
many of the women who were nondeployable during the
Gulf War because of pregnancy intentionally got pregnant
to avoid service in the Gulf.65' The military has responded to
many of these problems by prohibiting their discussion.652
Many men also perceive that their superiors allow
female personnel to get away with things that they could
not,653and it cannot be doubted that the "gender card" is a
potent weapon. A study of Army and Air Force pilots found
an overwhelming belief on the part of men that women
were given more time to complete tasks, more training, and
more chances, and that they were not washed out of
training under circumstances in which men would be.654
Women themselves also felt that instructors were more
lenient with them, and "they appreciated the special
considerations.655
Women are widely perceived as simply not holding up
their end. As one enlisted man complained to Laura Miller,
"Today all you hear in the Army is that we are equal, but
650. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, § 915, art. 115 (2000); see also
MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 154.
651. See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 204-05.
652. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SERVICE ACADEMIES, UPDATE ON EXTENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, GAO/NSIAD-
95-58 (1995) (listing ten forms of sexual harassment, including derogatory
comments, comments that standards have been lowered, and comments that
women do not belong at the service academies); Department of The Navy (DON)
Policy on Sexual Harassment, SECNAVINST. 5300.26B n.11 (defining sexual
harassment to include "sexist remarks or slurs"); see also HOUSE AIMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE, Gender-Integrated and Gender-Segregated Training
(March 17, 1999) (testimony of Anita K. Blair), http//www.iwf.org/news/
990317.shtml (noting that "[tihe Army, Navy, and Air Force have declared
gender-integration a success, and service members are strongly discouraged
from even expressing concerns about gender-integration, much less criticizing
any aspect of it"). Indeed, the final version of the RAND study on the effects of
sexual integration, HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13-especially on the
relationship between pregnancy and readiness-was substantially less negative
when released by the Pentagon than had been an earlier draft. See Rowan
Scarborough, Pentagon Study Excises References to Pregnancy, Readiness,
WASH. TMS, Nov. 7, 1997, at A3.
653. GANDT, supra note 505, at 35 (noting that male pilots believed that
women were being accorded special concessions in training and that a double
standard was being applied that allowed women to get away with mistakes that
would get a man disqualified).
654. Voge & King, supra note 504, at 881.
655. Id.
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men do all the hard and heavy work whether it's combat or
not."65 Yet another told her: "The majority of females I
know are not soldiers. They are employed. Anything
strenuous is avoided with a passion. I would hate to serve
with them during combat! I would end up doing my job and
2/3 of theirs just to stay alive."657
These negative attitudes are not confined to enlisted
men. One major told Miller that "[i]f every soldier in the
U.S. Army today had been trained at the same low level of
expectation that female soldiers routinely are, the U.S.
Army today would be either dead or in Prisoner of War
camps.
65 8
The RAND study on integration found that there was a
common perception that junior enlisted women used
"female problems" to get out of unattractive duties.659 This
belief is not without foundation. Several women told Laura
Miller while she was conducting a study of harassment of
Army women that they avoided certain duties by
complaining of menstrual cramps.660 Others told her that
they could hide contraband (such as candy) by placing
tampons or underwear on top of the contents of their
lockers or drawers because once encountering these items,
their superiors would be too embarrassed to look any
further.6 Still others obtain special consideration by
flirting with their superiors."2
According to both men and women, some women use
complaints of sexual harassment, or a threat of such
complaints, to avoid unpleasant tasks.6" Some superiors are
reluctant to assign unpleasant tasks to a woman, because
she has a "club" she could use against him if he did.6"
Moreover, a woman can complain of sexual harassment if
she does not like her job, and even if the charges are
unsubstantiated, she is generally placed in another work
656. Miller, supra note 646, at 46.
657. Id.
658. Id. at 47; see also HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 80 (finding
considerable resentment among men due to their perception that despite
demands for equal recognition women do not contribute their share to the work
of the unit).
659. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 42.
660. MILLER, supra note 646, at 47.
661. Id.
662. See GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 35.
663. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 74.
664. Id.
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group.665 Men are also reluctant to push women hard during
physical activities because of fear of unfounded charges of
sexual harassment.666
Men in the military are deathly afraid of these sexual
harassment charges, and, given recent experience, they are
right to be. This is especially true of senior enlisted men,
who feel they have a large investment in their careers that
could be lost by a sexual harassment charge that would
render them "guilty until proven guilty."6 7 Most of the men
interviewed for the RAND study reported being personally
aware of such occurrences.668
Women also receive favored treatment in receiving
plum assignments. Nowhere has this been more obvious
than in combat aviation. With the post-Cold War
"drawdown" of the military, there are fewer flying billets
available, and the competition for them is fierce. Women
are moved ahead of men in response to pressures to train
more female pilots.669  For example, the Presidential
Commission reported that at the Naval Academy, some
pilot billets are set aside for women, so that women can
claim the positions over men with higher class standings. 670
Only if women pass these positions by can they be claimed
by men. Men have responded with predictable
665. Id.
666. Id. at 73; see also FEDERAL ADVISORY COmThIiTTEE, REPORT ON GENDER-
INTEGRATED TRAINING AND RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 16
(Dec. 16, 1997) [hereinafter KASSEBAUM BAKER COMMISSION],
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/git/report.html.
667. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 76.
668. Id. Men are often placed in extremely vulnerable situations. When an
Air Force lieutenant requested on religious grounds not to be assigned to forty-
eight-hour shifts alone with a woman in an ICBM silo, his commanding officer
labeled him "unprofessional" in his fitness report. Sheila A. Moloney, Saving
Lieutenant Ryan, AM. ENTERPRISE, Sept. 1, 1999, at 13. The missile silo is
smaller than the inside of a school bus, with a single bed and toilet separated
from the work area by a shower curtain. Men in the private sector who placed
themselves in such a potentially compromising position would be labeled as
having poor judgment. They would, in the words of Judge Alex Kozinski, be
handing the woman "a loaded gun with which she can blow away their careers."
Alex Kozinski, Locking Women Workers in Gilded Cages, LEGAL TIMES, May 25,
1992, at 28. However, Lieutenant Berry was nonetheless labeled
"unprofessional" for his reluctance to be put in that position. See also Marie E.
DeYoung, Why I Back Berry, NAvY TIMES, Sept. 13, 1999, at 55.
669. The most famous female pilot so favored was Kara Hultgreen. See infra
note 924.
670. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 67, at 50.
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resentment.'
The view that "some are more equal than others" is
extremely destructive of group cohesion. Paradoxically,
Madeline Morris points to the following statement of a
female former Army officer as support for the view that
integration of women has positive effects:
It helps a lot to have females there, but especially if they have
some rank. Like in Saudi, during the Persian Gulf War, my
commander told me to 'Act like a soldier, not like a girl.' I
confronted him and he backed off. So he got feedback, because
there was a female there-but especially because I had enough
rank and the confidence to confront him. Not everyone would have
been in a position to do that.
Thus, members of a small, and already suspect, group have
a "right" empowering them to question their superiors, in
this case over a comment that is far milder than those that
virtually every man must endure. Having a woman in a
unit is not unlike having a general or admiral's son in the
unit when the father repeatedly steps in to protect his child.
At least three consequences are predictable: The son's
complaints are always going to be taken seriously; everyone
will resent, if not hate, the son; and unit members will lose
confidence in their superiors.
A cohesive military group needs to know that it will be
supported and protected by the chain of command when it
is in the right. But all along the chain of command everyone
now knows that conscientious service is not enough to avoid
substantial career damage. A perception, however incorrect,
that one is on the wrong side of "gender issues" can
substantially impair, if not end, one's career.
Perhaps the most visible such case is that of Admiral
Stanley Arthur, then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who
was a legendary pilot in Vietnam and commander of naval
forces in the Gulf War and, by all accounts, an honorable
man.6 72 When Rebecca Hansen, a female helicopter pilot,
washed out of training, she contacted her senator, Senator
David Durenberger of Minnesota, and complained that her
failure was in retaliation for her having filed a sexual
671. See GANDT, supra note 505, at 34.
672. GREGORY L. VIsTiCA, FALL FROM GLORY: THE IEN WHO SANK THE U.S.
NAvy 390-91 (1997).
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harassment charge.67 The decision had been reviewed up
the chain of command, but in response to an inquiry by the
senator, Admiral Arthur undertook a review of the matter.
Several weeks later, Admiral Arthur reported to the
senator that his review revealed that the woman in
question was not qualified to be a pilot. 74 Not satisfied with
that response, the senator placed a "hold" on the
nomination of Admiral Arthur to the position of
Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces (CINCPAC), the most
prestigious operational command in the Navy. Apparently
unwilling to be accused of taking the wrong position on a
"women's issue," Admiral Jeremy "Mike" Boorda, Chief of
Naval Operations, then withdrew Arthur's nomination. 76
Then, to add insult to injury as far as Admiral Arthur's
supporters were concerned, Admiral Boorda overruled the
decision to discharge Hansen and offered her a job on his
staff.676 That was not good enough for Hansen, who
demanded that the Navy send her to law school and assign
her to work on women's issues. When that demand was
refused, she left the Navy.677
The treatment of Admiral Arthur, based entirely on his
decision to support the grounding of a female pilot-a
decision whose good faith has been challenged by no one-
sent "a clear message-one not to be missed by many
admirals. ' 7 After Admiral Arthur's experience, "[a]ny
politically sensitive officer understood, rightly or wrongly,
that women were to succeed as pilots-period."679 One of the
most egregious cases (at least of those to come to light)
involved a female helicopter pilot who had failed a routine
safety test.60 A subsequent performance review found that
she had panicked on several occasions while carrying
passengers. On one occasion, her copilot had to land the
helicopter for her because she had become incapacitated.
673. Her charge of sexual harassment had been found to have merit, and
the accused harasser was discharged from the service. Id.
674. Id. at 390. Apparently, she was in fact a "problem student" who not
only lacked situational awareness but also had a poor attitude. Id. at 389.
675. Id. at 391.
676. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 287. Admiral Boorda had done the same for
Paula Coughlin, one of the Tailhook accusers. See id.
677. Id.
678. VISTICA, supra note 672, at 393.
679. Id.
680. Id.
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She was revived with oxygen on the ground and carried
away on a stretcher. 8 ' The admiral in charge of the Pacific
Fleet's Air Forces overruled a safety panel's
recommendation and allowed her to keep her wings."8 2 Not
surprisingly, male pilots were outraged.
In his study of F/A-18 Hornet training in the Navy,
Robert Gandt describes a problem female aviator who was
not very open to criticism." After she mistakenly cycled the
landing gear when there was an indication of trouble, which
is a serious violation of procedure,6 a Navy commander
said something along the lines of "I can't wait to hear her
story about that."' When she found out about this
comment, she filed a complaint alleging "verbal assault"
which was treated as a claim of sexual harassment. ?6
Although a JAG investigation concluded that there had
been no sexual harassment, the effect of the complaint was
that her mishandling of the plane was forgotten. The flight
instructors believed that that was her real motivation for
the charge.8 7 When she was later subjected to a review
board because of repeated problems, the board unanimously
recommended that her flight status be terminated."8 The
commanding officer of the RAG believed that removing her
wings was unwarranted but recommended that she be
transferred. The commander of the fighter wing agreed.
689
When the case went before the Admiral, he threw out the
entire recommendation relying on "extenuating
circumstances."69 ° Once again, the instructors concluded
that if you are female, you can't fail.
691
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. See GANDT, supra note 505, at 147-48.
684. Id. at 145-46.
685. Id. at 147.
686. Id. at 147-48.
687. Id. at 148.
688. Id. at 201-04.
689. Id. at 204-05.
690. Id. at 207.
691. Id. at 208. Subsequent to the publication of Gandt's book, the pilot,
whom he described pseudonymously, sued the Department of the Navy alleging
a violation of the Privacy Act and seeking ten million dollars in damages for the
disclosure of the review board proceedings. Her lawsuit was dismissed on the
basis of the Feres doctrine, which precludes lawsuits by military personnel
against the government. See Steve Vogel, Navy Pilot Fights Privacy Ruling,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at B1. No longer in the Navy, she maintains her "I
Love Me" website at www.MissyCummings.com.
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Concerns about preferential treatment are not, of
course, complaints about women themselves but rather
about the way the military has responded to their presence.
Mistakes in implementation of a policy do not demonstrate
that the policy goal is not worthwhile. However, there is a
sense in which the kinds of mistakes that the military has
made are inevitable, at least as long as its performance is
measured by how many women it can attract and keep.
C. Integrated Basic Training: Will It Get the Best Out of
Either Males or Females?
Perhaps nowhere are the problems and perils of sexual
integration more apparent than in the issue of whether the
sexes should go through basic training together. Cohesion is
enhanced when men have shared a particularly grueling
experience, which suggests that if the sexes are both to
participate in combat they should train together. If the
sexes train together under the same standards, however,
training must be relaxed, because a regimen that
challenged most men would cause most women to fail, but a
training regimen that could be survived by many women
would not challenge many men, and therefore men would
not develop the same sense of camaraderie that is nurtured
in the crucible of ordeal. As Richard Holmes has observed,
"There is a direct link between harshness of basic tramin
and the cohesiveness of the group which emerges from it.
' 6 9
Traditional basic training was rigorous and, at times,
somewhat abusive. In the words of a former head of drill
instructors at Parris Island:
Military training exists to break [the recruit] down to his
fundamental self, take away all that he possesses, and get him
started out in a way that you want him to be. Issue him all new
clothes, cut his hair, send his possessions home, and tell him he
doesn't know a damn thing, that he's the sorriest thing you've ever
seen, but with my help you're going to be worthwhile again.69 3
Today, much of that harshness has been eliminated.694
692. HOL~MS, supra note 60, at 47.
693. Carol Burke, Pernicious Cohesion, in IT's OUR MILITARY, Too!: WOMEN
AND THE U.S. MILITARY, supra note 57, at 205, 214.
694. For a critique of the relaxation of basic training standards that has
occurred in large part, but not exclusively, as a consequence of sexual
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Effort is viewed as more important than achievement.695
Navy recruits are told that it does not matter how fast they
cover the "confidence course," because the point of it is "just
to have a good time."696 Recruits are shown an orientation
video reassuring them that "physically, anybody can get
through boot camp" and that it is "O.K. to cry."697
Numerous studies have shown that different things
motivate males and females. Men respond better to harsh
discipline and criticism; women respond better to positive
motivation. Failure tends to make men work harder; it
tends to make women quit. 98 It may be a good strategy for
motivating women, but no serious person can believe that
the way to motivate young men is to tell them that a task is
an easy one that anyone can do and that it is "O.K. to cry."
There is a deeper reason than anti-female animus that drill
sergeants exhort (or, at least, formerly exhorted) their
recruits by calling them "ladies" and otherwise challenging
their manhood. But that kind of motivation does not work
well for women, so it has largely been discontinued. What
has replaced it is, in the words of Brian Mitchell, a "myopic
focus on getting recruits through training instead of
preparing them for wartime service."699
As Mitchell writes, the "emphasis on self-esteem and
'positive motivation,' inspired by the need to protect women
from the harshness of military life, has led the military to
an excessive reliance upon leadership and a potentially
fatal neglect of discipline."7"' General Claudia Kennedy, who
later made headlines for her accusation of sexual
harassment against a fellow general, has declared basic
training to be "a safe and intensely supervised
integration, see Anderson, supra note 61; see also Mark Thompson, Boot Camp
Goes Soft: Empathetic Drill Sergeants Make Basic Training Easier, but the
Recruits May Not Be Ready for War, TMIE, Aug. 4, 1997 (noting the widespread
view of male soldiers and outside experts that combining men and women in
boot camp "leads to relaxed standards of physical performance").
695. GUTrANN, supra note 76, at 78-79.
696. Id. at 60.
697. Thompson, supra note 694.
698. See Arden Miller, A Developmental Study of the Cognitive Basis of
Performance Impairment After Failure, 49 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 529, 537
(1985). The tendency of women not to persist after failure is especially acute
when tasks are defined as favoring men. GEARY, supra note 3, at 187.
699. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 342.
700. Id.
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experience.""' When the female head of the Great Lakes
Naval Training Center boot camp refers to recruits as "the
youngsters in our care,""2 you know that, in the words of
one observer, "this is not your father's navy." 3 This
declaration mirrors that of General Kennedy, who began
speeches introducing the "Consideration of Others" program
with the proud declaration that "This is not your father's
army anymore!," as if abandonment of tradition were an
effective way to enhance respect for and attachment to
military institutions. The commander of the naval base at
Pearl Harbor has declared that his "first priority is child
care,"7°4 a stance that may be welcome to many parents but
that is somewhat disconcerting to those who believe that
his first priority should be national defense.
The fact that different techniques motivate men, on
average, than motivate women is a strong argument for
sex-segregated basic training. The Marine Corps has found
that the traditional male-drill-instructor model, in which
the drill instructor screams at recruits to intimidate and
motivate them does not work well for women.0 5 According
to the female commander of the training battalion that
trains female recruits at Parris Island, "[m] ales and females
learn differently and we communicate differently.""6 Thus,
different training methods are needed, even to achieve the
same goals.0 7 Moreover, female drill instructors tended not
to be comfortable in the traditional male-style drill-
instructor mode.0 8
There are, however, costs of training the sexes
separately. If men and women are ultimately to be
integrated in the same units, separate training for women
may interfere with their later acceptance into those units;
701. GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 44.
702. Dirk Johnson, New Messages Sent At Navy Boot Camp: A Focus on
Treating All Recruits Better, N.Y. TIAEs, March 17, 1997, at A10.
703. Johnson, supra note 702.
704. GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 130.
705. Gidget Fuentes, Softening a Tough Road, NAvY TINES-MARmE CORPS
EDITION, Dec. 1, 1997, at 14.
706. Id.
707. Male and female sports coaches likewise tend to adopt different
motivational styles. Linda Millard, Differences in Coaching Behaviors of Male
and Female High School Soccer Coaches, 19 J. SPORT BEHAV. 19, 26-27 (1995).
708. Moreover, sexually integrated training brings with it some of the same
kinds of sexual difficulties that the Army has experienced at the Aberdeen
Proving Grounds and elsewhere. See Fuentes, supra note 705.
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they will always be "outsiders." They will not have gone
through the same grueling training as the men, and the
men will know it and resent the women's being allowed to
get through easily."0 9 On the other hand, when they train
together, the lesser physical demands placed on women are
even more apparent.
This quandary is no doubt responsible for the
vacillation of the military on the question of whether basic
training should be sexually integrated. The Army, for
example, had integrated basic training in the late 1970s but
abandoned it in the early 1980s because men were being
held back and women were not able to excel. 1 ' Alone among
the services, the Marines have never had integrated
training.
The conflicting pressures are also reflected in opposing
recommendations of two commissions assigned to consider
the question of integrated training. The first was created by
the Secretary of Defense and headed by former Senator
Nancy Kassebaum Baker. It unanimously recommended
that the sexes be separated in basic training in all services
because integrated training resulted in "less discipline, less
unit cohesion, and more distraction from the training
program." '11 However, the Secretary of Defense rejected that
recommendation. '12 The publicly stated reason was that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the move because it violated
the precept that you "train as you fight," despite the fact
that most women, of course, do not fight.
The second study was commissioned by Congress and
chaired by Anita K. Blair.1 ' It recommended, by a bare
majority, that the status quo be maintained-that is, that
integrated training be continued in the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, and segregated training be continued in the
Marines. Five of the nine members supported the
709. KASSEBAUM BAKER COMMISSION, supra note 666, at 15.
710. See HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, supra note 652; see also Army
Halting Joint Training of Male and Female Recruits, N.Y. TImES, Oct. 20, 1982,
at A15.
711. See KASSEBAUM BAKER COMMISSION, supra note 666.
712. See Dana Priest, Defense Chief Opposes Separating Sexes in Basic
Training, WASH. POST, June 9, 1998, at A9.
713. See STATEMENT AND STATUS REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION
ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES, Mar. 17, 1999 [hereinafter
BLAIR COMISSION], available at http://www.house.gov/hasc
testimony/106thcongress/99-03-17commissionl.htm.
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recommendation, one voted against, and three abstained.
The abstentions were prompted by concern that the
majority was not devoting sufficient attention to the
negative aspects of integrated training, especially "the
overwhelming consensus among trainers that something is
seriously flawed in gender-integrated training."714
There is no obvious answer to the training question.
Both integrated and segregated training have their costs,
and both kinds of costs are a consequence of sexual
integration. The challenge for the military is to train males
and females in such a way as to get the best out of both of
them and at the same time creating conditions that allows
them later to participate in cohesive units. If the primary
purpose of basic training is to create a self-identity as a
"warrior," it would seem that that result is more likely to be
attained through segregated training.
.D. Pregnancy Leads to Lower Rates of Female Deployability
and Potentially Lower Readiness
Lionel Tiger's explanation for the origins of men's
resistance to women rested in part on the fact that large
numbers of women would be pregnant or nursing at any
given time and therefore the missions of men who were
inclined to include women would less likely be
accomplished.715 Today, of course, women have greater
control over their pregnancies, so one might think that
inconvenient pregnancies are no longer a problem. In fact,
however, pregnancy has substantial current-day effects on
deployability and therefore, predictably, on military
readiness. At Fort Bragg, for example, there are 600 to 800
women (equivalent to an infantry battalion) pregnant at
any given time.716 While in the civilian sector employers can
714. See id. at 58 (statement of Commissioner Moskos). Commissioner
Moskos further stated:
But we ought not to ignore the recurrent theme among trainers that a
core set of problems does derive from gender-integrated settings. These
include physical strength differences between the sexes, maintenance
of privacy of the sexes, sexual distractions, and perceptions of double
standards applied to men and women in disciplinary actions and
accusations of sexual harassment.
Id.
715. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
716. Jane McHugh, Thumbs Up to Pregnant Soldiers: Wellness Program
Helps Soldiers Stay Fit, ARMY TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at 14.
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often hire temporary help, in the military when a soldier is
out, the rest of the unit must pick up the slack.717 Moreover,
it should be noted, even discounting "female-only" medical
problems, women are substantially more likely than men to
report for sick call. Indeed, a recent study of sick-bay visits
on a submarine tender found that women outnumbered
men by a ratio of six to one.718
In today's military, perhaps 10% of female personnel
are pregnant at any given moment.719 When the destroyer
tender U.S.S. Acadia returned from an eight-month
deployment, 29 (8%) of the 360 women on board had been
transferred off the ship because of pregnancy, earning it the
unenviable nickname "The Love Boat."72" Who is to blame
for this obvious personnel problem? According to Linda Bird
Francke, the Navy is to blame for failing "to instruct its
youngest recruits on sex education and birth control."721
Pregnancy results in substantial limitations on a
woman's ability to contribute to her unit. In the Army, for
example, pregnant soldiers are not transferred to or from
overseas commands, and they are exempt from physical
training and wearing load-bearing equipment.7 2 After
twenty weeks, they are exempt from standing at parade
717. See David H. Hackworth, Americans Depending on TV News Miss Big
Story About National Readiness, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 3, 1998,
at 17A (reporting that Lt. General William Kernan stated: "My concern is that
during these lean manpower years, soldier pregnancies can leave gaping holes
in a unit's readiness.").
718. John Omicinski, Study: Navy Women Visit Sick Bay More Often than
Men, NAVY TmIEs, Feb. 1, 2001.
719. Reliable figures are hard to come by. Brian Mitchell estimates that
from 7 to 17% of service women become pregnant each year. MITCHELL, supra
note 6, at 152. An Army Handbook entitled "Sustaining Female Soldiers' Health
and Performance During Deployment: Guidance for Small Unit Leaders" states
that approximately 12% of female soldiers are pregnant at any one time. Rowan
Scarborough, Army Guide Describes Women's Difficulties: Suggests Pregnancy
"Countermeasures", WASH. TIES, Mar. 17, 1997, at Al; see also Bill Gertz,
Dozens of GIs in Bosnia Pregnant: Army Bans Booze, Doesn't Curb Sex, WASH.
T MEs, July 18, 1996, at Al (citing Pentagon statistics indicating that 5.1% of
all military women deployed during the war became pregnant).
720. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 104. During a recent deployment of the
alrcraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, forty-five of the approximately 300
women who serve on it did not deploy or failed to complete the cruise because of
pregnancy. Tom Bowman, Women on Submarines-Navy Secretary Says It's
Coming; ROTC Crews Trying It Out, SEATrLE TIMEs, June 28, 1999, at A4.
Eleven of the women were flown off the carrier while it was at sea.
721. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 113.
722. BINKN, supra note 295, at 28-29.
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rest or at attention for more than fifteen minutes and
exempt from weapons training, swimming qualifications,
and field duty. Moreover, they are not assigned to duties
where nausea, fatigue, or lightheadedness would be
hazardous."'
The non-deployability rate for women is approximately
three times the non-deployability rate for men, the
difference being largely due to pregnancy."' According to
Martin Binkin of the Brookings Institution, the services
have, so far, been able to deal with pregnancies. He notes,
however, that the problem might not be so manageable in
combat units, as opposed to support units, where the
requirements of teamwork and burden sharing are
greater.725
The problems of pregnancy are even greater than the
bare numbers would suggest. A Navy study found that 41%
of pregnant sailors were single.726 Thus, the services must
face not only the question of how to deal with pregnant
personnel while they are pregnant, but also the longer-term
issue of how these women are going to combine the rigors of
child-rearing and the demands of a military job.2 During
the Gulf War, 16,300 single parents and 1231 dual-service
couples with children served in the Gulf, all of whom were
required to have approved child-care plans on file.728
723. Id. at 29.
724. PRESIDENTIAL COMMN, supra note 67, at 20.
725. BINKIN, supra note 295, at 46.
726. Patricia B. Hanna, An Overview of Stressors in the Careers of US
Servicewomen, in WOMEN SOLDIERS: IMAGES AND RESLITIEs, supra note 11, at 59,
71-72.
727. Id.
728. Dana Priest, 17,500 Families Divided: Data Given on Children Left
Without GI Parent, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1991, at Al. Statistics on the number
of single parents are often difficult to interpret because the services may count
them differently. The number of single parents reported may include non-
custodial parents. Thus, when it is asserted, as it frequently is, that there are
many more single fathers than single mothers in the service, that statistic
masks two things. First, under any view the proportion of service members who
are single parents is higher for women, and second, many more female than
male "single parents" are custodial parents. See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 102-
03 (noting that the Carter administration had announced that single
parenthood was not a "female issue" because three-fourths of all single parents
were men; what was not announced was that it was counting servicemen paying
child support as "single parents"). In 1988, women constituted approximately
14% of all personnel, but 50% of single parents, meaning that the rate of single
parenthood among the women was approximately six times that of men. Id. at
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The opportunity to become pregnant provides female
service personnel a potential egress from military service.729
There were widespread and persistent rumors that at the
outset of the Persian Gulf crisis some women intentionally
became pregnant to avoid deployment. For example, four of
the twenty-two women in the 360th Transportation
Company scheduled to leave for the Gulf were found to be
pregnant, all having conceived less than six days before
their regiment was deployed.3 ° The argument against the
suggestion that this was a deliberate act is simply that it is
implausible that women would get pregnant to avoid
deployment because women in the military receive only six
weeks maternity leave.73' But the critical fact is that if these
women did not deploy with their units, they were unlikely
to be sent overseas, even if they did report "for duty," and,
of course, they could elect to leave the service rather than
return.732
Perhaps the most honest argument on this side of the
158.
729. See Paul Richter, Exodus of Female Recruits Signals Trouble for
Military, L.A. TIES, Nov. 29, 1999, at Al (noting that pregnant enlisted
personnel can opt for an honorable discharge).
730. Suzanne Fields, Life in the Co-Ed Tents, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1990, at
G1.
731. Julie Wheelwright, "It Was Exactly Like the Movies!" The Media's Use
of the Feminine During the Gulf War, in WOMEN SOLDIERS: IMAGES MD
REALITIES, supra note 11, at 111, 130.
732. Pregnancy of officers, unlike that of enlisted personnel, is not a basis
for avoiding a service contract. Although because of the post-Cold War
drawdown, the Army has allowed some West Point graduates to leave the Army
prematurely, it has not allowed pilots, who are in short supply, to do so. See
Mark Thompson, A Call to Nurse: A Pilot Who Breast-Feeds Wants To Quit the
Army. Should it Let Her Go?, TmIE, Feb. 24, 1997, at 32. Thus, Black Hawk
helicopter pilot Emma Cuevas was not granted her request to leave the Army
three years early when she argued that her pilot duties were interfering with
the breast-feeding of her infant. Id. The Army's position was that it had spent
approximately one-half million dollars training her and that she must keep her
part of the bargain. She (or more precisely, her infant daughter) brought an
unsuccessful suit against the Army. Before it was resolved, however, she
decided she would rather stay home with her baby than go to work and she
refused to report for duty. Nick Adde, Cuevas Let Go From Army: Breast
Feeding Black Hawk Pilot Must Repay Education Funds, ARMY TMIES, Oct. 27,
1997, at 8. She was sanctioned by a disciplinary board for failure to report for
duty and left the Army. The Army refused to reveal the nature of her discharge
or whether she was required to repay the Army for her education, although
confidential sources informed Army Times that she would have to pay "some" of
the costs. Id.
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debate has come from Betty Friedan. She acknowledges
that pregnancy may interfere with performance
requirements, but argues that pregnancy must be tolerated
if women are to be assimilated.7"' Thus, the choice is
between military effectiveness and "equal opportunity."
E. Lesser Female Strength Poses Substantial Readiness
Problems
The view that technological advances have rendered the
very large sex differences in strength unimportant is
widespread.7"4 While it is true that most soldiers will not
engage in hand-to-hand combat, such combat is the last
resort of all warriors, whether they are infantry riflemen,
tank drivers, or fighter pilots, and it can be the last resort
of those occupying support positions, whether signalmen,
clerks, or cooks. Moreover, hand-to-hand combat is not the
only combat task requiring strength. Lifting heavy artillery
shells, damage control tasks on a warship, carrying a
machine gun, and pulling the lever operating the ejection
seat of a fighter plane all require substantial strength.
Even the prosaic task of digging foxholes imposes a
substantial obstacle to women."
It is not just combat positions that require physical
strength, however. Many combat support positions do, as
well. In a study conducted in the early 1980s, all Army men
in heavy-lifting MOSs were found qualified for their jobs,
but only about 15% of women were." Since then, the Army
has periodically attempted study of the strength issue, but
very little progress has been made because of concern about
how strength requirements would affect women's service
opportunities. Some changes have been made in training to
accommodate weaker females, such as training runs now
being performed in running shoes rather than combat boots
to deal with the extremely high level of stress fractures
among women. However, there has been substantial
reluctance to impose strength requirements more broadly,737
and increasing women's strength has often taken a
733. FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 105.
734. See supra note 57.
735. GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 258.
736. Id. at 250.
737. See id. at 244-62.
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backseat to the more palatable chore of simply making thejob easier. Thus, the job of stretcher carrier in the Navy,
formerly a two-man job, has been redefined as a four-person
job.7 38
Adverse conditions often interfere with the neat system
of MOSs. While women can probably drive a truck as well
as a man, if the truck gets a flat tire, then the driver needs
to be able to handle the seventy-pound tires. In the Gulf
War, male officers had to perform heavy lifting, at a time
when they should have been pursuing their command
responsibilities, because their female subordinates were too
weak to do it.739 If a ship gets struck by a bomb or a missile,
all hands may have to turn to the tasks of damage control,
such as fire fighting, flood limitation, and evacuation of the
wounded. 4 ° Analyst James Dunnigan has described damage
control as "the most dangerous, unpredictable, and chaotic"
of the Navy's combat operations. The sex differences in
ability to engage in such tasks are not small. The
Presidential Commission was presented with a 1985 study
that found that "[w]hile clear majorities of women (more
than 90% in some cases) failed to meet the physical
standards for eight critical shipboard tasks, virtually all the
men passed (in most cases 100%). " 42 One percent of women,
compared with 96% of men could carry water pumps to the
scene of a fire or flooded compartment."4
Strength differentials have led some to argue that
equipment should be redesigned to eliminate the need for
strength.' If the effectiveness of a weapon can be retained
with lower weight, then such a change would benefit both
men and women; if nothing else it may allow more
ammunition to be carried. If effectiveness is traded for
lower weight, however, then such a change would
predictably result in the loss of additional lives. Equipment
modification, like any other change, should be judged first
738. Id. at 257.
739. Id. at 258.
740. PRESIDENTIAL COAITN, supra note 67, at 32.
741. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 322.
742. PRESIDENTIAL COMAIN, supra note 67, at 74 (citing Robertson & Trent,
Documentation of Muscularly Demanding Job Tasks and Validation of an
Occupational Strength Test Battery (STB), Naval Personnel Research and
Development Center, San Diego, CA, Report No. 86-1 (1985)).
743. Id. at C-9.
744. See Peach, supra note 57, at 168.
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by the criterion of combat effectiveness.
VII. THE EFFECT OF SEXUAL INTEGRATION ON RECRUITMENT,
RETENTION, AND CONSCRIPTION
A. Integration May Diminish the Attractiveness of Military
Service to Men and May Affect What Kind of Men Join
Throughout the years, men have joined the military
both to test and to prove their manhood, attracted by the
traditionally masculine life of the military. In an era in
which we rely on volunteers to staff the armed services,
eliminating one of the primary attractions of the military to
men may have negative effects on the military's ability to
field a sufficient number of troops.745 Although some argue
that female "participation in combat will not change the
nature of our military,"746 that can only be true, if at all, if
there are very small numbers of women. Even now, it is fair
to say that the military is a very different place from what
it would be if women were not widely included.
It is difficult to measure the extent to which men might
be less inclined to join the military because of the
integration of women. People's motivations for joining the
military are not necessarily accessible to us, or, perhaps,
even to themselves. Respondents to surveys asking military
personnel why they joined tend to identify such factors as
educational and economic opportunities, serving one's
country, and so forth.747 Few say that they are joining to
turn themselves into men or to make themselves feel
manly. That would, after all, be a very unmanly thing to
say. Men who write about their decision to join long after
the fact, however, when they do not feel that their manhood
must be proved, often identiy the need to test their
manhood as a major motivation.'
Concerns about the effect on the willingness of men to
join the military were expressed during debate over the
question of admitting women into the service academies.
Admiral Worth Bagley, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
testified before Congress as follows:
745. See BINKIN, supra note 295, at 41-42.
746. Kornblum, supra note 10, at 357.
747. See MOSKOS, supra note 285, at 29.
748. See supra text accompanying note 290.
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The present male-dominated, sea-going facet of Navy life is one
that is understood and accepted by the country and the men in the
Navy. Men join the Navy for many different reasons; however, a
certain portion join and remain in the Navy because they enjoy
being in a job which has been historically associated with
fellowship among men in a difficult and dangerous endeavor.
Changing the fabric of the Navy by integrating women into all
combat roles might well reduce the attractions of the Navy to this
segment of mankind, as well as to some of those men who might,
in the future, join the Navy and make it a career.
The services have recently had difficulty attracting
enough recruits, in large part because of the booming
civilian economy and a smaller cohort of 18- to 22-year-
olds.7 1' Given the current orientation of military recruiting,
which is to compete essentially on civilian-labor-market
terms, these difficulties are not surprising. When the
military is perceived as just another job, it lacks the special
attributes that have traditionally attracted young recruits.
It may not be a coincidence that the Marine Corps-the
most "masculine" of the services, the only service to retain
sex-segregated basic training, and the service accused of
being the most "disconnected" from civilian society-is the
only service that has continued to be successful at meeting
its recruiting goals.' Indeed, a study of recruiting practices
commissioned by the Pentagon found that only the Marine
Corps, among all the services, articulates a clear image.
752
That image, most clearly, is one of masculine toughness.
Sexual integration may not affect just the numbers of
men who join; it may also negatively affect which men join.
One major criticism of the volunteer force is that it has
substituted an occupational orientation for an institutional
orientation; it has come to compete with the civilian sector
on civilian terms.7 13 Thus, there is substantial focus on
compensation competitive with the civilian sector and
749. See BINKIN, supra note 295, at 41.
750. Steven L. Myers, Drop in Recruits Pushes Pentagon to New Strategy,
N.Y. TnIES, Sept. 27, 1999, at Al.
751. It is also the smallest service, THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKNG THE CORPS 19
(1997), which may help, as well. See also id. at 274-75 (commenting on the
"remoteness" of the Marine Corps from civilian society).
752. Myers, supra note 750; see also RICKS, supra note 751, at 171-79
(comparing Marine boot camp and Army basic training).
753. See generally THE MILrrARY: MORE THAN JUST A JOB?, supra note 37, at
15, 16-17.
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training that will have value outside the military.
Diminishing the sense of "warrior spirit" that is associated
with the military would predictably enhance that shift."4
This may hold true even for men who are not in combat
MOSs, and, indeed, it may be even more true of them.
Under the current Marine Corps ethos, for example, "every
Marine is a rifleman."755 Thus, even Marines in combat
service support enjoy the cachet of "warrior." But when they
work side by side with women, who are not eligible to
participate in rifle companies, that mystique may
diminish.
756
The services must be concerned not only with
recruitment, but also with retention. Pilot attrition, for
example, is a serious problem.757 In 1998, 79% of Air Force
pilots declined to extend their service, despite substantial
financial incentives.5 ' A GAO report attributes the exodus
of pilots to a number of factors: better financial
opportunities outside of the military (primarily flying for
commercial airlines); dissatisfaction with current
deployments, which are lengthy, lack clear mission
objectives, interfere with training and family life, and must
be supported by a smaller military; and frustrations with
military leadership.759 One important source of family
tensions is the jealousy of wives who resent the time their
husbands spend with female aircrew, especially during
temporary duty and deployments.76 °
Although the GAO study did not identify dissatisfaction
with sexual integration as a problem-hardly surprising in
754. Admittedly, not everyone views this transformation negatively. See,
e.g., WOMEN SOLDIERS: IMAGES AND REALITIES, supra note 11, at 24 (suggesting
that the fact that soldiering has become "just a job" is a good thing precisely
because it has facilitated the entry of women).
755. See CAPUTO, supra note 63, at 14.
756. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 44:
Another issue was whether the ability to perform in their occupation
was more important than general military skills. The issue came up
more during our Marine Corps visits. For example, "I don't feel women
should be in the Marines. A Marine is a basic rifleman, an MOS women
cannot be assigned to. Therefore, women shouldn't be Marines. Other
services, yes, but not Marines."
757. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY PILOTS: OBSERVATIONS
ON CURRENT ISSUES, GAOtr-NSIAD-99-102, at 9-14 (1999), available at
http://frwcbgate.access.gpo.gov/cg.
758. GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 23.
759. Id. at 12.
760. Voge & King, supra note 504, at 884.
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that active duty personnel who complain are placing their
careers on the line-there is much anecdotal evidence that
such dissatisfaction is a significant factor in pilot morale
and that "frustrations with leadership" are often related to
sexual integration. For example, Robert Stumpf, former
commanding officer of the Navy Blue Angels, has expressed
the following views:
Quite simply, the essence of that warrior culture has been severely
diluted in this decade. Politically inspired social edicts enforced
since Tailhook '91 have rendered a ready room atmosphere so
different now that it is nearly unrecognizable. The emphasis has
shifted dramatically from how to administer death and destruction
to the enemy, to how to "get along" and how to prevent killing each
other in the air. Pilots are hampered in their ability to train as
warriors by the policies of their senior leaders. They are faced with
social experimentation and double standards in training.
Experienced pilots are forced to qualify certain trainees who may
or may not demonstrate established quality standards. This leads
to distrust and resentment, two powerfully harmful factors in
terms of human morale, and thus military effectiveness ....
The flight of our military aviators has little to do with how much
we pay them, and much to do with the decline of their cherished
military culture and traditions. They will continue to be
dissatisfied until their leadership's policies actively and
definitively support a warrior approach at the squadron level;
where tactical proficiency and innovation are rewarded; where
social intimidation ceases to exist; where the ready room is once
. 761
again an extension of the cockpit from a cultural perspective.
Stumpf is not alone in his views. Fred Reed, a
columnist for the Armed Forces News, reports that he
receives large volumes of e-mail from service members
about why they are leaving the services.7 12 While such
missives do not constitute a random sample of military
personnel, they do indicate clear dissatisfaction on the part
of many. The most frequent complaints are about women
working in jobs they cannot perform and a culture of
761. Robert Stumpf, Problems with Pilot Retention in the Post-Tailhook
Armed Forces (October 21, 1998) (remarks at Center for Military Readiness
Conference at the U.S. Capitol), available at http'//www.cmrlink.
org/STUMPF102198.htm.
762. Fred Reed, Group Therapy vs. National Defense, ARMED FORCES NEWS,
Oct. 8, 1999, available at http'//www.armedforcesnews.com/fredreed.htm.
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"compulsory political correctness."7" Male service members
complain of insulting "sensitivity" training and having to
work around the demands of pregnancy and daycare. An
army company executive officer wrote of the amount of time
he spends dealing with pregnancy issues and complained
that "I entered the army to be a warrior, not a babysitter."7
Reed attributes the military's recruiting and retention
problems to a military that no longer values "courage,
strength, self-reliance, leadership, stoicism, and
manliness."65 The "defining mission" of the military is no
longer to engage in warfare, Reed argues, but "to learn to
make women feel comfortable."766 Reed asks rhetorically, "Is
the problem perhaps not that young men don't want to join
the military, but rather that they do, and can't find one to
join?""7 Although the Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces found that
majorities of all subgroups surveyed indicated that the
assignment of women to combat positions would not have
much of an effect on their likelihood of remaining in the
military, 39% of Marines and 25% of Army personnel
reported that combat integration would decrease their
likelihood of remaining in the service." Another study
found that many Army and Air Force pilots believe that
-today's military is not worthwhile as a career because of
political considerations.769
To the extent that the military has adopted a culture of
double standards and political correctness-with all of the
dishonesty that such phenomena entail-one must fear for
the quality of the officer corps. Individuals of integrity and
honor do not operate well in such an environment, so one
may predict that the quality of the officer corps will decline
as men of honor leave the service rather than participate in
such behaviors only to have their places taken by careerists
all too eager to please. Stephanie Gutmann quotes ex-Army
763. Id.
764. Id.
765. Id.
766. Fred Reed, Recruiting and Gender, ARMED FORCES NEWS, Nov. 19,
1999.
767. Fred Reed, Lower Standards, Increase Recruiting Problems?, ARAIED
FORCES NEWS, Sept. 24, 1999, available at http://www.armedforcesnews.
com/backissues/092499.htm.
768. PRESIDENTIAL Coi~im'N, supra note 67, at C-113.
769. Voge & King, supra note 504, at 883.
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officer John Hillen as stating a view that seems to be
shared by many: "It's becoming like Mao's cultural
revolution. Everybody knows it's a system built on a
thousand little lies, but everybody's waiting for someone
that's high ranking who's not a complete moral coward to
come out and say So." 7
70
The goals of a peacetime and wartime military diverge,
and the characteristics of successful peacetime personnel
are not necessarily the characteristics of successful wartime
personnel. Armed forces typically experience "a constant
struggle between the 'warrior' and 'manager' mentality, and
it's getting worse. "77 Some officers who get in trouble in
peacetime excel in wartime. Today, a West Point cadet who,
as a prank, set the shirt of an unpopular cadet on fire would
probably be cashiered. Perhaps that is also true at
Sandhurst, but if it had been true at the beginning of the
last century, Britain would have been deprived of its most
famous-albeit highly controversial-World War II
general.772 Similarly, although William Tecumseh Sherman
graduated sixth in his West Point class, his large number of
conduct demerits placed him 216' in "personal behavior"
out of a total of 233 cadets enrolled.7 7 ' Both Wellington and
Napoleon received very low grades in school but were
obviously commanders of the first magnitude.7 As one
Army officer commented to Stephanie Gutmann, "Soldiers
who are natural warriors don't get promoted because they
also tend to be outspoken and say insensitive things. 7 5
People like Generals Patton and Schwartzkopf, he noted,
"would never have made it past basic training."
770. GUTMIANN, supra note 76, at 23.
771. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 322. Perhaps this is not simply a
consequence of a peacetime/wartime distinction, however. Paul Savage and
Richard Gabriel, in their powerful, though controversial, critique of the
American Army in Vietnam, observed that even then the traditional
"gladiatorial" officer had been replaced with "managerial combat
nonparticipants," with efficiency, rather than honor, becoming the performance
standard. Savage & Gabriel, supra note 373, at 340. Savage and Gabriel argue
that the managerial disposition undermines the sense of military honor because
it replaces "profitless" personal sacrifice with an officer's inclination to see his
troops as a resource base of potential career survival and profitability.
772. See VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY, THE fEmOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE
VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAmEIN 24 (1958).
773. HANSON, supra note 1, at 216.
774. DIXON, supra note 372, at 159.
775. GUTMIANN, supra note 76, at 188.
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Conversely, as military analyst James Dunnigan has
observed, "[i]ncompetent wartime military leaders are often
highly regarded peacetime commanders," because
"[flighting a war... requires a quite different mind-set
than preparing for one."7 Even highly professional armies
find that 50% or more of their leaders are ineffective in
wartime. In the early stages of World War I, Marshal
Joseph Joffre found it necessary to relieve many "over-age
or underaggressive commanders."777 Similarly, within a few
months of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it became apparent
that many ship captains-who had obtained command
largely on the basis of seniority and not making waves-
were not cut out to be wartime commanders, and they were
replaced.778 They simply were not aggressive enough and
not able to accept responsibility for other men's lives in
such perilous circumstances.77
Some analysts have been highly critical of peacetime
pilot selection. For example, Mike Spick observes that
'while theoretically training for war, the peacetime fighter
pilot was one who flew his aircraft safely and well, without
breaking either it or himself."7 °  Selection criteria
concentrate on "flying and systems operation potential,
rather than fighting potential," operating on the
assumption that anyone who can be taught to fly the
airplane can be taught to fight it.781 Selection criteria that
reward caution and good behavior no doubt favor women,
but they probably do not favor combat effectiveness.
Many proponents of women in the military object to
recruitment aimed at the very pool that would seem likely
to yield the most able fighters. Thus, slogans such as "The
Marine Corps is looking for a few good men" and "Kiss your
momma goodbye" (Army National Guard) are to be avoided
because they play on "men's insecurities about their
776. DUNNIGAN, supra note 7, at 309; see also id. at 315 (criticizing "trial by
examination" as largely irrelevant to leadership in combat).
777. STOKESBURY, supra note 91, at 42. Indeed, by the end of August 1914,
he had dismissed an army commander, three corps commanders, and thirty-one
division commanders, followed by thirty-eight more divisional commanders in
September, eleven in October, and twelve in November. JOHN KEEGAN, THE
FIRST WORLD WAR 89 (1998).
778. CALVERT, supra note 472, at 53.
779. Id.
780. SPICK, supra note 365, at 157.
781. Id. at 157-58.
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masculinity."782  Instead, these proponents presumably
approve of such television commercials as one for the Army
National Guard that shows a woman helping a man over an
obstacle course. While this kind of advertisement may
appeal to some women, it seems unlikely to appeal to many
men.
It may be that integration of some of the combat arms
will cause those that remain the most male to develop
orientations that differ from the rest of the (more
feminized) military. Men who formerly joined any branch of
the military for the satisfaction of being a "male warrior"
may now tend to concentrate in the Marines, Rangers, and
Special Operations units such as Special Forces ("Green
Berets") and the Navy SEALs.783 Whether this will be a
problem is difficult to predict, but it may ultimately result
in tensions between the branches and impair morale in the
arms that the "real men" tend to shun.
Perhaps the leading cause of dissatisfaction among
military personnel is a profound change in the culture of
the military, many but not all of which are a consequence of
sexual integration. While concerns about pay and
operations tempo play a role, their role is probably not
primary. As the Center for Strategic and International
Studies reported, "unmet expectations for a challenging and
satisfying military lifestyle were identified as a larger issue
in nearly every focus group."7" In short, a military career is
a lot less "fun" than it used to be. Stephanie Gutmann put it
well. At the beginning of the last decade, she says, the
services "threw away the mystique, the one thing that gave
782. Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in
Nontraditional Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on
Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215,245 & n.195 (1990).
783. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Sara Lister was forced to resign after having denounced Marines as
"extremists" that posed a risk of a "total disconnection with society." Philip
Shenon, Denounced for Remarks on Marines, Army Official Quits, N.Y. TaEs,
Nov. 15, 1997, at A12. The question of how similar the military should be to the
nation it serves is a complex one, but presumably Lister's comment was
animated by the fact that the Marines are the least "feminized" of the services.
See Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society,
ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, July 1997 (stating that the Marines were the most
tradition-bound and unabashedly culturally conservative of the services). See
generally RIcKS, supra note 751 at 19 (discussing the "formalistic, insular,
elitist" culture of the Marines).
784. CSIS, supra note 541.
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them an edge over the civilian economy with which they
now find themselves in competition."785 She continues:
Without all those intangibles, without the monastery, stripped of
its aggressive "we kill people and break stuff' nature, military
service becomes the corporation at its dreary, petty, soul-killing
worst, or just another civil service job-a place of low pay, dim
lighting, crummy furniture, ugly buildings, piles of paperwork,
and a sort of sexless, exhausted male/female rapport.78
6
The changes in the military are in large part due to a
new military culture that attempts to suppress many of its
masculine attributes in order to provide a more welcoming
environment for women. What was formerly one of the most
meritocratic of American institutions has now substituted a
focus on merit with a focus on equality. While many people
may not care now whether the military is "fun" anymore,
they may begin to care when the nation is faced with a
military challenge that it cannot handle, or at least handle
well, because, while more attractive to women, the military
can no longer attract the men upon whom it still must
depend.
B. Sex Differences in Interest and Ability Make It Unlikely
That Large Numbers of Women Will Actually Be
Interested in Serving in Combat
In balancing the costs and benefits of integrating
women into combat positions, one relevant datum is how
many women would participate should their inclusion be
voluntary. As it stands today, it costs about five times as
much effort to recruit a woman as to recruit a man, with
the woman being less likely to stay for the length of her
service contract. ' That, already, is a substantial cost. The
disproportion may grow with greater combat options for
women, but costs that might be justified if many women
would serve might not be justified if relatively few would.788
There is no simple linear relationship between costs and
numbers, however. If the number of women is extremely
low, then some kinds of costs would be correspondingly low
785. GUTALANN, supra note 76, at 277.
786. Id. at 277.
787. Id. at 279.
788. See BINKIN, supra note 295, at 57.
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(although the benefits would be low as well). For example, if
only a single woman elected to become a Marine rifleman,
that one woman would have little effect on overall
effectiveness of the Marines or make the Marine Corps
significantly less attractive to men who were seeking a
"masculine" experience. On the other hand, to give a lone
Navy woman the same range of possible sea duty
assignments as a man would require modification of
numerous ships. However, if experience to date is any
indicator, the services would not accept, or be allowed to
accept, the fact that only very small numbers of women
would enter combat specialties. The small number itself
would be viewed as evidence that the services were not
creating a welcoming environment for women.
How many women would have the interest and ability
to enter combat specialties (assuming that no allowances
were made for the female sex)? There is reason to think
that the number would be relatively small. In the aftermath
of the Gulf War, only 15% of Army women surveyed
expressed a desire to occupy combat positions."9 According
to the Presidential Commission, countries that have opened
ground-combat specialties to women have been unable to
attract significant numbers of women.790  Six NATO
nations-Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Spain-have no restrictions on women serving
in ground-combat arms.79' However, the number of women
in such positions is generally well under 1%, primarily
because of lack of female applicants.
789. Cynthia H. Enloe, The Politics of Constructing the American Woman
Soldier, in WOMEN SOLDIERS: IMTAGES AND REALITIES, supra note 11, at 81, 95.
Most surveys have revealed similar numbers. See, e.g., BINKIN, supra note 295,
at 47 (finding that 12% of enlisted women, 10% of female noncommissioned
officers, and 14% of female officers said that they would volunteer for combat
duty); see Rowan Scarborough, Women in Arms Say No Thanks to Combat,
WASH. TmIES, Sept. 29, 1998, at Al (reporting survey indicating that 71% of
Army noncommissioned officers and 79% of enlisted women indicated they
would not volunteer for combat). But see BINKIN, supra note 295, at 47
(reporting survey in which 46% of female respondents said that they would be
"likely" to volunteer for combat duty).
790. See PRESIDENTIAL COMI I'N, supra note 67, at 26, C-21.
791. Paolo Valpolini & Heinz Sculte, Women Warriors, JANE's DEFENCE
WEEKLY, June 23, 1999. Germany recently bowed to a ruling of the European
Court declaring that the German ban on women bearing arms was inconsistent
with the European Union rules on sexual equality. New World Order: Coed
Trenches, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 24, 2001, at 1.
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Canada's experience with integration of women into
ground-combat positions may illustrate women's level of
interest. In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Commission
ordered the Canadian Forces to integrate women fully into
the forces (with the exception of submarines).79 2 In 1989,
there were forty-eight women (and 12,700 men) in combat
positions. By 1997, there were sixty-six women (and 10,450
men).793 Because of this glacial progress in increasing the
number of women, the army implemented a $1.5 million
advertising campaign to attract women to infantry, armor,
artillery and combat engineering. Its goal was to recruit
2000 new soldiers, including 500 women, for combat arms
in the ensuing twelve to eighteen months.794 In the event,
the army was able to enlist ninety, of whom approximately
half graduated.795 The Human Rights Commission was not
impressed, the chief commissioner stating that "[n]o matter
how you choose to define full integration, the numbers
demonstrate that integration has not been achieved."798
Thus, assuming that the advertising campaign was
responsible for all of the females recruited, it cost $30,000
in advertising alone for each woman graduated. Undeterred
by the military's difficulty in attracting women to such jobs,
the Canadian Defence Minister announced his desire to
boost the representation of women in combat units to 50%,
although he declined to specify how he intended to do so
other than by abolishing "attitudes," "skepticism,"
"barriers" and "well-intended concerns."
797
Some surveys show a substantial difference of opinion
between female officers and enlisted personnel about
combat service in the U.S. military. In his study of field
operations in Honduras, Charles Moskos found that
enlisted women were evenly split between the view that
women should not be allowed in combat units and the view
that women should be allowed to volunteer for combat
792. Allan Thompson, Military Slammed Over Women's Role, TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 20, 1999.
793. Canadian Newswire, Army Calls for More Women to Sign Up For
Combat, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 19, 1997, at A33.
794. Id.
795. See Sharon Hobson, Canada Struggles to Meet Combat Arms Quotas,
JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., June 23, 1999.
796. Thompson, supra note 792.
797. Eggleton Wants a Few (More) Good Women, EDMONTON SUN, Feb. 26,
1999, at 24.
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roles. 9' Female officers, on the other hand, were evenly
split between the view that women should be allowed to
volunteer for combat units and the view that women should
be compelled to serve in combat units in the same
circumstances that men would be.799 A more recent survey
of Army women by Laura Miller found more concordance in
women's views, with the proportion of enlisted women
supporting voluntary combat service being higher than
Moskos found, and the proportion of female officers favoring
identity of treatment being far lower."0 Among Army
women, a bare third believe that the central mission of the
Army is to fight wars.80 '
Many proponents of women in combat argue that
technological advances have made combat less dependent
on brute strength-and thus more congenial to women ° -
but the primary substitute for strength has been in
technical know-how. There is every reason to believe that
the same sex imbalance in technical and mechanical fields
that one finds in the civilian sector would be replicated, and
perhaps exaggerated, in combat positions. Indeed, a recent
GAO report found that "[t]he occupational patterns of
military women are similar to those of civilian women"
despite the opening of many nontraditional positions to
women.
80 3
Even in noncombat jobs, women not only enter the
services in smaller numbers than men, they also leave
earlier. Attrition statistics for enlisted personnel-both
males and females-are alarmingly high. Thirty-three
percent of men and 38% of women are gone before the
798. MOSKOS, supra note 285, at 32.
799. Female officers were also much more likely than enlisted women to
report problems with sexual harassment, a fact that Moskos judged to be a
result not of objectively higher rates of harassment, but of the broader
definition adopted by the officers. Id. at 32-33.
800. Miller, supra note 646, at 43. Sixteen percent of enlisted women, 24% of
NCOs, and 16% of officers were satisfied with current rules excluding women
from ground combat. Seventy-eight percent of enlisted, 72% of NCOs, and 70%
of officers favored voluntary combat service for women. Only 6%, 4%, and 14%,
respectively, favored women's being treated just like men. Thus, those favoring
voluntary combat service outnumbered those favoring equality of treatment by
13:1, 18:1, and 5:1, respectively.
801. Kate O'Beirne, Bread and Circuses, NAT'L REV., Nov. 24, 1997.
802. See supra note 57.
803. GAO, TRENDs IN OCCUPATIONAL DISTIBUTION, supra note 15, at 27
(1999).
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expiration of their initial service contract."4 The Army
figures reflect a glaring sex difference: 28% of men are gone
within three years, while 47% of women are. For white
women, the figure is 54%.05 The cost of this attrition is
high, because the Army pays approximately thirty-five
thousand dollars for recruiting and initial training for each
soldier.
80 6
Women in non-traditional occupations have higher
rates of attrition than women in traditional occupations,
807
which is probably at least in part a consequence of the
services' pressuring women to move into nontraditional
areas that they are not particularly interested in. Moreover,
just as in the civilian labor force, women are more likely to
leave because of family conflicts. Thus, female officers are
twice as likely as men to leave the Army because of the
requirement of separation from family.0 8 Out of a total of
thirty-seven female generals and admirals, only four are
mothers."0 9
These numbers should not be surprising. Women tend
far less than men to endorse militaristic values."0 They are
less interested in and knowledgeable about military
matters,81' they fear war more than men do,812 and they are
804. See Richter, supra note 729. For slightly older but similar statistics, see
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, M=ATARYATrRITION: DOD NEEDS TO BETTER
UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR SEPARATION AND IMPROVE RECRUITING SYSTEMS,
GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, MILITARYATrr1TION].
805. Id; see also Andrea Stone, White Female Enlistees Leaving the Army at
an Alarming Rate, ARMY TImES, Apr. 5, 1999, at 14.
806. Id.
807. GAO, MtITARYATTRITION, supra note 804, at 31-32.
808. Dana Priest, Pregnancy Often Causes Tension in Army Ranks, WASH.
POST, Dec. 30, 1997, at A6. Referring to family separations, one brigade
commander observed, "[we find more males than females willing to pay that
price." Id.
809. Becker, supra note 27.
810. See Bendyna et al., supra note 136 (reporting a sizeable gap between
the sexes in approval of the use of force both before and after the war); see also
Felicia Pratto et al., The Gender Gap: Differences in Political Attitudes and
Social Dominance Orientation, 36 BRIT. J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 49 (1997); Francis
Fukuyama, Women and the Evolution of World Politics, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1998, at 24.
811. The effect size on the "military" scale of the Strong Interest Inventory
is .65. WARREN W. WILLINGHAM & LINDA M. JOHNSON, SUPPLEMENT TO GENDER
AND FAIR ASSESSMENT tbl. S-19 (1997).
812. Klaus Boehnke & Shalom H. Schwartz, Fear of War: Relations to
Values, Gender, and Mental Health in Germany and Israel, 3 PEACE &
CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 149, 161-62 (1997).
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less inclined to inflict physical harm on others, especially on
persons they do not know. 1' Moreover, many positions (both
combat and support positions) continue to require strength.
Women are less likely than men to have the spatial ability
required for aviation positions and are less likely than men
to have the technical aptitude for others. Moreover, military
service often entails frequent moves and lengthy
deployments away from family, which is less likely to
appeal to women than to men. Thus, to say that sexual
integration of the military results in a "doubling" of the
recruiting pool, as Navy Secretary Richard Danzig has
done,814 is not accurate, at least not in a meaningful sense.
Full integration into combat specialties may have an
effect on women's willingness to serve in the military just
the opposite of that intended. Many women may be less
inclined to join the military if by doing so they were
exposing themselves to the possibility of involuntary
assignment to combat units. Thus, there are probably more
women who would be discouraged from a military career by
the possibility of required combat service than would be
attracted by that same possibility. The Royal Navy's
opening of seagoing positions to women was met with
substantial concern that "there are so few women who like
sea service that this will have a negative impact on the
recruitment and retention of the quality women personnel
that the navy has been able to rely upon in the past."'15 The
possibility of involuntary assignment to combat zones may
make it more difficult for the military to attract women for
other roles where they have traditionally played important
roles and are actually sorely needed, such as in nursing.
Recognizing that women's "ethic of care" may mean that
women may tend to have an aversion to combat, one
advocate of sexual integration suggests "careful evaluation
of whether it is necessary to make combat duty mandatory
or whether some gender-neutral type of conscientious-
objector status could be feasible."1 6 Thus, one could join the
military but at the same time renounce any willingness to
serve in combat. As military sociologist Charles Moskos has
813. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
814. See Philpott, supra note 301.
815. Christopher Dandeker & Mady W. Segal, Gender Integration in Armed
Forces: Recent Policy Developments in the United Kingdom, 23 ARmIED FORCES &
SOC'Y 29, 42 (1996).
816. Peach, supra note 57, at 181.
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noted, however:
To allow both sexes to choose whether or not to go into combat
would be the end of an effective military force. Honesty requires
that supporters of lifting the ban on women in combat state openly
that they want to put all female soldiers at the same combat risk
as all male soldiers-or that they don't8 17
It seems extremely unlikely that the military will, or
perhaps even could, establish a system that would allow
either individual women or individual men and women to
opt out of combat duty. But if all female soldiers were at the
same combat risk as all male soldiers, it seems unlikely
that the military could keep its female numbers even at
current levels.
C. Integration of Women into Combat Positions Increases
the Likelihood that Women Would Be Subject to a
Reinstated Draft
Although the issue is typically phrased in terms of
whether women should be "allowed" to serve in combat "if
they want to," such a rule would not be a stable solution. As
Charles Moskos noted above, the real test of equality is
whether women would have the same obligation to serve in
combat that men do. Men in the military often have little
say over their assignment, and men in noncombat positions
are often reassigned to combat positions as needed. To
allow women to choose when men cannot would cause
substantial morale problems.
Allowing women to opt in to combat specialties may
also increase the likelihood that if the United States
resumes conscription it would be required to draft women
and place them into combat units. When the Supreme
Court upheld male-only draft registration, it did so against
the background of the unchallenged combat-exclusion
policy.818 If women are no longer ineligible to serve in
combat, excluding them from the draft may no longer be
legally permissible.
Opening only some positions to women probably does
not imperil male-only conscription, since most draftees are
inducted into ground-combat arms that at this writing
817. Moskos, supra note 30, at 78.
818. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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continue to be closed to women. Although the combat
exclusion has now been narrowed, the Department of
Defense views the exclusion of women from direct ground
combat as a continuing justification for continuing to
exclude women from draft registration.819
There is a colorable argument based on the Supreme
Court's recent sex-discrimination cases for the proposition
that the current ground-combat restriction is itself
unconstitutional. ° In holding that the Virginia Military
Institute could not maintain its all-male character, the
Court held that the government "must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females." As long as
"some" women are capable "of all the individual activities
required of VMI cadets," VMI could not exclude all
women.82' Equivalent reasoning would yield the conclusion
that as long as there are any women who are capable of the
"individual activities required of" ground-combat
personnel-as there surely are-women cannot be
categorically excluded from those positions. The focus on
"individual activities" seems designed to eliminate reliance
on group effects, such as cohesion. In light of the Supreme
Court's historic deference to the other two branches of
government in matters related to national defense,
however, it seems doubtful that the Court is prepared to go
so far.
The Supreme Court's view might change, however, if
women are allowed to opt in to ground-combat positions.
Under such circumstances, presumably both of the political
branches would have made the judgment that women may
appropriately serve in the relevant combat units. Having
made that judgment, these branches may no longer be
permitted to make such service optional for women but
mandatory for men.
819. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: CHANGES WOULD
BE NEEDED TO EXPAND SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRATION TO WOMEN,
GAO/NSIAD 98-199 (1998); SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, WHY WOMEN AREN'T
REQUIRED TO REGISTER, Oct. 27, 1998, available at http://www.sss.gov/
women.htm.
820. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that sex
classifications must be supported by "exceedingly persuasive" justifications).
821. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
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VIII. THE PROBLEMS OF A SEXUALLY INTEGRATED MILITARY
MAY BE INTRACTABLE
The initial question for policy makers is whether they
have to accept the male lack of acceptance of women as a
given or whether it is amenable to modification. If it is not
reasonably amenable to modification, then the question is
how, or whether, to work around it. This section will first
suggest that male opposition to women may be relatively
intractable and then briefly examine the question whether
sex-segregated combat units might solve some of the
problems of inclusion of women in combat forces while at
the same time providing women the opportunity to serve
their country in this very important way.
A. An Innate Male Disinclination to Form Aggressive
Coalitions with Women May Be Difficult to Overcome
The suggestion that integration of women into combat
positions compromises military readiness is usually
dismissed as being, if true at all, true only in the transition
period until male attitudes are fully "adjusted." However, if
these attitudes are deeply rooted in individuals, the period
of "transition" may never end. As Lionel Tiger observed
about his consultations with fraternity leaders on the
subject of hazing, the leaders always have difficulty
understanding that efforts to limit hazing have to be
constantly renewed: "Each new class of members is
vulnerable to dangerous and hectic excess because it is
essentially the same as the one before: postadolescent
males."22 Thus, the Tailhooks, Aberdeens, Kelly Flinns, and
the like, are probably not transitional phenomena but are
likely to be recurring features of an integrated military.
The opposition of many men to combat roles for women
is very deep and very emotional. Former Marine Corps
Commandant Barrows testified at congressional hearings in
1991 that women in combat positions "would destroy the
Marine Corps, something no enemy has been able to do in
822. LIONEL TIGER, THE DECLINE OF MALES 277 n.37 (1999).
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"123over two hundred years. Unlike the success the military
had in breaking down racial suspicions and increasing
mutual acceptance between the races," acceptance of
women by men has been far less successful. Experience
working with women does not significantly increase men's
acceptance of them. According to a 1990 poll, for example,
while 45% of male midshipmen entering the Naval
Academy felt women did not belong, 38% of seniors also felt
the same way.825 Early studies, at least, found that negative
attitudes toward women actually increased over time."
Polls of military personnel demonstrate a broad range
of views, varying with branch and combat arm. Across all
services, 69% of men in air combat units opposed allowing
women to enter those units.827  The Presidential
Commission's survey of all known retired generals and
admirals revealed that between 76% and 90% opposed the
assignment of women to the different combat specialties.828
Moreover, reported statistics may understate the opposition
of men to inclusion of women. Laura Miller found, for
example, that most of the men who favored opening combat
roles to women on the same terms as men did so only
because they believed that women would fail in these roles.
These men, whom Miller labeled "hostile proponents" of
women in combat, also believed that inclusion and ultimate
failure of women was the only way to obtain closure on the
issue.29
Many of the poll results reflect a kind of parochialism.
For example, more male Navy personnel believe that
women should continue to be excluded from submarines
(34%) than believe that they should be excluded from
infantry (22%), while more male Marines believe that
women should be excluded from infantry (71%) than believe
they should be excluded from submarines (52%).830
823. Peach, supra note 57, at 183.
824. See generally CHARLES MOSKOS & JOHN S. BuTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN
BE: BLACK LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY (1996).
825. See FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 187.
826. Lois B. DeFleur et al., Sex Integration of the U.S. Air Force Academy:
Changing Roles for Women, 4 AlmED FORCES & SOC'Y 607, 617-18 (1978); see
Robert F. Priest et al., The First Coed Class at West Point: Performance and
Attitudes, 10 YouTH & SOC. 205, 218 (1978).
827. PRESIDENTIAL COIiM'N, supra note 67, at 29.
828. Id. at 66.
829. Miller, supra note 646, at 43.
830. HARRELL & MLR, supra note 13, at 92.
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Similarly, while only 9% of Navy women believe that
infantry should continue to be closed to women, 27% believe
that submarines should remain closed."' Fifty-three percent
of female Marines believe that infantry should be closed,
but only 32% believe that submarines should be."2 The
more familiar individuals are with the combat duties of a
particular combat arm, it seems, the less inclined they are
to believe that women should participate. 3
Many military men who are favorably inclined toward
working with women in noncombat units nonetheless
believe that women should not serve in combat."4 Martin
Binkin of the Brookings Institution believes that men's
ambivalence toward women in the military is captured well
in the statements of a naval aviator quoted in the Los
Angeles Times:
The aviator said he "logically" felt "at ease" with women in the
military performing equal tasks-even combat missions-
alongside men. "But my gut tells me something else. There's this
all-encompassing sexual tension loose in society that is simply out
of place in some military settings." Putting women in positions
where they could be an amorous distraction to men, he said, "could
affect your concentration. It could affect a fellow pilot or the guy
who fixes your plane. It could kill you."8
5
One of the leading contributors to group cohesion is a
set of "common attitudes, values, and beliefs.""'
Traditionally, part of that shared value set has been the
bond of masculinity, which women simply cannot share
with men. Men who hold traditional values are most likely
to oppose the integration of women,83 7 and the attitudes of
831. Id.
832. Id.
833. For example, a Roper poll reported that 74% of military members
surveyed did not think women should serve in the infantry, 72% did not think
they should serve in the Marine infantry, 59% opposed women in tank crews,
and 54% opposed women in the artillery. Of military personnel who had
actually served in the ground-combat arms, 83% opposed women in the infantry
and in Marine infantry, 71% opposed women in armored units, and 64%
opposed women in artillery. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 67, at 26.
834. See id. at 29.
835. BINKm, supra note 295, at 43.
836. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 75; see also WATSON, supra note 295, at
116-17 (noting that psychological homogeneity within a squad is associated with
greater combat effectiveness).
837. See Hugh Smith & Ian McAllister, The Changing Military Profession:
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military men are more traditional than those of men in the
public at large.83
Even if a majority of men can be convinced that
inclusion of women is a good thing, that is not sufficient to
eliminate the problem. Morale is not something that is
decided by majority vote. If a bare majority thinks there is
not a morale problem, and a large minority thinks there is,
it is the minority that is right. In a study of the attitudes of
male pilots toward women as fighter pilots, Patricia Shields
and her colleagues acknowledged that "[mlale pilot
acceptance of women as fighter pilots is important if women
are to become members and leaders of effective fighter
squadrons."39 They then reported that the average score for
male pilots "indicates indecision, or at worst marginal
disagreement" about female integration.84 ° However, the
modal response of the men was "strongly disagree" with
integration.84' Large numbers of both "strongly disagree"
and "strongly agree" is not "neutrality"; it is substantial
opposition.
While the most obvious consequence of men's resistance
to women in combat is a disruption of unit cohesion and
reduction in combat effectiveness, more concrete effects
may result as well. During the Vietnam war, hundreds of
officers and NCOs fell victim to "fragging." In 1971 alone,
there were 333 confirmed incidents and another 158
possible ones. 2 An examination of the reasons for these
incidents suggests that similar forces may operate to create
substantial risk to women in the military.
Fraggings in Vietnam were of two basic types. A
minority (perhaps 20%) were individual actions taken on
Integrating Women in the Australian Defence Force, 27 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. SOCIOL.
369, 384 (1991); see also id. at 387-88 (reporting that "male attitudes in officer
training institutions are still far from accepting women as equals").
838. Juanita M. Firestone, Sex-Appropriate Roles: Comparing the Attitudes
of Civilian and Military Youth, 6 Pop. RES. & POL. REV. 275, 288 (1987); see
DeFleur et al, supra note 826, at 611.
839. Shields et al., supra note 425, at 21.
840. Id. at 32.
841. Id.
842. RICHARD A. GABRIEL & PAUL L. SAVAGE, CRISIS IN COimAND:
MISMANAGEMENT IN THE ARMY 43, 183 (1978). While "fragging" in the strictest
sense did not develop as a practice until the development of fragmentation
grenades, "military leaders have always been at risk, living as they must among
men used to violence in an atmosphere where life is cheap." HOLMES, supra note
60, at 320, 330.
2001] 215
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the basis of a private grudge by individuals who were
somewhat unstable. 3 However, an estimated 80% were
group affairs, falling into three primary categories.
According to Charles Moskos, probably the most common
variant was racially inspired, directed primarily by blacks
against white superiors perceived to be racist.' Next in
frequency were what Moskos terms "dope hassle" fraggings,
representing reprisal by drug users against overly vigorous
enforcers of rules against drug use. Finally, there were
fraggings in combat groups against NCOs or officers (and
even some enlisted men)8 who were seen as too "gung ho"
and as creating what was perceived to be excessive risk to
the men involved." Grievances leading to fragging included
interference with a man's date of return to the U.S.,
perceived inequities in rotating patrol responsibilities, and
even, odd as it may seem, requiring the men to take
malaria jlls and salt tablets and to wear flak jackets and
helmets. While fraggings are viewed by some as an
indicator of a breakdown in unit cohesion," an alternative
view is that they are a consequence of a "disarticulation"
between the norms of a still-cohesive primary group and
those of the greater military."'
The objections that many men have to women seem to
be the kind that predictably may lead to fragging. Two of
the most frequently heard complaints about women in the
military are that women obtain favored treatment from
superiors and that they are less combat capable and will
not pull their weight in combat thereby endangering the
lives of male soldiers. While outside the combat context
these kinds of perceptions may lead only to resentment, in a
combat situation, they may lead to deadly responses. In her
study of sexual harassment in the Army, Laura Miller
found that while only one group of men acknowledged that
they themselves would "rape the women if you send them
843. See Moskos, supra note 355, at 79.
844. See id. at 80.
845. See id.
846. See HOLMES, supra note 60, at 329.
847. Moskos, supra note 355, at 80.
848. CHARLES R. ANDERSON, THE GRUNTS 188 (1976). The flak jackets and
helmets were too hot, the malaria pills caused diarrhea, and the salt pills
caused nausea.
849. See Savage & Gabriel, supra note 373.
850. See Faris, supra note 356, at 460-61.
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out to the tanks and foxholes with us," many men predicted
that "other men" would harass, rape, and allow to be killed
women who entered infantry or armor units.85'
It seems predictable that the male impulse to protect
women.. will substantially weaken at the point at which
men perceive the women as endangering the men's own
lives. While men may be willing to risk their lives for what
they see as a good cause, it seems unlikely that many would
view "gender equity" to be a cause worth dying for.
Although one's first response from afar may be to dismiss
such actions as being disproportionate to the situation, a
man whose life is in immediate peril may have a different
view. As Charles Anderson observed, "[e]very soldier,
marine, sailor or airman who fragged a unit leader believed
at the time of the incident that he acted with more than
ample justification."85' Fraggings of women because they are
perceived as being a threat are no more justified than the
fraggings in Vietnam, but they are nonetheless predictable
outcomes.
When people display strong emotions about an issue
but seem unable to muster a logical intellectual defense of
their position, it is generally assumed that they do not have
a good reason for their beliefs and that they should
therefore change their minds. Sometimes this assumption is
warranted, but sometimes it is not. Western intellectuals
tend to believe that if a position cannot be defended
rationally then it necessarily should be abandoned. A
Cartesian separation of intellect and emotion places a
premium on the intellect. Yet emotional responses may be
as important and as central to our existence as intellectual
ones. As Lionel Tiger has observed, "behaviours
accompanied by strong 'emotion' are likely to reflect
situations which are very important to the survival of theanimal and which have been important for a long time
during its formative evolutionary history."854 When people
act on the basis of their feelings, they are not necessarily
acting irrationally, but rather acting on the basis of '"hat
is, or was, in their best biological interest."855
851. Miller, supra note 646, at 39.
852. See supra text accompanying notes 493-522.
853. ANDERSON, supra note 848, at 189.
854. TIGER, supra note 233, at 85.
855. VICTOR S. JOHNSTON, WHY WE FEEL: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN EMOTIONS
179 (1999).
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Sometimes we have good reasons for feeling something
that we cannot quite "put our finger on." For example, a
woman who experiences a visceral foreboding about a man
should probably not be encouraged to allow herself to be
alone with him even if she can identify no objective basis for
her fear. Women have evolved to be very sensitive to sexual
threats, 6 and should probably listen to their emotions in
such circumstances. Even if we were quite sure the woman
was wrong, the "wrongness" of her emotional response does
not mean that she is not experiencing it or that her
response will not get in the way of her trusting the man.
People's capacity to overcome emotional responses
based upon cognitive input is limited. Most people are
repelled by the sight of hideously deformed children, and
parents of such children have tremendous difficulty bonding
with them."' Nonetheless, they surely know on a cognitive
level that these children are as morally deserving of love as
any other child and probably even more in need of it. Yet
the revulsion the parents feel is a natural product of our
evolutionary history-after all, parents inclined to devote
substantial resources to unreproductive offspring would
have been at a selective disadvantage relative to parents
who invested more strategically.858 Educating parents to
this fact may help them, but probably because it will
assuage their feelings of guilt rather than because it will
cause them to have the same kind of feelings for their
deformed child that they would have for their normal
children.
If men's emotional response to women in combat is in
fact a product of men's innate psychology, those who
attempt to "educate" men that women are their equals in
combat may be no more successful in altering their feelings
than those who would encourage parents of deformed
children to believe that they are beautiful. Attempts to alter
856. See Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment, supra
note 4, at 26.
857. Indeed, deformed children throughout the world are at a substantially
elevated risk of infanticide. See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law:
An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1201-05
(1997).
858. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HISTORY OF MOTHERS,
INFANTS, AND NATURAL SELECTION 457-60 (1999); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson,
Discriminative Parental Solicitude: A Biological Perspective, 42 J. MARRIAGE &
FAA. 277, 278 (1980).
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behavior, rather than the underlying emotions, are often
more successful. Parents can be deterred from abusing and
neglecting their children, and male soldiers can be deterred
from harassing their female colleagues. But the underlying
emotions, in both the parental and the combat context, are
important, for the mere absence of abuse or neglect of a
child is not enough to make it feel loved, and the mere
absence of harassment is not enough to make a combat unit
cohesive.
B. Resistance to Women in the Military Has a Different
Basis From Resistance to Women in the Civilian
Professions
Some see in the arguments about women in the military
shades of arguments concerning women in the professions.
After all, it was sometimes said that women should not be
lawyers because they are insufficiently aggressive to be
litigators, and that including women in law partnerships
could disrupt the relationship among lawyers. The military
is just the latest, and perhaps the last, example of such
specious reasoning, the argument goes, which is based upon
men's desire to keep the "good jobs" for themselves.
However, the fact that there was little basis for exclusion of
women from the professions does not imply a similar lack of
basis for keeping them out of certain positions in the
military.
In contrast to the extensive empirical basis for concern
about full inclusion of women in the military, there was in
fact little empirical basis for their exclusion from the legal
profession."9 While it is true that women are less aggressive
than men, on average, aggressiveness is not a requirement
for all lawyers, or even for all litigators for that matter.
Moreover, the practice of law does not require physical
aggressiveness, for which the greatest sex differences exist,
and despite the fact that law is a very verbally oriented
profession, female verbal facility was given no weight in the
decision whether to allow them to practice law. Finally,
under modern doctrines, even the fact-if it were a fact-
that men, on average, make better lawyers would not
859. One should also bear in mind that women's exclusion from the
professions was to a large extent simply a part of women's exclusion from most
segments of the work force.
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justify exclusion of all women. If an employer wants
aggressive lawyers, it cannot use sex as a proxy for
aggressiveness. Other indicia, such as force of personality
displayed in an interview, are probably far better measures
of verbal aggressiveness than is sex. In short, a non-
frivolous argument that sex is a "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ)860 for the position of lawyer is hard to
construct.
The experience of women in the practice of law bears
out the judgment that women belong in the practice of law.
It is not necessary to produce a patronizing listing of able
female lawyers; a more compelling measure is the
statistical progress of women in the profession. In 1972,
women constituted 3.8% of all lawyers and judges.86' In
1995, the figure was 26.2%,8"2 and women now constitute
approximately 46% of new lawyers. 63 For the most part
these extraordinary gains have been achieved without any
kind of "thumb on the scales." Although many complain
that women do not reach the highest levels in the legal
profession (large-firm partners, general counsels) in
accordance with their numbers, the overall reception of
women in the legal profession has been quite welcoming.8"
That women belong in the legal profession, the medical
profession, business, and almost every other occupation is
completely settled. It is not just settled for now as a matter
of policy; it is simply not a subject that people seriously
debate.
Why is the military different? First, any fair-minded
person must at least acknowledge that the arguments for
excluding women from at least some military positions are
860. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
861. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
389 (103rd ed. 1982-1983).
862. THE AMERICAN ALMANAC: STATiSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
405 (116th ed. 1996-1997).
863. In 1998, women earned approximately 46% of the J.D. degrees awarded
in the U.S. ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar,
Miscellaneous Statistics, Professional Degrees Conferred, 1998, available at
http://abanet.org/legaled/miscstats.htm.
864. The fact that women do not achieve the highest levels in proportion to
their representation at lower levels is a general feature of the labor market and
not specific to the legal profession. For an evolutionary explanation of the "glass
ceiling" phenomenon, see BROWNE, DIVIDED LABOURS, supra note 4; Browne, An
Evolutionary Account, supra note 4; Browne, Sex and Temperament, supra note
4.
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stronger than the arguments for excluding them from the
aforementioned professions, even if the arguments are
deemed ultimately unconvincing. The link between "male"
traits and performance is tighter, many of the traits are
harder to measure in advance, the potential for disruption
of functioning of the organization simply by inclusion of
women no matter what their individual characteristics is
greater, and the consequences of being wrong are more
severe. In other words, no one would bring dishonor upon
himself by arguing that sex is a BFOQ for the position of
combat soldier, even under strict current doctrine.865
But what of the argument that the combat exclusion
reflects a desire of men to keep the "good jobs" for
themselves?866 According to the National Organization for
Women, for example, "the exclusion of women from combat
in the modern military is a fraud only to perpetuate a
second class status of women in the military.""8 Others
have argued that the combat exclusion is a product of male
collusion designed to "protect[ ] the common economic and
status interests of military men.'"6
The argument is implausible for a number of reasons.
The common assertion that men as a class are motivated to
unite against women as a class ignores the fact that most
competition (among both men and women) is against
members of their own sex.69 While it is perfectly
understandable that male candidates for aviation positions
might resent competition from female candidates for purely
selfish reasons, self-interest does not explain why their
instructors, who are not in competition with the women,
would also judge women lacking.
Self-interest also does not explain why Congress and
the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense have
865. Reference to the BFOQ standard is for illustrative purposes only, as
Title VII does not apply to the military.
866. See, e.g., Benecke & Dodge, supra note 782, at 232-33; see also
FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 23 (asserting that "the combat exclusion laws were
designed to perpetuate an all-male preserve and career advantages").
867. National Organization for Women, National Board Policy: Women in
the Military, at http://www.now.org/issues/military/policies/wim.html; see also
Kornblum, supra note 10, at 360-61 (stating that "[t]he combat exclusion exists
as an exclusion simply for the sake of excluding").
868. Benecke & Dodge, supra note 782, at 232.
869. David M. Buss, Sexual Conflict: Evolutionary Insights into Feminism
and the "Battle of the Sexes," in DAvm M. Buss & NEIL M. MALAMUTH, SEX,
POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 296, 309 (1996).
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been willing accomplices to the subjugation of military
women all these years. Why was a Congress that was
willing to eliminate "male privilege" through the Equal Pay
Act,87 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 Title IX of
the Educational Amendments of 1972,72 the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,7 the Violence Against Women Act,"4 and a
whole host of other laws intended to benefit women, so
determined to stand up for male interests by retaining the
combat exclusion for so many years? Is it because
congressmen believe that service in the military is more
important to the maintenance of male privilege than, say,
the right to vote or the right to employment throughout the
civilian economy? In retaining the exclusion for "direct
ground combat" but permitting the opening up of shipboard
and aviation positions were policymakers motivated by a
belief in the superiority of the job of infantry rifleman over
the job of F/A-18 pilot or aircraft-carrier commander? It
seems unlikely.
It is not clear, in fact, that it is men and not women who
are seeking "the good jobs." Many of the men who served in
Vietnam, for example, may not have thought that their job
was so good. Indeed, many of the 58,000 men who died
there probably would have been willing to let a woman take
their place. The fact is that women were not much
interested in the "good job" of combat service until the draft
was abolished and the grubby memories of Vietnam had
been replaced by the afterglow of our clean and relatively
bloodless (for our side) victory in the Gulf War and until the
military began trying to make itself attractive in civilian
terms. Even now, most of the clamoring is not to get women
into the infantry. After all, when the killing starts, a
disproportionate number of infantrymen die.78 Rather,
pressure to include women in combat has focused primarily
on high-prestige jobs such as aviation-truly the "good
870. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1998).
871. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
872. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
873. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
874. See supra note 521.
875. See ELLIS, supra note 69, at 158 (noting that in World War II, the
infantry was 10% of the Army's strength and 70% of its battle casualties);
DuNNIGAN & NOFI, supra note 39, at 3 (noting that in Vietnam, almost one-third
of combat deaths were in the infantry rifleman MOS alone).
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jobs." Yet far more women would benefit by opening up the
infantry, given that there are far more infantry positions
than aviation positions. There is, however, little push to get
women into such pedestrian positions. 76
Most of the civilian occupations in which women have
had the greatest difficulty finding acceptance have certain
traits in common with the military. Contrary to those who
think that male resistance is a method of maintaining a
male monopoly over high-prestige jobs, the common traits
do not relate to status, but rather to physical danger.
Policemen, for example, like men in the military, have
been reluctant to work with women. Numerous studies
have found that female police officers are effective, and in
some contexts-notably defusing potentially violent
domestic situations-more effective than men. 7
Nonetheless, male police officers still hold strongly negative
attitudes toward female officers on patrol.87 Indeed, a study
of the Los Angeles Police Department found that men's
attitudes toward policewomen became somewhat more
negative after they worked together.79 The reason for these
persistent negative views is that the male officers simply do
not feel they can depend on women in those relatively
infrequent circumstances when confrontations turn
violent."0
The answer to the question why women have achieved
such widespread acceptance in high-status professions such
as law and medicine is in large part that these occupations
are physically safe. In positions involving physical danger,
876. A recent GAO study found that while sixty-two women Marines were
pilots or flight officers, no women occupied the position of explosive ordnance
disposal officer. GAO, TRENDS IN OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, supra note 15, at
16.
877. See Joseph Balkin, Why Policemen Don't Like Policewomen, 16 J.
POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 29, 30-33 (1988).
878. See id. at 33.
879. See id; cf Jane M. Craig & Rick R. Jacobs, The Effect of Working with
Women on Male Attitudes Toward Female Leadership, 6 BAsic & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 61 (1985).
880. See SUSAN E. MARTIN, BREAKING AND ENTERING: POLICEWOIEN ON
PATROL 90-96 (1980); see also Balkin, supra note 877, at 34. Balkin argues that
the attitudes of policemen are so entrenched that it is unlikely that they will
change. Instead, he says, change will come only with new generations of
policemen who come to the job "without the kind of psychological baggage that
most of them have now." Id. at 36. He apparently believes that current
policemen hold the views they do because of their parents and that modem
parents will not create that "baggage." He may have reason for disappointment.
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men are reluctant to trust their female colleagues. This
explanation may not resonate with many who have not
worked in dangerous occupations, which may be why sexual
integration in the military made such great strides once the
top civilian leadership consisted of men and women-the
President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and
Director of Central Intelligence-who had not themselves
served in the military.88' It may also partially explain the
fact that junior officers-who are more likely to be exposed
to danger-view sexual integration more negatively than
many more senior officers.8 2
C. Sex Distinctions Resemble Age Distinctions More Closely
than They Do Race Distinctions
Advocates of full integration of women into combat
units frequently argue that men's resistance to women is no
different from the resistance of whites to inclusion of blacks
in the military and no more worthy of accommodation.8"
For reasons set forth below, however, the comparison is less
than compelling.
The fact that some of the arguments raised against
inclusion of women in combat units are similar to those
raised by opponents of racial integration does not mean
that the two sets of arguments are logically or morally
equivalent, for the simple reason that sex and race are
different sorts of classifications. It is true that cohesion can
be impaired by any kind of diversity, since homogeneous
groups tend to be more cohesive, particularly groups that
are homogeneous in attitudes, values, and beliefs.884 Conflict
will often result in the absence of such similarity,
particularly if the group is held together by outside
authority.8 5 Thus, racially homogeneous groups, like
sexually homogeneous ones, tend to be more cohesive than
heterogeneous ones.
881. See GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 119.
882. See supra text accompanying note 539.
883. See Kornblum, supra note 10, at 427 (observing that the argument that
men will not follow women leaders is similar to the argument that white
soldiers would not follow black leaders and arguing "the military should not
deny leadership positions to qualified women to accommodate male prejudices");
see also Karst, supra note 10.
884. George, supra note 343, at 303; HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 75.
885. HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 75.
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Because of this similarity, some people see in the
opposition to women in combat echoes of the same forces
that kept blacks out of the military or in segregated units.
But there are important differences between race and sex.
While race, like sex, has a biological component, much of
the perceived difference between blacks and whites is based
upon the social construction we place on race.8 6 But
arguments of some feminists to the contrary
notwithstanding,8 7 sex differences and sexual interactions
are not just social constructions. Heterosexual men and
women can be taught in appropriate circumstances not to
categorize on the basis of race but they cannot be taught to
be indifferent to the sex of their sexual partners or of others
with whom they interact. Sex is simply relevant in a way
that race is not.888 Thus, it is wrong to conclude that the
challenges presented by introduction of women into combat
units are no different from those presented by the racial
integration of the military.8 9
One might ask why sexual integration has been so
886. The suspicion, if not animus, that members of one racial group have
toward other groups appears itself to have a biological basis in the tendency of
people to categorize individuals as "us" versus "them." See generally VERNON
REYNOLDS ET AL., THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM: EVOLUTIONARY
DIMENSIONS OF XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION, RACISM & NATIONALISM (1986).
887. Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple
Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
95, 129 (1992).
888. Many years ago there was an advertisement with a message of racial
tolerance that showed a picture of a black man and asked the reader what he
saw. The "correct" answer was "a man," rather than "a black man." That is, the
aspiration was that people would not even notice the man's race. Carrying the
race/sex comparison to its logical conclusion, the "correct" answer would be "a
person" rather than "a man," but few people would take that next step.
889. See Charles C. Moskos, Women in the Military, 22 ARIED FORCES &
SOc'Y 316, 316-17 (1995-1996) (reviewing SANDRA CARSON STANLEY, WOMEN IN
THE MILITARY (1993)) (noting that racial integration has long been established
in the military and that the principle of racial equality in the military is
"nondebatable," while the role of women in the military "is still fraught with
ambiguity and promises to continue to be so for some time to come"). Moskos
has also noted:
The main argument for the integration of women in the armed
forces must be the same as it was for blacks: Does it make for a
more effective military? The bottom line is that blacks and whites
are essentially interchangeable soldiers. But when physical
differences and privacy concerns matter-and they do-men and
women are not.
Moskos, supra note 84.
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much more difficult than racial integration. The military
has been far ahead of civilian society with respect to racial
integration,89 ' but it lags far behind it in acceptance of
women. The acceptance of racial integration is all the more
remarkable considering the fact that military personnel
tend to be socially conservative and drawn
disproportionately from southern states.
The combat exclusion for women resembles less the
discrimination against blacks in the military than it does
the exclusion of older people. The exclusion of blacks was
based largely on prejudice against a group that did not
differ biologically from the non-excluded groups in any
militarily relevant way. The exclusion of women, like the
exclusion of older people, is based (at least in large part) on
group generalizations that are based not just on societal
attitudes but on biological fact.
Why is it that the military will refuse to allow a 36-
year-old man to enlist, even if he is strong, healthy, and
possesses skills that the military wants? There are, after
all, many 36-year-old men who are stronger, smarter, and
more disciplined and aggressive than many of today's soft
and undisciplined nineteen-year-olds, 9' whom the military
is eager to have. John Keegan provides the following
explanation:
Battle is also to the young. Its physical ordeals--discomfort, loss of
sleep, hunger, thirst, burdens-are not only better borne by men
under thirty; so too are its terrors, its anxieties, its separations, its
bereavements. And young men are also moved more deeply than
older men by the moral consolations with which battle
compensates the soldier-it would be foolish to deny that there are
compensations-for its cruelties: the thrill of comradeship, the
excitements of the chase, the exhilaration of surprise, deception
and the ruse de guerre, the exaltations of success, the sheer fun of. .. .. 892
prankish irresponsibility.
Keegan's view that battle is for the young is shared by
most, though not all observers. In 1940, William 0. ('Wild
890. See generally MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 824.
891. See Rick Maze, Survey: Recruits Aren't Tough Anymore/Quality Down,
Say 65% of Navy People Polled, NAVY TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1999, at 8 (reporting survey
results indicating that although current recruits are as smart as, or smarter
than, recruits of five years ago, they are less disciplined, less physically fit,
more rebellious, and less able to adjust to military life and teamwork).
892. KEEGAN, supra note 318, at 325.
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Bill") Donovan, later head of the OSS, suggested in the
pamphlet Should Men of Fifty Fight Our Wars? that
because the soldier of 1940 "rides to war on wheels," older
men could fight the coming war, sparing the young.893
Commenting upon that suggestion, Paul Fussell wrote:
"Had time softened his memory of the way ground combat
works, the way men will attack only if young, athletic,
credulous, and sustained by some equivalent of the buddy
system-that is, fear of shame?";9
4
A willingness to take risks is essential to most combat
positions. As historian Steven Ambrose noted about P-47
Thunderbolt pilots in World War II, they "were daredevil
youngsters, some of them only nineteen years of age (it was
generally felt that by the time he reached his mid-twenties,
a man was too sensible to take the chances routinely
required of a P-47 pilot)." 95 When the German manpower
shortage was acute, Ambrose notes, German replacements
were either "frightfully young or alarmingly old."96 Not
surprisingly, the two groups did not respond the same way
to combat: "The old men looked for the best chance to
surrender. The boys looked for a fight."97
The biological basis for the lesser aggressiveness and
risk-taking of females compared with males may be similar
to the biological basis for the lesser aggressiveness of older
males compared with younger males. For example, the
lower testosterone levels of older males is believed to have a
causal relationship with their lower levels of risk-taking.8 98
In sum, the military's sex discrimination has much
more in common with its age discrimination-which most
people do not find morally problematic-than it does with
racial discrimination. While debating points may be scored
by equating racial and sexual distinctions, such arguments
do not advance the goals of reasoned argument.
893. FUSSELL, supra note 85, at 3-4.
894. Id. at 4.
895. AMIBROSE, supra note 70, at 80; see also DUNNIGAN & NOFI, supra note
39, at 116 (describing the "gutsy" young warrant officer helicopter pilots who
"turned out to be a lot more fearless than the older.., breed of Army helicopter
pilots").
896. AMBROSE, supra note 70, at 410.
897. Id.
898. Gove, supra note 158, at 133-35.
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D. Are Sex-Segregated Units the Answer?
If the phenomena described in this paper are in fact
relatively intractable aspects of human psychology, a
number of policy responses are possible. One could decide
that any negative impact on military effectiveness is offset
by other benefits, such as equality for women, and proceed
with full integration. However, assuming that military
effectiveness is the touchstone, which is the publicly stated
position of both the government and most advocates of
allowing women to serve in combat, there are at least two
potential policy responses: women could be allowed to serve
in combat but in sexually segregated units,899 or they could
simply be barred altogether from combat positions and
perhaps other positions as well.
Service in sexually segregated units would eliminate a
number of the problems related to group cohesion. Such a
course may reduce the sexual jealousy and frustration that
results from inclusion of women within the group, as well
as the negative emotional response from men to their
inclusion. The Soviet Union used female troops during
World War II who, for the most part, fought in all-female
units.
900
There are a number of problems with sex-segregated
units.9 ' The first requirement is to identify an appropriate
organizational level for segregation that would minimize
the problems of sexual integration without at the same time
creating other problems. In the Army, for example, is the
appropriate level the squad, platoon, company, battalion,
regiment, brigade, or division? Sex-segregated squads
within a platoon would not avoid many of the problems of
sexual integration, nor would sex-segregated platoons
within companies. There would still be issues of sexual
frustration and jealousy, as well as male resistance to
inclusion of women. Because companies within a battalion
often fight side-by-side, issues about male protectiveness
899. See Fukuyama, supra note 810, at 37-38 (advocating single-sex combat
units); DINTER, supra note 75, at 45 (arguing that "[ilf women must be allowed
into the armed forces, then they should be organized as a separate unit").
900. After World War II, the Soviet Union returned to its practice of barring
women from combat. PRESIDENTIAL Co i'N, supra note 67, at 26, 66.
901. The discussion here concerns operational units. There is an additional
question whether, even if combat units are sexually integrated, basic training
should be integrated. See supra text accompanying notes 692-714.
228 [Vol. 49
WOMEN AT WAR
toward women would still continue even at that level. Thus,
it would seem that the segregation would have to occur at a
higher organizational level.
But is it realistic to envision all-female brigades or
divisions? It would create logistical problems but perhaps
no greater than the problems created by units formerly
made up of Nisei or blacks. A further question, though, is
whether one could find large numbers of women willing to
engage in combat without being surrounded by large
numbers of men 0 Moreover, large all-female units would
tend to magnify individual sex differences. That is, in a
mixed-sex group the fact that 10% of the unit is female and
women are, on average, less aggressive, less willing to kill,
more risk-averse, and so forth, may get swamped by the
large numbers of men. However, if 100% of the unit is
female, these average sex differences could become quite
critical to unit effectiveness.
Sex-segregated units may not substantially mitigate
other problems with women in combat. Perhaps most to the
point is the effect that they would have on the notion of the
"manliness" of combat. To the extent that the warrior role is
separated from their identity as a man, men's motivations
to expose themselves to deadly fire may be substantially
diminished. This diminution in attractiveness of the
military may result whether women engage in combat in
segregated or integrated units."3 Sex-segregated units
would also not mitigate the problem of female prisoners of
war, since the enemy would generally hold prisoners from
multiple units.
Finally, there is reason to doubt that all-female groups
would exhibit the same kind of cohesion that men's groups
exhibit. Women tend not to be as good as men at working
with people they do not like. They tend to take
disagreements personally and hold grudges more than men
do.9" This pattern appears to begin in childhood, when boys
are better able both to compete against friends and
902. Leora Rosen et al., Cohesion and Readiness in Gender-Integrated
Combat Service Support Units: The Impact of Acceptance of Women and Gender
Ratio, 22 ARIED FORCES & Soc'y 537, 550 (1996) (finding that female soldiers
were less likely than male soldiers to want to work with women).
903. See supra text accompanying notes 745-86.
904. HELEN FISHER, THE FIRST SEX: THE NATURAL TALENTS OF WOMEN AND
How THEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 43-44 (1999).
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cooperate against teammates whom they do not like."5 One
well-known study found that girls' games seldom survived a
quarrel over application of the rules.0 6 For many reasons,
therefore, all-female units simply do not appear to be a
practical option.
IX. How Do WE DEAL WITH THE INEVITABLE UNCERTAINTY
A. The Difficulty of Empirical Testing
In theory, the question of women's combat performance
is an empirical one that could be answered by placement of
women into combat units, either sexually integrated or all-
female units, and observing their performance. However,
reliable data would be difficult to obtain. First, of course, we
would need a war. Laboratory investigations are not
possible because no combat simulation can replicate actual
combat; the most realistic field exercise is still an exercise
and everyone knows it. The following observation by S.L.A.
Marshall applies to laboratory experiments as well as to
training:
[Field maneuvers] cannot ever approximate the conditions of
[combat]. Fears of varying sort afflict the soldier in battle. The
unit commander soon comes to realize that one of his difficulties is
to get men to leave cover because of enemy bullets and the fear
they instill. In training, there being no real bullet danger even on
the courses which employ live ammunition, every advance under a
supposed enemy fire is unrealistic. Too, in training, the soldier
does not have a man as his target. He is not shooting with the idea
of killing. There is a third vast difference in the two conditions:
The rifleman in training is usually under close observation and the
chief pressure upon him is to give satisfaction to his superior,
whereas the rifleman engaging the enemy is of necessity pretty
much on his own and the chief pressure upon him is to remain
alive, if possible.
9 7
Even if we had a war, it is not trivial to compare
905. Janet Lever, Sex Differences in the Games Children Play, 23 Soc.
PROBs. 478, 485 (1976).
906. Id. at 483.
907. MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 70; see also MOSKOS, supra note 285, at
140 (noting that "[iut is only in the context of the immediate combat situation
that one can appreciate the nature of the primary-group processes developed in
combat squads").
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performance of different individuals and different units.
"Given the ambiguities involved with defining-much less
measuring-cohesion,"9 8 even limited experience with
women in combat would provide little basis for confident
conclusions. Each unit in combat faces different
circumstances. Thus, in comparing units, there would
always be sufficient ambiguity that any conclusion could be
supported. If all-female units suffered high casualties, one
side would argue that it was because they were given more
difficult missions, while the other side would argue that it
was because they were less combat effective. If all-female
units suffered lower casualties, the arguments would
simply reverse. In short, female combat performance would
have to be either spectacularly great or catastrophic in
order to reach even tentative conclusions in a reasonably
short time.
There are a few empirical studies of performance of
integrated non-combat units. Most of these studies find no
impairment,9 9 while others report some, but relatively
little, impairment.90 A study by Leora Rosen and her
colleagues based on 1988 data found a significant negative
correlation between the percentage of women in a group
and horizontal cohesion of male junior enlisted men,' but a
1995 study disclosed no such correlation.912 A review study
of five separate studies-three on deployments in the
Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti, in addition to two
garrison studies-also conducted by Rosen and colleagues,
found a negative correlation between percentage of women
in the unit and horizontal cohesion in four of the five
studies. They concluded that "overall patterns indicate a
consistent negative relationship" between the percentage of
women and unit cohesion. 93 In the deployment studies, the
908. BINKIN, supra note 295, at 38.
909. Walter R. Schumm et al., Gender Trends in the U.S. Army and a
Discussion of Implications for Readiness and Retention, 74 PSYCHOL. REP. 499
(1994) (discussing studies).
910. See, e.g., id. at 506 (finding that overall unit readiness was lower in
units with more females); HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 99 (finding that
"gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness,
cohesion, and morale in the units we studied").
911. Rosen et al., supra note 902.
912. Leora N. Rosen & Lee Martin, Sexual Harassment, Cohesion, and
Readiness in U.S. Army Support Units, 24 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 221 (1997).
913. Leora N. Rosen et al., Gender Composition and Group Cohesion in U.S.
Army Units: A Comparison Across Five Studies, 25 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 365,
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strength of the negative impact of women appeared to
correlate with the extent of physical danger. The negative
effect was most pronounced in Somalia, where the risk of
being shot at was greatest; only moderate in the Persian
Gulf, where the risk was somewhat less, and neutral to
mildly positive in Haiti, where the risk was virtually nil.9"'
There was no organized effort by the military to
evaluate the performance of women (or men) during the
Gulf War, so any conclusion must "rest mostly on anecdotal
information provided by military sources or obtained
through observation and interviews."915 A GAO study of the
performance of women in the Gulf War noted that
comments in focus groups were "notably positive,"9"6 not
surprising, perhaps, in an environment where expressing
negative feelings about women can be career-threatening if
not terminating.917 However, although majorities of men's
and women's focus group comments were positive, there
was still a sizeable minority who expressed the view that
women did not perform as well as men.9"8  Many
participants, especially men, believed that women's relative
lack of strength negatively affected the mission and that
men had to work harder because of women's limitations.9 9
Stephanie Gutmann reports that in the Gulf War, "[mien in
many units took over tearing down tents or loading boxes
because most of the women simply couldn't or wouldn't do
these chores as fast."920
A recent study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies reported similar conclusions about
the effects of sexual integration.92' It found "significant
perception problems" about the job performance of female
377 (1999).
914. Id. at 381-82.
915. BINEIN, supra note 295, at 19.
916. See GAO, DEPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, supra note 504.
917. Laura Miller found in her study of attitudes of Army personnel that
many men would initially recite the "party line" about the success of
integration. Only when pressed would "their true feelings burst forth." Miller,
supra note 646, at 48. Other men would say nothing in mixed-sex groups, but
when asked to stay after the group was dismissed, they would indicate that
they did not feel free to state their true opinions publicly, especially in the
presence of female officers.
918. GAO, DEPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, supra note 504, at 22.
919. Id.
920. GUTMANN, supra note 76, at 15.
921. See CSIS, supra note 541.
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personnel, and it expressed "surprise" that a significant
percentage of women were skeptical about the performance
of female service personnel. The study also reported that
focus group discussions revealed more concern about female
job performance and the impact of sexual integration on
unit cohesion than many studies in the past had
suggested. 2
Political considerations make it very difficult to obtain
reliable information from the military concerning the
performance of women. Thus, it is not clear that one could
even trust the military's assessment or, put another way,
that the military would reveal its true assessment. A case
in point involves the death of Kara Hultgreen, an F-14 pilot
who was killed in an abortive carrier landing.9 23 While the
Navy publicly maintained that Lieutenant Hultgreen was
an above-average pilot whose death was attributable to
mechanical failure, confidential investigative reports
indicated that the cause of the crash was pilot error and
that she had had serious problems in training and had been
given more chances than men usually receive.9"
An apparently similar situation occurred during the
Panama invasion. CBS News reported that two female
truck drivers had been accused of cowardice in the face of
the enemy for refusing, in tears, to drive some troops to the
scene of fighting.925 After the news report, the Army
commenced an investigation. Two days into the
investigation, and several days before it was completed, the
Army public affairs office announced that the women had
acted appropriately. According to Army spokesmen, the two
women were "exhausted" after driving under fire for nine
hours and had asked to be relieved because they feared they
might endanger the lives of their passengers.9 26 However,
according to officers of the infantry battalion, the women
922. Id.
923. Tony Perry, Crash Kills First Female F-14 Combat Pilot, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1994, at Al.
924. M TCHELL, supra note 6, at 288-302; see also Becky Garrison, Internal
Report Confirms Hultgreen's Error, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 3; Becky
Garrison, Female Aviator's Flying in Question: Squadronmate of Hultgreen
Subject of Investigation Aboard Carrier, NAVY TIMES, July 3, 1995, at 10;
Blazar, supra note 572.
925. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 197.
926. Id.
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had not been driving under fire for nine hours."7 They had
briefly come under fire in the first hour of the invasion and
had spent the next eight hours waiting for their next
mission, at one point having to be rousted out of their
barracks and made to stay with their trucks.9" According to
Brian Mitchell:
Only after they were told where they would be driving did one of
the women object. When she began to cry, the second woman said
she didn't want to go, either. The men at the scene had no doubt
but that the women were afraid, not tired.... [When they broke
down in tears, the NCO replaced them with male drivers.
Nonetheless, according to an Army official, these two
women "performed superbly."93
If the Army views the actions of these two drivers as
praiseworthy, one must fear for the performance of the
Army the next time it engages in sustained combat.
Whereas during the breakout from Normandy in August
and September 1944, drivers of the "Red Ball Express" were
on the road twenty hours a day moving fuel, food, and
ammunition to the ever-eastward-shifting front lines,931
today the Army apparently thinks that a full shift is eight
or nine hours, much of it spent in barracks.
The services have all but announced that they will not
release information that they believe might reflect
negatively on women's service. For example, Sara Lister,
then-Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, stated that the Army does not publicly
discuss strength and pregnancy issues because "those
subjects quickly became fodder for conservatives seeking to
limit women's role in the Army.
932
927. Id. at 198.
928. Id.
929. Id.
930. Id. at 197. This incident unwittingly reveals the low esteem in which
the military actually holds women. As William Ian Miller has pointed out, it
will not be the award of Medals of Honor to women that shows that women
have become "official players at aggressive combat courage," because it will be
suspected that the medals were awarded on the basis of sex. Instead, Miller
argues, "[wle will know women have made it when it is fully believed that they
can be subject to a court martial for cowardly conduct." MILLER, supra note 269,
at 252.
931. AMBROSE, supra note 70, at 113.
932. Richard J. Newman, Army Sex Ed 101: Lessons from Racial Integration
Could Ease Gender Wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 11, 1997.
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It is this pattern that makes it hard to place a great
deal of weight on laudatory statements from military
authorities, such as the statement of the executive officer of
the U.S.S. Eisenhower who, after returning from six months
at sea, told Time magazine that the mission was a
"resounding success" and that the ship performed "as well
as if not better than before women were aboard."933 The
statement may in fact be true, and one would like to say
that the fact that it was made by an officer in the United
States Navy-with its core values of honor, courage, and
commitment-is strong evidence that it was indeed true.
Unfortunately, when the subject is women in the military,
one simply cannot rely on military honor.
Experimentation with women in combat also raises
substantial ethical issues. If military and civilian leaders
have substantial doubts about whether women will be as
effective as men but nonetheless experiment with
integration for political purposes, they are jeopardizing the
lives not only of the women involved but also the lives of
others who depend upon the performance of the
experimental unit. Just as it would be unethical for doctors
to try out a new procedure that they think would probably
produce worse results (and certainly not better results) for
the patient but higher incomes for themselves, it may
likewise be unethical for military leaders to experiment
with integration if they believe that it is unlikely to produce
combat effectiveness equal to all-male groups. This is
especially true if their actions are motivated by a selfish
desire to curry favor with their military or civilian
superiors. So, the question is: what are the expected combat
consequences of including women in infantry squads, tank
crews, helicopter companies, aircraft carrier or submarine
crews, and fighter squadrons? Military commanders whose
attitude is "I have my doubts, but let's try it" are not doing
their duty.
The necessity of relying on what might be not much
more than "educated guesses" presents the risk that
conclusions-either in favor of or against women in
combat-will be made on the basis of unfounded belief
rather than on logic. But despite the uncertainty, some
action is required, and it must be pointed out that, with
respect to military effectiveness, the uncertainty is largely
933. Peach, supra note 57, at 166.
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one-sided. The question is whether integration of women
into combat units would diminish military effectiveness.
Although politicians sometimes express sentiments to the
contrary,"' few seriously argue that expanding the role of
women in combat would enhance combat performance." 5
Some may argue that we do not need to conduct
"experiments," since there is already evidence from other
cultures. Thus, the fact that women have occasionally been
active in warfare at various times in the past in various
cultures is sometimes invoked as proof that the exclusion of
women from warfare in most cultures is simply arbitrary.
Historical reports are indeed plentiful of women who have
been active in warfare: Joan of Arc, the "king's wives" of
Dahomey, women who served in the Soviet Army during
World War II, women in many wars who have dressed up
like men and served in armies throughout the world, and
women who have fought with insurgent groups such as the
Viet Cong and the Sandinistas."6 Such examples led
anthropologist David Jones to the extravagant conclusion
that "[history ... demonstrates that the warrior's mantle is
a woman's birthright as surely as it is a man's."937 If Jones's
conclusion is a bit overdrawn, it is nonetheless probably fair
934. For example, after the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
announced that "women have made a major contribution to this effort," which
was certainly a true statement. CNN Newsmaker, Transcript #50, available in
Lexis News Library. However, his next statement-"we could not have won
without them'---is surely false. Our national security would have to be fragile
indeed if the margin of victory in the Gulf was so slight that the 6.8% of our
forces in the Gulf that were women-noncombatants at that-made the
difference between victory and defeat. (And, of course, if the women had not
been there, there would have been plenty of men who could have taken their
place.). See also David Stout, Cohen Upholds Mixed Training in the Military,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1998, at A16 (quoting Secretary of Defense Cohen as
saying: "We cannot run a military without women"); 137 CONG. REc. S11432
(daily ed. July 31, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Leahy) (asserting that "[tihe recent
victory against Saddam Hussein could not have been possible without women
who served courageously in the Persian Gulf').
935. But see Miriam Cooke, Subverting the Gender and Military Paradigms,
in IT'S OUR M _IITARY, Too!: WOMEN AND THE U.S. MImrARY, supra note 57, at
235, 256 (asserting that "some [unspecified people] fear that increasing the
number of women in the armed forces may strengthen the military and perhaps
make the country readier to go to war"); PEACH, supra note 57, at 174 (arguing
that excluding women from combat assignments "prevents maximum use of the
talents and capabilities of all members of the military, thereby reducing
effectiveness and decreasing national security").
936. See supra note 266.
937. JONES, supra note 266, at xiii (emphasis added).
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to say that some women at some times have shown
themselves to be capable soldiers and warriors. What are
the implications of this fact for the question whether
women should serve in combat positions in the United
States military?
That individual women have hidden their sex and
performed competently should be no surprise. Combat-
related skills and interests differ substantially on average
between the sexes, but no one would argue that there is no
overlap-i.e., that the least able man is a better warrior
than the most able woman. Some women are very strong
and very brave, and some of these women have proved it by
acting as men. The fact that they disguised their
womanhood means that whatever concerns about cohesion
that might exist through inclusion of women in the group
simply do not materialize because no one knows that they
are women.
Large-scale inclusion of women in combat organizations
is also not unknown. For example, in the West African
kingdom of Dahomey in the 19th Century, all-female
units-theoretically all virgins and known as "the King's
wives"-were reputed to be fierce fighters, by some
accounts fiercer than the male soldiers. 8 Similarly, during
World War II, perhaps a half-million Soviet women served
in combat roles, mostly in all-female units.939 As one
historian noted, "[t]he noncombat-combat classification
which preoccupied the Americans, British, and Germans
proved an unaffordable luxury to the Soviets."94 After the
war, the Soviet Union reverted to its policy of excluding
women from combat positions.
The Soviet experience holds different lessons for
different people. Some use the post-war exclusion of women
as evidence that inclusion of women in combat was a bad
idea. Others argue that the fact that so many Soviet women
served valiantly demonstrates the capacity of women. The
truth may lie somewhere in between. Just as numerous
Soviet women served bravely, so too did numerous German
fifteen-year-old boys and fifty-year-old men. Both Soviet
938. TURNEY-HIGH, supra note 47, at 159.
939. D'Ann Campbell, Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in
the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 57 J. MIL.
HIST. 301, 318 (1993).
940. Id. at 319.
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and German personnel practices were a mark of
desperation, and, as such, the lessons that they teach are
not fully extendable to the wisdom of such practices when
the country is not in extremis."4' It is probably fair to say
that if the United States were invaded by a highly trained
army that caused massive casualties to our forces and that
threatened the very existence of the nation-as the Soviet
Union was in 1941-public sentiment and military
necessity would support the participation in combat of
women, as well as of many other groups currently excluded
from the military. The question is not whether there are
conceivable circumstances in which it would make military
sense to include women, but whether it makes military
sense at this particular time and place.
B. Who Should Bear the Burden of Proof?
The choice is difficult because it requires an assessment
of the tradeoff between the uncertain risk to national
security of making fundamental changes in the culture of
combat units, on the one hand, and, on the other, furthering
a social imperative that, in the end, would probably benefit
only a limited number of women.94 -
-Martin Binkin
The somewhat speculative nature of predictions about
female combat performance raises the question of the
appropriate placement of the burden of proof. Should
proponents of integration bear the burden of proving that
women would not degrade military effectiveness or should
the opponents bear the burden of proving that they would?
This is a difficult, and perhaps, given the uncertainties, an
outcome-determinative, question.
941. Thus, contrary to Campbell, the fact that American women were not
placed in combat when women of other countries were, may tell us more about
the desperate plights of those countries than it does "about gender roles in
America." Id. at 302.
942. BIN, supra note 295, at 166.
943. The burden of proof issue was touched upon by the Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. Addressing the
Commission, Commissioner Charles Moskos said:
You raised a question, Mr. Chair, where the burden of proof
should lie. Other things being equal, you say, well, then let
equal opportunity triumph. Well, most of the evidence that
we've heard here-and there will be some debate about the
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Proponents of sexual integration are certain that
inclusion of women in combat will advance the goal of
sexual equality, at least as they define it. The range of their
possible beliefs about the effects on combat effectiveness
extends from the view that inclusion will enhance
effectiveness, to its not harming effectiveness, to its not
harming it enough to prevent integration. Opponents
believe that inclusion of women will reduce combat
effectiveness and, in light of that belief, generally tend not
to tarry long on the question of sexual equality, viewing
that as a concern subordinate to military effectiveness.
Partisans on both sides would, of course, like to place
the burden on their opponents. There are probably two
principled arguments-in addition to less-principled
tactical reasons-for their preferences. First, it makes sense
to place the burden of proof on the party making an
unusual or facially implausible claim. Proponents of placing
women in combat tend to believe that most of the relevant
differences between the sexes are artifacts of socialization
and that it is unlikely that there are intractable biological
differences that would stand in the way of integration. They
attribute suggestions of inherent sex differences to the
same kind of irrational prejudice that excluded blacks from
the military. Opponents, on the other hand, tend to believe
that differences between the sexes are more likely to be
fixed and relatively resistant to change and that it is the
assumption of interchangeability that is improbable. They
rest their argument in part on the universal cultural
pattern of relying primarily on men for defense, in addition
to physical and psychological differences that are widely
believed to have a biological basis.
In light of the evidence presented in this article, it
appears that it is the claim of interchangeability that is the
implausible one. Large average differences exist between
the sexes, and, without regard to the individual traits of the
people involved, integration itself has substantial effects
degree-is that mixed-gender units, particularly as it gets
closer to the combat area, have lower deployment rates,
higher attrition, less physical strength, more sexual activity,
higher costs, et cetera, et cetera. It would seem to me the
burden of the proof would be on the side of saying equal
opportunity is of such significance that we're going to override
some of these costs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMIB'N, supra note 67, at 47.
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simply because men and women interact differently
together than men do with other men.
The second reason for different views of where the
burden of proof should lie are differences in the perceived
risks of error. Where the costs of error are asymmetrical,
the party advocating the position that is likely to cause the
greater harm if wrong should bear the burden of proof.
Proponents of women in combat seem to believe that the
harm caused by erroneously excluding women is greater
than the harm of erroneously including them, while
opponents seem to believe just the opposite.
What is the cost of erroneously concluding that women
should be excluded from combat? Proponents of integration
would identify primarily two-one tangible, the other less
so. First, individual women, even if only a few, who wish to
serve in combat are unable to do so, which has, they say,
adverse career consequences to female military personnel.
Second, all women suffer from exclusion because it
represents a kind of second-class citizenship; thus, all
women, not just women in the military, are harmed by a
refusal to integrate. Opponents, in contrast, would argue
first that there are unlikely to be many individual women
who have both the desire and the ability to participate in
combat, so the quantity of disappointed aspirations is
relatively low. Moreover, they would challenge the assertion
that the combat exclusion impairs their prospects for
promotion. Further, if integration results in combat service
being a prerequisite to promotion for both sexes, then it will
be more difficult for the many women who do not want to
serve in combat to be promoted. Finally, they would dispute
that the combat exclusion represents any more a form of
second-class citizenship than barring individuals on the
basis of age or mental or physical limitations.
What is the cost of erroneously concluding that women
should be integrated into combat positions? Opponents of
integration would argue that if their arguments are right
and erroneously rejected, the resulting reduction in military
effectiveness will be measured in human lives and a
reduced ability to achieve our strategic objectives in the
event of conflict. Moreover, a loss of confidence in military
readiness may result in reluctance to intervene militarily
when it is in our strategic interest to do so, or a concern
about female casualties may cause us to fail to act in
circumstances in which we would be willing to accept male
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casualties."s Proponents may respond that the United
States is the world's only superpower, so even if we guess
wrong and our military effectiveness is reduced, a moderate
degradation of combat effectiveness is unlikely to cause the
United States to lose a war it would otherwise win." Even
if sexual equality costs some lives, it is a price worth
paying. After all, we are willing to expend American lives in
the cause of freedom overseas, so why should we not expend
them in the cause of equality at home? Moreover, if
integration caused us to be a little more reluctant to employ
military force, that can only be a good thing, although that
is, of course, an argument for military weakness generally.
The burden-of-proof question ultimately boils down to a
relatively stark choice: Is it better that some lives be lost
than that some women be unfairly excluded from combat?
Or is it better that some women be unfairly excluded from
combat than that some lives be lost? That is obviously a
highly value-laden question, so in a sense there is no "right"
answer. However, it is a question that to date most
proponents of integration have, not surprisingly, declined to
acknowledge. The argument that it is better that some lives
be lost than that some "qualified" women be excluded from
combat is not one that can successfully be made in the
political arena."' Thus, most proponents simply refuse to
acknowledge that they might be wrong, because once they
acknowledge the possibility of error, the potential tradeoff
of lives for equality must also be acknowledged.
944. For a warning about potential adverse consequences of undue
emphasis on limitation of casualties, see Karl W. Eikenberry, Take No
Casualties, PARAIETERS: U.S. ARIYWARC.Q. 109, 116-17 (Summer 1996).
945. Cf van Creveld, supra note 81, at 67 (noting that "experimenting with
women in combat is a luxury Israel simply cannot afford").
946. Academics come closer to making it. See, e.g., WOOEN SoLDMRs: IMAGES
AND REALITIES, supra note 11, at 3-4 (complaining that "if some women would
choose to be soldiers, denying them this possibility... asks women to sacrifice
whatever individual opportunities they expect to find in military service and
whatever collective advantage they might gain by participating in it, for the
sake of a common good"); PEACH, supra note 57, at 165 (complaining that the
argument that the military "must not be used for social experimentation to the
degradation of its war-fighting capability" is in essence an argument that
"national defense takes priority over rights and justice").
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CONCLUSION
Those in charge of the modern military, especially
civilian leaders, generally assume that the frictions created
by sexual integration are "cultural." Under this view, all it
takes is "leadership" to re-educate males and disabuse them
of their unfortunate beliefs. But it should not be forgotten
that "[tlhe art of command is the art of dealing with human
nature."947 As Lord Moran has noted, "[tihe soldier is
governed through his heart and not through his head."
9 48
Thus, one should not place excessive faith in the outcome of
attempts to overcome problems of integration through
indoctrination aimed at altering men's cognitive beliefs.
The content of the "leadership" that is deemed the
answer to the problems of integration is generally
unspecified. Invocation of better "leadership" as the solution
seems to rest on an unstated syllogism: (1) with adequate
leadership, X would not be a problem; (2) X is a problem; (3)
therefore, leadership is inadequate. In this syllogism, X can
be sexual harassment, fraternization, lack of unit cohesion,
concern about favoritism and double standards, or anything
else. Thus, the Harrell and Miller RAND study could
conclude that "gender integration is perceived to have a
relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale"
but "other influences, such as leadership and training, are
perceived as being far more influential."949 Yet the initial
premise, while assumed, is left unexamined.
The focus on "leadership" assumes that competent
leaders could eliminate the problem. Yet, there is little
discussion about what a leader might actually do. Anita
Blair, chairman of the Congressional Commission on
Military Training and Gender-Related Issues,95 captured
an important truth when she stated, referring to sexual
contacts among recruits, "I do not think it is possible to
create mature judgment in 18 and 19 year olds within the
time of basic training (seven to ten weeks), even if one
947. LORD MORAN, supra note 313, at 183.
948. Id.
949. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 13, at 99.
950. See supra note 713.
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exercised leadership nonstop."95' Thus, the belief that some
characteristic of military leaders will be capable of
eliminating the effects of fundamental features of human
psychology is based purely on an unstated, and probably
unsupportable, assumption.
The resort to "leadership" as the answer is consistent
with much of the feminist literature, which assumes that
resistance to women in these positions is a result of
misogynistic attitudes.952 Assuming that these attitudes are
conscious beliefs encourages the view that it is possible and
practical to convince men that they should be indifferent to
the sex of their combat compatriots, an assumption that
necessarily rests on an erroneous view of men and women
as largely interchangeable and motivated by the same
factors.
The standard view today seems to be that men need to
be "educated" out of their "masculinity." But if this view is
correct, then perhaps women need to be educated out of
their "femininity." The male traits that many feminists
today decry are present because the traits contributed in
the past to male reproductive success. Put another way,
men are the way they are because women, over the course
of thousands of generations, have chosen men who display
these traits.953
Some have argued that it is important to fully integrate
the services to make them reflective of the society that they
serve, and they perceive danger in too great a gulf between
the military and civilian society. At some level, there can be
danger, both to the military and to society from such
estrangement, but necessarily there must be some gap. As
Jean Yarborough has observed:
Although the military defends the principles of democratic society,
951. HoUSE ARMED SERVICES COMEMITEE, supra note 652.
952. Some have even managed to inject race into the issue. Linda Bird
Francke repeatedly blames women's problems in the military on "white males."
FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 188, 243, 253-55, 260. She even manages to blame
the "white male club" of the Army for its reluctance to open combat jobs to
women, notwithstanding the substantial presence of blacks in the Army
throughout the ranks, including at the time, the Secretary of the Army Togo
West (not to mention former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin
Powell). The singling out of white males is particularly puzzling in light of the
total absence of any showing by Francke that white men hold more traditional
views of sex roles than, say, black or Hispanic men.
953. Buss, supra note 104, at 211-14.
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it cannot fully embody them. Its end is victory, not equity; its
virtue is courage, not [social] justice; its structure is authoritarian,
not pluralistic.
It has been observed by many proponents of women in
the military that the problem with women in the military is
men in the military." The problem, however, derives from
qualities of both women and men. There are real individual
differences between men and women that make women,
overall, less-effective combat personnel. Moreover, groups
function differently depending upon the sex of members of
the group. But men in the military are a necessity, and
there is a real possibility of an all-male military; no one
argues seriously that we should--or even could-adopt an
all-female military. Thus, the critical point is not where we
should point the finger of blame, but how we get the most
effective military possible.
Opponents of reliance on the findings of psychology-
especially evolutionary psychology-in public policy
discussions often accuse its practitioners of committing the
"naturalistic fallacy," that is, reasoning from "is" to "ought,"
from what is "natural" to what is "good." But to say that
certain behavior derives from biological predispositions is
not to endorse it. Murder,956 rape,9 sexual harassment,. 8
and child abuse959  are all products of our evolved
psychology, but no one suggests that because of that fact we
should not try to reduce their prevalence. Similarly, to
argue that resistance of men to inclusion of women in
combat units has a biological basis does not by itself
suggest that we should just live with it, although it may
suggest that alteration of those feelings may be harder to
achieve than many have supposed.
If it is fallacious to conclude that something is good
because it is natural, it is equally fallacious to argue that
954. Jean Yarborough, The Feminist Mistake: Sexual Equality and the
Decline of the American Military, POL'Y REv. 48, 52 (1985).
955. See FRANCKE, supra note 6, at 26 (noting that "[tihe combat issue was
never about women but about men"); Kornblum, supra note 10, at 424 (stating
that "[tihis problem is men's problem, not women's").
956. MARTIN DALY& MARGO WILSON, HoMICIDE (1988).
957. Jones, supra note 491; RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMR, A
NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000).
958. Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment, supra
note 4.
959. Daly & Wilson, supra note 858, at 281-82; Jones, supra note 857.
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because something is bad it is not natural-or as ethologist
Irend.us Eibl-Eibesfeldt has called it, the principle that
"what ought not be, cannot be."96 It is a mistake to ignore
the findings of psychology simply because we disapprove of
what we learn. Although much that is written here will be
interpreted by some as critical of women-e.g., the
suggestion that women are, on average, less capable
warriors than men-many of the suggestions about male
psychology are no more flattering. It is suggested here, for
example, that men in combat are motivated more by a need
to prove themselves as men than by an ideological
commitment to serve democracy. This may be viewed as
inconsistent to an extent with the myth of the patriotic,
selfless warrior. On the other hand, if women are clamoring
for entry into combat positions because it will advance their
careers, that motivation seems hardly more noble. It is also
suggested here that jealousy can be important human
motivator9 " and even that some men like to kill. But if
these are the motivators of men, pretending they are not
will not change that fact.
The importance of individual combat motivation is well
understood by the military but is largely glossed over in
discussions of sexual integration. John Keegan has
observed:
Each [the British and American armies] has tended to find itself
speaking with two voices about the problem of human behaviour
in battle: with a newly found private voice, which admits that
everything ultimately rests with the ordinary soldier's 'motivation
to combat' and with a traditional public voice, the one heard in
military academy leadership lectures, which continues to
emphasize the primary role of discipline and command.
62
It is past time for integration of these two "voices."
We should proceed more cautiously in assessing the
proper role of women in the military, especially in light of
the potential costs of being wrong. We should also guard
against an arrogance that convinces us that we are the first
society wise enough to recognize that men and women are
interchangeable in combat roles, given that the mankind's
960. EIBL-EIBESFELDT, supra note 416, at 186.
961. See generally DAVID M. BUSS, THE DANGEROUS PASSION: WHY JEALOUSY
is AS NECESSARY AS LOVE AND SEX (2000).
962. KEEGAN, supra note 318, at 53.
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vast experience with warfare has been to the contrary.
What might seem a good idea when viewed only through
the lens of a particular conception of equality might look
different if the potential costs in human lives are added into
the equation. Testifying before the 1992 Presidential
Commission, a Gulf War mechanized infantry commander
captured an important point:
It has been said that in combat the important things are simple,
and the simple things are difficult. We are making this more
difficult by doing that. This is not Olympic diving. We do not get
extra credit for adding an extra degree ... of difficulty.
9 6 3
While some of the arguments presented here relate
specifically to the question of women's combat service,
others are relevant to the broader question of whether
women should be widely integrated into even "non-combat"
positions. It may be time for a "ground up" review of the
entire question of women's military service.
There is a largely unrecognized urgency about these
issues. They may seem not terribly pressing because there
is no major war clearly on the horizon, and the seemingly
never-ending array of small-scale operations may provide
the opportunity to test women in combat and in positions
increasingly close to combat. In small numbers, the results
are likely to be inconclusive, especially if we massively
outgun our enemy. Results are especially likely to be
misleading if the women are an unusually elite group and
general conclusions about women's capacity to perform
militarily are drawn from the performance of this group.
But what happens if we keep moving in this same direction
and a few years from now find ourselves engaged in a major
conflict with large numbers of women in combat positions?
If it turns out that it really does not work, will the people
find out about it? If the "great experiment" is acknowledged
to be a failure, the nation's military and civilian leaders will
have to acknowledge their sacrifice of the lives of the
nation's sons and daughters in a misguided pursuit of their
vision of "gender justice." There is little in the history of
this nation or any nation that makes such an admission a
likely prospect. Instead, regardless of actual performance,
the experiment will almost certainly be labeled a success.
963. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 67, at 65.
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Both the civilian and military leadership should
establish as a high priority the greater understanding of
the social dynamics of sexual integration. They should be
genuinely open to the possibility that fundamental
psychological differences between the sexes differentiate
them in terms of combat capability, so much so as to
stimulate a rethinking of the role of women in the military.
Serious consideration should be given to the effects of
integration on the culture of the military and the long-term
consequences of those effects, and serious respect should be
paid to the views of men who have actually served in
combat. What have heretofore been described as malleable
"attitudes" should be recognized as having a deeper and
more fundamental origin. Regrettable though these
propensities might be in the eyes of some, they must be
taken into account, at least by those who believe that
combat effectiveness is the ultimate measure of the
military.
